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4 NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARYT
he three papers in this volume investigate the same
subject matter, the procyclicality of banking sector
behaviour, from three different perspectives.
Banks are said to behave in a procyclical way when
their lending, the stringency of their credit rating policy
and provisioning practices as well as their profitability
move in correlation with the economy’s short-term busi-
ness cycles. During a cyclical upswing, banks tend to be
excessively optimistic about the economy and hence
their customers’ position and to advance loans against
poorer collateral (possibly overrated due to asset price
bubbles created during the cycle), as well as to reduce
the applied risk premia and to allocate less loan-loss re-
serves to cover expected risks. At the same time, there is
usually an upsurge in banks’ profitability during a
boom.
However, the heady optimism of a cyclical upswing
vanishes once the business cycle turns down and eco-
nomic conditions become less rosy, causing formerly hid-
den shortcomings to become visible. At such times banks
may incur disproportionately large provisioning bur-
dens, which can undermine profitability and worsen
their capital situation. Banks will typically respond by
an excessive cut-back in lending, often declining loans
even to enterprises which have maintained their credit-
worthiness despite the cyclical downturn. Thus, when
times get hard, banks may start to behave in a way that
further aggravates the situation. Cutting back sharply on
lending may even result in a credit crunch, i.e. a major re-
striction of credit, while the shortage of reserves and the
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Foreworderosion of earnings potential and capital may, in extreme
scenarios,evenprecipitateasystem-widebankingcrisis.
Thus, procyclicality in banking may contribute in its
own right to the volatility of economic trends, increasing
the amplitude of economic cycles. As this is a harmful
trend from the point of view of financial stability, central
bankers, responsible for financial stability, have the task
of exploring the causes of procyclical behaviour, gaining
thorough knowledge about its nature and, if necessary,
mitigating it by regulatory means (or if the required
means are not available within central bank regulatory
instruments, promoting the creation and adoption of
such).
Guided by this objective, the economists of the
Banking Department and Regulatory Policy Department
oftheNationalBankofHungaryhaveattemptedtoexam-
ine procyclicality in banking behaviour from a number of
perspectives. The following three papers do not aspire to
explore all facets of the problem, wishing only to make
some contribution to the ongoing research on the sub-
ject. Thus, none of the studies deal with the actual prog-
ress of and experiences with historical lending cycles in
great detail, and they do not (or only to a limited extent)
make any specific proposals. Although all three papers
focus on procyclicality, they differ significantly in terms
of their approach and the issues dealt with.
Balázs Zsámboki, author of the first paper of the vol-
ume, focuses on some regulatory aspects of banks’
procyclical behaviour. He begins with a look at the real
economic role of bank loans and a description of the ef-
fects on monetary transmission. He then analyses the
real economic implications of lending cycles, concentrat-
ing on the effects on small and medium-sized enterprises,
the importance of demand and supply factors and the im-
plications of changes in lending standards.
This is followed by an assessment of the relationship
of the current and proposed Basle capital regulations,
6 NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARYand accounting and provisioning principles to
procyclical behaviour. The author points out that regula-
tory shortcomings, perverse incentives generated by the
system and problems arising from asymmetric informa-
tion significantly influence the rate of credit growth, the
composition of the lending portfolio and, indirectly, the
correlation between and prospective development of the
banking system and the real economy.
The second paper in the volume, by Katalin Mérõ,
deals both with the depth of financial intermediation and
banks’ procyclical behaviour. It seems justified to link
these two subjects as the catching-up economies (includ-
ing Hungary, of course), which exhibit a very low level of
financial intermediation in global comparison, may in all
likelihood need to deepen financial intermediation to a
significant degree in order to facilitate the sustainable
economic growth necessary for the catching-up process.
Thus, the strong credit expansion seen in these countries
may not be merely the consequence of procyclical lend-
ing behaviour, but also that of an unavoidable financial
deepening. Hence, the two effects cannot be separated.
Consequently, the regulatory dilemma posed by the pro-
posed restriction of financial institutions’ procyclical be-
haviour in these countries is a much more complex issue.
The primary conclusion of the paper is that in the catch-
ing-up countries (which have a low level of financial in-
termediation) effective regulation should be based on a
regulatory framework that focuses on qualitative mea-
sures in promoting the development of the sector and its
operation according to international standards rather
than quantitative rules which (may) hamper activity
growth.
The third paper, by Edit Horváth, describes some reg-
ulatory options that may encourage banks to prepare in
due time for a deterioration in loan quality due to
changes in the economic environment. This paper seeks
to pinpoint the specific methodological and regulatory
OCCASIONAL PAPERS 7deficiencies which prevent banks from taking account of
a downturn in economic conditions and which lead to
risk assessment and risk classification assuming that the
current economic situation is permanent. Of the regula-
tory options devised to prevent procyclical behaviour,
such as amendments to the rules on collateral assess-
ment, provisioning and capital adequacy, the paper
takes a close look at “dynamic provisioning” for expected
loss, which also considers the trend of systemic risk. It
presents the conceptual model of dynamic provisioning,
the main obstacles to its widespread implementation, in
addition to detailed analyses of some specific interna-
tional examples.
We sincerely hope that this volume will promote a
better understanding of banks’ procyclical behaviour
and greater awareness of risk, as well as contribute to
professional thinking about the questions raised in the
volume.
Authors
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ContentsCyclical lending may
have serious real eco-
nomic effects and





in general, regarding the economic role of financial inter-
mediaries and the most important characteristics of their
activities. In this paper the cyclicality of banks’ lending
practices is examined from several perspectives. This
facet of banks’ behaviour deserves special attention, as
cyclicallendingactivitiesmaywellhaveseriousimplica-
tions for the real economy. Consequently, all factors
which amplify the cyclicality of lending may represent
risks to both the macroeconomy and financial stability.
Thepaperfocusesonthesefactorsandtheeffectsofbank-
ing regulations, in particular.
When analysing the cyclical nature of lending, the
first step is to examine the importance of bank lending for
the efficient operations of the economy and the role credit
plays in the monetary transmission mechanism. Chapter
One discusses these issues. Separate sub-chapters deal
with the real economic effects of lending cycles on small
and medium-sized businesses, the importance of supply
and demand factors, and the possible consequences of
changes in credit standards. In addition, the analysis
also devotes space to examining how lending cycles de-
velop in response to a change in economic regime. As an
example, the paper provides an overview of lending prac-
tices in the European Union, paying particular attention
to developments in the banking market in recent years.
The reasons for this special treatment are that the creation
of EMU has brought about radical changes in the finan-
cial markets of member states, and that these changes
will likely affect Hungary as well.
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1  IntroductionChapter Two looks at lending cycles from the per-
spective of banking regulation. Following an introduc-
tion to the basic principles of banking regulation, the pa-
per presents an evaluation of the Basle Capital Accord,
the capital standard accepted world-wide, shedding
light on the deficiencies and perverse incentives of the
current system. A separate sub-chapter deals with the ef-
fects of the latest Basle recommendations on bank capital
and banks’ lending activities, as well as on their cyclical
lending behaviour, placing the main emphasis on the
likely consequences. This chapter also discusses ac-
counting issues as well, as a large part of banking regula-
tion affects this field.
Chapter Three analyses provisioning against loan
losses, a possible ‘antidote’ to procyclical bank lending,
from both economic and regulatory perspectives.
The paper concludes with a short summary.
14 NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARY2.1 The effects of bank loans
on the real economy












conomic literature generally explains the existence of financial
intermediaries with transaction costs and information asymme-
try. Harmonising the different preferences of savers and borrowers
entailsatransactioncostinrespectofthematurity,denomination,li-
quidity and other parameters of loans. Beyond this, there exists an
information asymmetry between savers and borrowers, which may
lead to serious problems in the lender-borrower relationship, espe-
cially,ifthelenderisunabletoadequatelywatchitscustomer(moni-
toring), or the customer is unable to differentiate himself from other,
possibly lower-rated, clients (signalling), and borrowers may find it
impossible to obtain financing. All these phenomena lead to the rise
of financial intermediaries, who make the flow of funds between sav-
ers and borrowers more efficient and are able to mitigate the prob-
lems mentioned above. These institutions include banks, which
have an information advantage over other economic agents in re-
spect of judging the quality and creditworthiness of customers. Nev-
ertheless,itshouldbeemphasisedthat,albeittoasmallerextent,the
informationasymmetriesnotedaboveexistbetweenbanksandtheir
customers as well, and that financial intermediation may also create
new asymmetries.
The importance to the
economy of transac-
tion costs and infor-
mation asymmetry is
declining, due pri-
marily to the rapid
development of infor-
mation technology
An important facet of today’s financial markets is that the im-
portance to the economy of both transaction costs and information
asymmetry is declining. Naturally, this tends to affect the very exis-
tence of financial intermediary institutions as well as their activities.
The decline in transaction costs and information asymmetry primar-
ily stems from the rapid development of information technology, so
the institutions active in the market, and in particular banks, which
have a relative information advantage, must face up to new chal-
lenges.
Information asymme-
try is still an existing
phenomenon of the fi-
nancial world
Although the decline in their relative information advantage
may affect banks negatively, information asymmetry is still an exist-
ing phenomenon of the financial world. Precisely because of this, a
large proportion of economic research is currently devoted to ad-
dressing these issues, and much has been achieved in recent de-
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2  Lending cyclescades in the analysis of financial markets and the operations of
credit markets, in particular.
1 Most of the research focuses on the
various interactions of real financial relationships
2 going back as far
as the Great Depression. In the literature special emphasis is placed
on the analysis of allocation effects arising from the information
problems facing financial markets. As the imperfect operations of
credit markets have consequences for monetary policy as well, it is
very important for central banks to analyse these issues, especially
in order to better understand the channels of monetary transmission.
A bank credit is a
special product, i.e.
there is no perfect
substitute from the
perspective of either






The relationships between central bank policy actions and the
operations of credit markets are dealt with in the economic literature
on ‘credit channels’ or, using another term, ‘lending view’. These
studies take as their starting point the fact that a bank credit is a spe-
cial product, i.e. there is no perfect substitute from the perspective of
either the bank or the borrower, and that monetary policy directly in-
fluences the developments in bank lending. It is important to stress
that these preconditions must be met in order for the monetary
transmission channel through bank lending to exist.
There are two approaches within the ‘lending view’ literature.
One examines the effects of monetary policy on the balance sheet
structures of borrowers (balance sheet theories); the other looks at
the influences of central bank actions on bank loans (bank loan the-
ories). In both cases, the effectiveness of monetary policy is depend-




have access to exter-
nal finance
At the core of balance sheet theories is the view that the bal-
ance sheet structure influences the opportunities to have access to
external finance, as lenders fundamentally rely on information which
can be derived from balance sheets and other financial statements
when assessing debtors’ creditworthiness. Central bank decisions on
interest rates have an impact on a given firm’s net worth (as rising in-
terest rates negatively affect borrowers’ cash flow due to higher in-
terest payments, and reduce the value of their collateral as well), so
they affect firms’ creditworthiness, too. Banks take into account all
these influences, and build them into risk premia, thereby influenc-
ing the demand for and supply of loans.
The operations of
firms that are heavily
dependent on banks,
and the real eco-
nomic consequences
of these are funda-
mentally determined
by changes in the
bank lending market
By contrast, bank loan theories investigate (i) the extent to
which a bank loan can be deemed as unique, (ii) whether there are
substitutes for bank loans in the financial marketplace, and (iii) at
what price and for which sectors or firms these substitute products
are available. As the various economic sectors depend on bank fi-
nance to various degrees, the operations of firms that are heavily de-
pendent on banks, and the real economic consequences of these are
fundamentally determined by changes in the bank lending market.
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1 One of the most comprehensive studies on the subject is Gertler (1988).
2 A substantial portion of the literature analyses the relationship between the depth of financial
intermediation and economic development, and generally demonstrates a strong correlation be-
tween these two factors. For a discussion of the literature and conclusions for the Central and East-
ern European countries, see Méro (2002), included in this volume as well.2.1.1 The effect of lending cycles








Small and medium-sized businesses and households are particu-
larly heavily exposed to banks’ lending decisions as they have no
access to alternative finance at all, or only at a prohibitive cost.
3 The
high costs of entering the capital market, coupled with mandatory
disclosure requirements, mean that borrowing from non-bank







At this juncture, it is important to emphasise the special role
small banks play in financial intermediation – as small firms are gen-
erally financed by small banks, the effect of the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism, realised through the lending channel, may be
stronger and may affect smaller economic agents more sensitively in
countries where small institutions dominate the banking sector.
The explanation for small banks’ leading role in this market
segment is that they provide finance based on longer-term relation-
ships, very often personal contacts. By contrast, large banks gener-
ally offer standardised loans, which they provide to firms after con-
sidering various financial indicators. However, there has been a
structural rearrangement in the financial markets world-wide. One of
the characteristics of these changes is the increase in the number
and average value of bank mergers and acquisitions. An examina-
tion of this issue raises the question of the likely consequences of
small banks being taken over by large ones, and whether this threat-
ens small businesses’ access to finance.
In most countries, there is a very strong financing relationship
between small banks and small businesses. Table 1 illustrates the
strength of this relationship in the United States.
Strahan and Weston (1996) point out that the data indicating a
strong relationship between small banks and small businesses can-
not be examined statically, given that, by taking over small banks,
OCCASIONAL PAPERS 17
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Table 1
Portfolio Shares of Small C&I Loans
Per cent
Banks by Asset Size Small C&I Loans / Total
C&I Loans
Small C&I Loans / Total
Assets
< $100 million 96.7 8.9
$100 million to $300 million 85.2 8.8
$300 million to $1 billion 63.2 6.9
$1 billion to $5 billion 37.8 4.9
> $5 billion 16.9 2.9
Source: Strahan and Weston (1996)
3 These arguments are valid for larger companies as well in countries with underdeveloped capi-
tal markets.large ones seize the opportunity to lend. If, however, it is not worth it
for a large institution to lend to small businesses, it means that small
banks enjoy a cost advantage in providing finance to this segment of
the market, i.e. they can operate profitably in this market sector,
even over the longer term. In other words, the demand of small busi-
nesses for loans creates small banks’ raison d’être. This is sup-
ported, for example, by the experience of the United States, where
the proportion of small business loans in existing small banks’ port-








shocks for their cus-
tomers…
…and are able to pro-
vide funds even if no
other channels for ob-
taining finance are
available
Looking at the issue from a broader perspective, bank-based fi-
nancing appears to be advantageous mainly for industries or eco-
nomic sectors where information asymmetries are strong. One ad-
vantage of bank finance is that banks mitigate the effect of economic
shocks for their customers as their interest rates are less volatile than
market rates (‘smoothing effect’), and that banks are able to provide
funds even if no other financial intermediary institutions or channels
for obtaining finance are available.
4 Moreover, the securities mar-
kets, an alternative source of obtaining finance, are not always liquid
enough for businesses to satisfy their funding needs. However, aside
from the potential liquidity problems of the capital markets, the real
difficulty for small and medium-sized firms is that often they are not
able to bear the high costs of entering the capital market, and so are







Examining the relationship between monetary policy and bank
lending, not only loans to small businesses but those to individuals
as well are peculiar from a certain perspective. Experience shows
that loans to individuals are generally much more sensitive
to changes in monetary policy than corporate loans. De Bondt
(1999) demonstrated that this is particularly valid for Germany,
France and Italy. In these countries, there is a strong transmission
through the lending channel. De Bondt (1999) believes that the exis-
tence of a balance sheet channel is primarily demonstrable in Ger-
many and Italy.
18 NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARY
The effects of prudential regulation on banks’ procyclical behaviour
4Inconnectionwiththis,Duisenberg(2001)pointsoutthatthestrongdependenceofsmalldebt-
ors on banks and their sensitiveness to the imperfections of credit markets explain the general phe-
nomenon of the banking system that, in cases of monetary tightening, the ratio of small business










Analysing banks’ lending activities, it is often difficult to see whether
an expansion or contraction of lending is attributable to changes in
the demand for or supply of credit. Furthermore, provided that both
play a role, what are the relative weights of these factors? If, for ex-
ample, the decline in the supply of credit is sharper than that in de-
mand for loans, it means that restrictions on lending may exacer-
bate the economic downturn. Such episodes of credit crunches
were observable, for example, in the United States from the second
half of the 1980s. Large losses on lending affected banks’ capital
positions quite negatively in the period, and this contributed to the
perceptible curtailment of lending.
However, examining the role of demand and supply factors in
lending cycles, Berger and Udell (1994) found that the supply-side
effect was not significant in the USA at the end of the 1980s. They ar-
gue that the contraction of credit supply had a major impact on the
real economy in Japan and a smaller one in the Scandinavian coun-
tries.
...Which causes a de-
cline in lending, ris-
ing margins and a
significant rearrange-
ment of portfolios
A marked lending cycle was observable in Australia in the pe-
riod 1986–1993. Examining the lending cycle, Tallman and
Bharucha (2000) found that the robust expansion of lending, ac-
companied by narrow margins, was followed by an unfavourable
turn in economic conditions, a drastic decline in lending, huge loan
losses, rising margins and a significant rearrangement of portfolios.
Those banks that had larger-than-average problem assets cut back
on lending by more than the broad average and reduced the growth
rates of their risk-weighted assets. While the growth rate of outstand-
ing loans remained positive overall, the adjusted balance sheet total
often fell, i.e. banks made a shift towards low-risk loans within total
lending. In other words, banks’ profitability and capital strength did
indeed have an effect on their lending decisions. Rising margins, in
turn, dampened demand, so the forces on both the demand and sup-
ply sides served to reinforce the downturn.
Procyclical lending is
also explained by the
cyclical changes in
demand
Analysing the case of Spain, De Lis et al (2000) explain
procyclical lending by the cyclical changes in demand, in addition to
supply-side factors. One of the expansionary forces on demand is
the fact that in the upward phase of the economic cycle borrowers
generally spend more on products that entail a higher financing re-
quirement. On the consumer side these include consumer durables
and investments in residential property, while on the corporate side
these include business-related investments. At the same time, how-
ever, borrowing not only assists the purchase of real goods but that
of financial investments as well, which are not included in the com-
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De Lis et al (2000) maintain that real interest rates are also an im-
portant element of demand for credit. Another factor affecting credit
demand is the change in relative prices, for example, property mar-
ket booms. The latest strong upsurge in lending in Spain is explained
by the country’s preparation for entry into EMU, as well as the result-






which can be espe-
cially dangerous for
stability
It is important to point out that intensifying competition among
market participants may also trigger lending booms. Shrinking mar-
gins and new products resulting from competition attract new cus-
tomers to the market. This phenomenon, however, can be especially
dangerous for stability, as banks are at an information disadvantage
vis-à-vis the new entrants. Since losses only come to light later, this
strong asymmetry may prove to be lasting, and so current assess-
ments of loans may not necessarily give an accurate picture of bor-
rowers’ actual creditworthiness.
2.1.3 The role of non-price factors
in lending cycles
Movements in the de-
mand for and supply
of credit are influ-
enced by develop-
ments in the broadly
defined credit stan-
dards
In addition to interest rates, movements in the demand for and sup-
ply of credit are influenced by other factors, such as developments
in the broadly defined credit standards. The reason for this is that
the ‘prices’ of loans are not only interest rates – various fees and
commissions must also be taken into account.
Prices do not always
have a market clear-
ing function, i.e.
prices do not neces-
sarily bring demand






Moreover, borrowers must fulfil a number of criteria before
loans are granted. Prices, as the theory of asymmetric information
asserts, do not always have a market clearing function, i.e. prices do
not necessarily bring demand and supply into equilibrium.
6 The
prices of loans are often a secondary factor and clients’ creditworthi-
ness as well as other individual, non-price conditions may become
more important when allocating credit. Therefore, banks quite often
opt to tighten the broadly defined credit standards as the main
means of curtailing lending, rather than raising interest rates.
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5Inadditiontothereasonsabove,DeLisetal(2000)emphasisebanks’disastermyopia,herding
behaviour, perverse incentives and principal-agent problems. The explanation for this is that the
market is likely to more easily ‘forgive’ errors if committed by more and, consequently, managers
are encouraged to realise expansive lending policies in times of economic recoveries.
6 Analysis of this phenomenon is primarily in the focus of the theory of credit rationing. See, for
example, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). It should be noted, that this phenomenon may occur not only in
episodes of crisis. The theory treats credit rationing as a general feature of the market as a conse-
quence of the information asymmetry of credit markets. The ‘credit crunch’ phenomenon, which
means a drastic decline in lending activity, is slightly different and is mainly relevant for crisis peri-






A number of studies examine the relationship between the
lending criteria banks require of their corporate clients and eco-
nomic growth. Analysing the characteristics of this relationship,
Lown et al (2000) found that lending drops off following the tighten-
ing of lending criteria, and economic performance weakens as well.
This phenomenon is particularly observable in inventory financing.
Demonstrably, banks generally tighten standards within short peri-
ods, while loosening takes a longer time. Due to this, the decline in
lending also starts to pick up later, only after lending criteria have
been relaxed.
Tightening of credit
standards has a good
predictive power
in respect of the fu-
ture development
of the economy. The
timing of the decline




Data is collected regularly in the USA in respect of changes in
credit standards, based on reports by banks’ lending specialists.
Using this database, Lown et al (2000) showed that in 1998, in the
aftermath of the Asian and Russian financial crises, lending criteria
were tightened strongly in the United States, leading to a decline in
lending in early 1999. The same pattern was observable in the period
1973–1975 as well as in the early 1990s, when banks reported a
tightening of credit standards, and subsequently there was a large
drop in lending. Out of the last five recessions in the USA, four were
preceded by a tightening of credit standards; consequently, this has
a good predictive power in respect of the future development of the
economy. However, the authors also pointed out that it is difficult to
separate demand and supply effects in the case of credit standards,
as reports by lending specialists show that the timing of the decline
in demand for credit and the tightening of credit standards coincide.









Examining the relationship between credit aggregates and eco-
nomic performance, Asea and Blomberg (1997) also demonstrated
a stable procyclical link between these two factors. The authors ana-
lysed the relationship between banks’ lending criteria and the cycli-
cal changes in unemployment in the United States. For this analysis
they used data from 483 banks, examining the contractual terms of
nearly two million loans granted between 1977 and 1993. According
to their findings, there are systematic changes in credit standards.
During cyclical downturns, banks require higher risk premia and
more collateral. At times of economic expansion, the reverse is true,
with the added feature that the average size of loan increases as well.
Consequently, deficiencies exist not only in times of recession, when
counter-selection increases (i.e. bad loans crowd out good ones),
but during economic expansion as well, when bad loans are ex-
tended along with the good. During these periods of economic up-
turn, even customers with higher default risks have access to financ-
ing, so changes in lending criteria influence the performance of the
real economy as well and contribute to excessive risk taking, which
then sooner or later reverses the cycle. Asea and Blomberg (1997)
emphasise that changes in credit standards usually accompany the
entire economic cycle.
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From the studies mentioned above we can draw the conclusion
that excessive expansions and contractions of lending may well
have real economic implications. At the same time, the question
arises as to what extent financial cycles or, in more serious cases, fi-
nancial crises could be a trigger of real economic crises. Eisenbeis
(1997) maintains that the economic history of the United States pro-
vides evidence for real economic recessions leading to financial cri-
ses in many cases; however, the process is not observable in reverse
– financial crises do not necessarily cause real economic recessions.
However, if the crisis erupts during a recession, then that may
worsen the economic conditions and prolong the crisis.
In periods of financial
crisis, the distortions
of the financial inter-
mediary system
grow more intense
A related issue is that not only a decline in outstanding loans
can cause a further real economic recession during financial crises,
but also the fact that during such periods the distortions of the finan-
cial intermediary system (deterioration in the lender/borrower rela-
tionship, asymmetric information, etc.) grow more intense, and thus
obtaining finance becomes more difficult for borrowers. Bernanke
(1983) points out that the Great Depression is a good example of the
negative implications of the distortions in financial markets.
However, these assertions should be treated with care, as interrela-
tionships that were valid in the past are not necessarily true today,
when the information asymmetry between economic agents is less
and the cost of access to information is lower than a couple of de-
cades ago.
2.2 The effects of the change in economic
regime on bank lending – experiences of EMU
The Economic and
Monetary Union can
be interpreted as a








as are those of the
EMU member states
Theoretical interrelationships are often invalidated if radical
changes take place in the real economy or the financial sphere over
a short period. The birth of the Economic and Monetary Union is an
example of such a fundamental change, which can be interpreted as
a kind of change in the economic regime in the European financial
marketplace. As it is one of Hungary’s most important objectives to
become a member of EMU as soon as possible after joining the EU,
it is worth examining the changes that have taken place in the Euro-
pean bank loan market over recent years, and especially to see
whether the change in economic regime has had any impact on
lending cycles. Naturally, these events are too recent to allow firm
conclusions to be drawn. Presenting the initial experiences, how-
ever, may be useful, especially because the Hungarian financial
market is characterised by the dominance of banks, as are those of
the EMU member states. Therefore, analysing the developments in
the lending market may yield a number of useful lessons.
22 NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARY
The effects of prudential regulation on banks’ procyclical behaviourThe important economic role of loans in the European Union is
demonstrated by the statistics of the ECB (2000), which show that
the ratio of banks’ corporate lending to firms expressed as a percent-
age of GDP was 45.2% in 1999, while the figure for corporate bonds
was only 7.4%. In the USA these ratios were 12.6% and 29%, respec-
tively. In other words, banks’ role in financing the economy is much
greater in Europe than in the USA. The balance sheet total-to-GDP
ratio is further evidence of this, being 175% in the euro area, com-
pared with just 99% in the USA.
The way in which
monetary policy ex-
erts its influence, and






in the banking sector
In line with the earlier remarks, the ECB (2000) points out that
the way in which monetary policy exerts its influence and the effi-
ciency of transmission both strongly depend on developments in de-
mand and supply and structural factors in the banking sector. These
latter include the level of competition, the preferences for the maturi-
ties of loans and deposits, the adjustability of interest rates, the vari-
ous risk premia, as well as administrative regulations and costs.
Household and corporate sector borrowing rates follow the trends of
market rates fairly closely, although the variability of bank rates is
much lower; consequently, the smoothing effect mentioned earlier is
observable here as well.
The primary external
source of finance for
non-financial corpo-
rations operating in
countries of the euro
area is bank loans
The primary external source of finance for non-financial corpo-
rations operating in countries of the euro area is bank loans, al-
though the role of bank lending has fallen somewhat in the past de-
cades.
7 A large proportion of loans are long term – nearly 70% of
them are for periods of more than one year, and the original maturity
of more than a half of all loans is longer than 5 years (ECB, 2001a,
Table 2).
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7 At this juncture, it should be noted that if the structure of financing shifts gradually away from
bankloanstoequityandbondfinancinginacountry,thentheemphasisonwealtheffectswithinthe
consequences of monetary policy actions will be greater. The explanation for this is that changes in
interest rates affect the prices of financial and real goods, and through the wealth effect, firms’ and
households’ creditworthiness as well.
Table 2
Financial structure of non-financial corporations*
Per cent
Euro-area USA Japan
1997 1998 1999 1999 1999
Liabilities 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Loans 30.0 27.2 23.3 5.4 38.9
Trade credit and advance payments re-
ceived 10.7 9.8 8.3 7.8 12.4
Securities other than shares 3.1 2.8 2.4 10.6 9.4
Shares and other equity 51.7 56.3 62.6 70.2 33.8
Other liabilities 4.5 3.9 3.3 6.1 5.5
Source: ECB (2001c)
* Debt securities and shares are valued at market prices.Convergence towards
EMU has promoted
the expansion of lend-
ing
Taking into account that the prices of debt securities and
shares rose significantly in the period 1997–1999, the table obscures
the fact that there was a robust increase in loan and bond liabilities in
volume terms. Although the revaluation effect reduced substantially
the weight of loan and bond liabilities within total liabilities, the ratio
to GDP of non-equity borrowing actually rose. Lending growth fluc-
tuated around 10% in the period under review, which, after taking in-
flation into account, corresponds to a very significant real increase of
some 7%–8% (ECB, 2001a). There were a number of factors behind
this high rate. The majority of these were linked to the change in eco-
nomic regime – EMU convergence brought about low interest rates
and a favourable economic environment in the region, together with
increased M&A activities, all of which contributed significantly to an
expansion in lending. At the same time, however, one-off factors
also had an influence on the overall picture, in particular the financ-
ing requirements of UMTS licences, which also caused a consider-
able lending expansion.
According to the ECB (2001a), EMU convergence brought real
interest rates down to around 4% by the end of the 1990s, creating
favourable conditions for borrowing. However, economic growth ta-
pered off in the second half of 2000, and real interest rates rose
above 5%. As a consequence, lending activity also fell somewhat.
Calza et al (2001) demonstrate that economic growth and the real
interest rate level taken together are good explanatory variables of
developments in real lending in the euro area, and their model based
on this finding provides a good description of the fluctuations in lend-
ing within the EU.
However, since the birth of EMU the expansion of lending
has exceeded the level forecast by their model, despite falling a little.
Some of the reasons for this are the pick-up in corporate
investments outside the EU, for which, in a number of cases,
banks provide the finance, and the increase in property and land
prices, in addition to the telecommunication projects already men-
tioned.
The procyclical be-
haviour of bank lend-
ing is characteristic in
the European Union
as well
The slight drop in lending has affected the various economic
sectors unevenly. Whereas annual growth in corporate borrowing re-
mained above 10% in 2000, growth in consumer credit and housing
loans declined, in line with the theory discussed earlier. The decline
in demand for housing loans can be explained partly by rising inter-
est rates and partly by a slower increase in property prices. All these
developments show that the procyclical behaviour of bank lending is
characteristic in the European Union as well. However, in its early
stages EMU, which can be regarded as a change in the economic re-
gime, helped prevent the decline in economic growth from leading to
a large-scale contraction of bank lending.
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Nevertheless, the changes in regimes affecting financial mar-
kets need not only be macroeconomic by nature, but can also in-
clude changes in the regime in terms of banking regulations. Such a
process resulting in sweeping changes was the liberalisation of fi-
nancial markets in the 1970s and 1980s, which led to considerable
credit expansion. However, the creation and widespread use of
standardised international capital regulations can also be interpreted
as a change in the economic regime, being a kind of coun-
ter-reaction to the operational problems of liberalised financial mar-
kets. The next chapter is an overview of the impact of these regula-
tory changes on banks’ lending activities.
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The Basle Committee
on Banking Supervi-




porated into the na-
tional regulation of
the OECD countries
and then into the na-
tional regulation of
other countries
within a few years
T
he significant differences that existed between the various inter-
nationalframeworksforbankregulationnecessitatedtheformu-
lation of a regulatory framework based on uniform guidelines, bear-
ing in mind competitive neutrality for the institutions operating in the
liberalised market. The capital adequacy standards issued by the
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision in 1988 adopted a uni-
form methodology to measure banks’ regulatory capital and
risk-weighted assets. Within a few years, the new capital standards
were incorporated first into the national regulation of the OECD
countries and then into the national regulation other countries.
In the United States, which had played a key role in the formu-
lation of the Basle principles, the Fed approved the risk-based capi-
tal calculation guidelines as early as 1988, with the date of applica-
tion set for 1992. This left the banks with sufficient time in which to
make the gradual transformation required by the new regulation. In
this way it was possible to implement the regime change without the
banks suffering any shocks. The adjustment first of all called for a
strengthening in the banks’ capital position, the results of which are
shown in the Table 3 below.
Its main objective in
establishing the new
standards was to pro-
mote a level playing
field from a pruden-





In the period prior to the introduction of risk-weighted capital
regulations, national authorities in general imposed a single capital
ratio on all banks, broadly in terms of a proportion of their balance
sheet totals. The Basle principles provided some additional stan-
dards in relation to credit risk. The Committee’s main objective in es-
tablishing the new standards was to promote a level playing field
from a prudential perspective to regulate the banks participating in
international financial markets, thereby removing the possibility of
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 and cyclicality
Table 3
Weighted percentage of banks that would have failed
the total capital requirement and the average total CAR
Per cent
Q1 1990 Q2 1991 Q4 1992
CAR<8% 29.5 9.1 0.6
CAR, average 9.8 10.8 12.5
Source: Grenadier and Hall (1995).
Note: Banks are weighted by asset size.arbitrage between differing national capital requirements for banks.
Differences in regulation between Japanese and US banks were es-
pecially salient. Adoption of the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) pro-
vided a universal approach to measurement of capital, which






ing to arbitrage be-
tween financial
sectors
While the regulatory differences between countries have largely
disappeared, the difference between bank and non-bank regulation
has remained. In other words, arbitrage has shifted from countries to
financial sectors. Widespread securitisation of bank assets is per-
haps the best example, which has taken bank lending off balance
sheets.
8 It became clear shortly after the capital standards were in-
troduced that if the focus of the regulations was the institution, then
the activity of those under more stringent regulation would be taken
over by less regulated, or, indeed, completely unregulated institu-
tions. The Basle standards on market risk capital requirements are
already based on the principle that it is not so much the type of insti-
tution that matters but the type of activity. Thus, the standards use
identical principles to regulate both banks and investment firms.
The shifting of risk to
non-bank institutions
is a motivation for
regulators to make
bank capital more
sensitive to the risk
taken
The shifting of risk to non-bank institutions is a motivation for
regulators to make further refinements in lending risk standards, in
order to make bank capital in every sector of activity more sensitive
to the risk taken, in other words, to establish a closer alignment of
regulatory capital with ‘economic capital’, which is used to cover ac-
tual losses.




due to financial inno-
vation
The introduction of uniform capital measurement standards
was also an urgent task because the type of activity and risk under-
taken by banks has changed significantly due to numerous financial
innovations, and banks have not always had capital of sufficient size
and quality to cover the latter. Carr (2001) points out that on-
balance sheet capital ratios have been declining steadily, from 35%
in the 1860s to around 4% today. This has caused a sharp rise in the
probability of failure, the costs of which are often borne by taxpayers
or deposit insurance funds.
Asymmetry in terms
of gains and losses
raises the issue of
moral hazard
It is a typical feature of banking that depositors, shareholders
and management all prosper during a boom. When times are good
banks offer higher interest rates to depositors to ensure funds for
lending, shareholders may hope to earn higher dividends thanks to
higher profitability and management takes home high salaries and
bonus payments. On the other hand, when banking is loss-making,
the depositors normally have no cause for concern as they are pro-
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8 As far as the size of the arbitrage is concerned, Clementi (2001) found that non-mortgage se-
curitisation amounted to USD 200 billion for the ten largest American bank holding companies, ex-
ceeding 25% of the risk-weighted loans of these institutions.tected by either explicit or implicit deposit insurance. Shareholders’
liability is limited to the capital invested and management is not fi-
nancially liable (unless there has been a criminal offence). This
asymmetry in terms of gains and losses raises the issue of moral
hazard. This is because shareholders have the option of leaving the
bank to the creditors (depositors), while the creditors can similarly
shift the problems onto the taxpayer or the deposit insurance funds.
9
Although this paper does not wish to discuss the issue of government
bailout of banks or the problem of ‘too big to fail’, we would like to in-
dicate how crucial capital is to ‘absorbing’ losses so that the parties
concerned do not exercise the aforementioned options. Thus, the so-
cially optimal level of capital lies above the privately optimal level of
bank capital. In Carr’s (2001) definition, economic capital is optimal
for shareholders and regulatory capital is optimal for the taxpayer.
This concept has been recognised by the Basle Committee in its
move to broaden the definition of regulatory capital to include other
capital elements, in addition to the capital shown in the accounts,
with the aim of taking it closer to the socially optimal level.
3.2 The economic effects
of the current regulations
After regulation was
introduced in the
United States and Ja-
pan, there was a de-
cline in lending and a
reallocation of bank
portfolios
Numerous studies have analysed the effects of the Basle regula-
tions, with mixed results (e.g. Hall 1993, Grenadier–Hall 1995,
Ito–Sasaki 1998, Jackson 2000, Furfine 2000). Studies on the
United States and Japan, for example, clearly reveal that after regu-
lation was introduced there was a decline in lending and a realloca-
tion of bank portfolios in the direction that could have been pre-
dicted in the light of the regulatory incentives. Grenadier and Hall
(1995) showed that in the USA low-risk securities and mortgage
loans increased in weight, simultaneously with a drop in the propor-
tion of corporate and commercial property development loans. In
the period between 1988 and 1992 securities as a whole increased
by 12% in annual terms, with mortgage loans increasing by 11.3%.
Commercial property loans rose by 2% and consumer lending re-
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9 Following Merton (1977), it is now a common theorem of economic literature that deposit in-
surance can be viewed as a put option for a bank’s assets. In the event of failure, shareholders ‘sell’
their assets to the deposit insurers (or the state). The exercise price equals the sum of the insured
deposits. This option represents a positive value for the bank on which the insurance premium is
paid. The value of the option can be raised by banks increasing leverage and/or asset volatility. If
the insurance premiums contain no risk premium, then these incentives might influence banking
behaviour considerably.mained virtually flat (0.5%). C&I loans even exhibited a negative
trend (–2.6%).
10
Furfine (2000) came to a similar conclusion regarding the ef-
fects of the current Basle regulations. He shows that there is clear ev-
idence of a shift from lending to securities-based financing in the
USA. Banks shifted away from lending to increase their securities
holdings, a move reflected in the fall of the bank portfolio share of
corporate loans from 22.5% to 16%, simultaneously with a rising pro-
portion of government securities from 15% to 25% between
1989–1994. Thus, the early 1990s witnessed a real credit crunch in
the United States. (See Table 4)
The change in capital
requirements gives a
good explanation for
all the portfolio shifts
It should be born in mind that the American economy was in a
slump in that period, making it difficult to judge whether the shift in
the portfolio composition was due to a rise in capital requirements or
to weaker demand for credit. Furfine (2000) points out that the real-
location of portfolios started before the recession and was still there
for one or two years after the recession ended. Moreover, during pre-
vious recessions (1974–1975 and 1982) there was no evidence of
similar restructuring. The study demonstrates that the weaker de-
mand for credit does not by itself explain the decline in lending,
whereas the change in capital requirements gives a good explana-
tion for all the portfolio shifts. In other words, US banks responded





sition of their assets
Prior to the introduction of risk-based capital regulation, banks
were only able to improve their capital adequacy by reducing assets
or raising additional capital. In contrast, the new framework enables
them to achieve this by changing the composition of their assets.
This is the case for on and off-balance sheet items.
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10 ‘C&I loans’ are largely comprised of lending to non-financial private enterprises, and as such
roughly correspond to ‘corporate lending’ under Hungarian terminology.
Table 4







Mean 0.40 1.10 1.30 0.13 1.70
Standard deviation 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.10 0.70
Maximum 1.30 2.30 2.50 0.20 2.40
Minimum 0.04 0.30 0.50 0.01 0.80
Source: Grenadier and Hall (1995).As noted above, the upsurge in mortgage-based residential
lending was also one of the consequences of the portfolio realloca-
tion. Grenadier and Hall (1995) point out that the capital require-
ment still appears to be excessive when compared to default rates in
this market segment, and the incentives have encouraged banks to
gradually shift from direct mortgage lending into the secondary
mortgage market.




aged to shift towards
riskier items
A sign of the rigidity in the current Basle regulations is that de-
spite large differences between commercial property loans in re-
spect of write-offs, i.e. losses incurred on industrial and retail loans
being lower than those on office and hotel loans, the Basle standards
classify them into the same risk category. Thus, when loans with a
similar risk weighting are concerned, banks are encouraged to shift
towards riskier items.
11 In this way, they can take more risk without
increasing their level of capital and, consequently, charge higher
premiums on their loans.
As regards the issue of writing off losses, it should be
noted that, as long as the stock of lending is increasing, figures
will tend to underestimate the true rate of the losses, while the re-
verse is true when lending is falling. It should also be taken into
consideration that since banks write off certain types of loans faster
than others, the data do not necessarily give a true picture of the
losses.
A major shortcoming
of the current Basle
regulations is that
they fail to take into
account the advan-
tages arising from di-
versification…
Another major shortcoming of the current Basle regulations is
that they fail to take into account the advantages arising from diver-
sification. As suggested by Grenadier and Hall (1995), lending
losses can be reduced by as much as 50% through greater geograph-
ical diversification.
12 The authors also point out that while the reallo-
cation of portfolios carried out in response to regulation has reduced
the risk of failure, it has also increased interest rate risk and the bal-
ance sheet term structure risk. Therefore, the supervisory authorities
must also consider whether an apparent improvement in risk might
be due to a reallocation from one type of risk to another.
…or a great number
of financial innova-
tions
An additional serious weakness is that the current regulatory
framework does not take account of the many financial innovations
over the past decade and does not adequately recognise the role of
such innovations in increasing or lowering risk in the current system.
To eliminate these shortcomings, for years the Basle Committee has
been engaged in drawing up new capital standards, submitting its
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11 Had capital requirements been better aligned with the risks, property market investment
probablywouldnothavereceivedbankfinancingonsuchalargescale,consideringtherathervola-
tile returns on such investments. The low capital requirement of short-term interbank loans must
have been one of the factors at work in the strong lending to Asian countries during the pre-crisis
years.
12 Needless to say, geographical diversification is only one of numerous diversification options.
For a more detailed description of the risk-reduction and efficiency-boosting effects of loan portfo-
lio diversification, see Morgan (1989) and Gollinger-Morgan (1993).proposals for a comprehensive professional debate. The next sec-
tion describes the current and prospective regulations, together with
an analysis of their likely impact.
3.2.1 The effect of the Basle standards
on banks’ procyclical behaviour
Prudential regulation
can also amplify or
weaken procyclical
bank behaviour
When evaluating the Basle principles, this paper focuses on issues
crucial to financial stability, examining whether banking regulation
is a contributory factor in amplifying the fluctuations of the business
cycle. As suggested by the preceding sections, although banks’
procyclical behaviour is a general phenomenon, from a stability
point of view it is crucial to examine its impact on the real economy
and the financial environment. Past experience suggests that pru-
dential regulation can amplify or weaken procyclical bank behav-
iour. As current regulation focuses mainly on determining the ade-
quate level of capital, it is through this mechanism that regulation
makes its effect felt.
Banks’ capital should
change in line with
the economic cycle
Ideally, the regulatory framework should be devised so that
capital reserves can be built up during the profitable years in order to
ensure that banks’ capital position remains adequate when there is a
recession and the unexpected losses are written off against capital.
In other words, banks’ capital reserves should change in line with the
economic cycle, since during a slump, when profitability is low,
banks will run into significant difficulties in their search for new injec-
tions of capital. The question is whether the current and new ap-
proaches ensure that capital reserves are built up before they are
needed.
Procyclicality occurs
when the capital and
provisions held by
banks are not suffi-
cient to cover risks at
the time of an eco-
nomic downturn
Looking into the relationship between regulation and
procyclical lending, a study by the ECB (2001b) claims that
procyclicality occurs mainly when the capital and provisions held by
banks are not sufficient to cover risks at the time of an economic
downturn or imminent recession; that is to say, at such times banks
are forced to restrict lending so that they can comply with regulatory
requirements. Incidentally, this procyclicality also exists when there
are no minimum capital requirements. This is because when eco-
nomic activity is buoyant banks can typically make more profits,
with the higher profit reserves raising their level of capital, while the
situation is just the reverse during a slump. This will affect bank lend-
ing independently of regulation.
The question is, to what extent regulation itself contributes to
cyclicality and how much the Basle proposals reduce or amplify ex-
isting cyclical effects.
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Analysts’ opinions vary about the extent of procyclicality in the
current system (Jackson (1999), Furfine (2000)). It is certain, how-
ever, that there has been a clear increase in banks’ average capital
adequacy ratio in the period since capital standards were intro-
duced. Within euro-area countries, the ratio rose from 9% in 1989 to
10.6% in 1999 (ECB, 2001b), reaching 10.9% for the 100 largest
banks. As shown by the calculations of Jackson et al, (1999), the
average capital adequacy ratio in the G-10 countries rose from 9.3%
to 11.2% between 1988 and 1996. The resulting higher capital re-
serves dampen procyclicality as banks then have higher levels of
capital to cover potential losses. Moreover, banks seek to hold more
capital than the minimum limit anyway.
In the boom phase,
banks can obtain ad-
ditional capital under
more favourable




In the boom phase procyclicality tends to strengthen, as banks
can obtain additional capital under more favourable terms, which
may give further impetus to their lending. By contrast, during a
downturn capital becomes more expensive and banks often respond
by cutting back lending or shifting towards lower-risk customers.
This is especially true for undercapitalised banks. At the same time,
it is difficult to separate the effect of capital standards from banks’
behaviour during a recession when, prompted by deteriorating cus-
tomer quality, they tend to shift towards lower-risk customers.
It is worthwhile to examine the size of the reduction (increase)
in banks’ balance sheet total that might be caused by a unit fall (in-
crease) in bank capital for the banking system as a whole. As docu-
mented by the ECB study (2001b), the capital-to-assets ratio within
the euro-area countries moved in line with the economic cycles. In
other words, capital acted as a successful shock-absorbing cushion.
This means that a drop (or lower growth rate) of capital did not entail
a similar reduction in assets.
3.3 The possible impact
of the new Basle regulations
on lending cycles
In the future, banks
will be allowed to
adopt an internal rat-
ings-based approach
It has been noted that the current Basle principles are not suffi-
ciently sensitive to risk, which may cause numerous problems in
banking, often leading to distorted incentives. The Basle Committee
has therefore brought forward for discussion within the profession a
proposal for an updated revision of the standards, in order to bring
them into line with the new challenges and to remedy these weak-
nesses. One of the key elements of the new proposals (hereinafter
referred to as Basle 2) is that in the future banks will be allowed to
determine the amount of capital required to cover credit risk, based
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approach the capital requirement is the function of individual cus-
tomers’ probability of default, loss given default and exposure to de-
fault, maturity and portfolio concentration. Needless to say, bank
supervisors will face a major task in testing how realistic the model
parameters are.
Banks with insufficient resources to implement the rather
costly internal rating systems can continue to use the standard ap-
proach, which has been refined to a significant degree so that it is
better able to assess credit risk.
These steps all serve the Committee’s purpose of narrowing the






in an enhanced de-




Altman and Saunders (2001) stress that a capital adequacy
system built around traditional rating principles may be procyclical,
following rather than leading the business cycle, and thus resulting in
an enhanced rather than a reduced degree of instability for individual
banks and the banking system as a whole. Demonstrating that the
capital requirements for the risk categories in the standard approach
do not cover real risks, they propose an alternative risk weighting for
corporate loans.
The 30% shown in the Table 5 is much lower than the 100%
suggested in the first version of the Basle proposal. The latest pro-
posal shows a slightly different version, but also applies a weighting
of at least 50% to the A-rated category and 100% to lower-rated
items.
The customer ratings
suggested in the new
Basle standards
move in line with
changes in economic
cycles
It should be noted that the customer ratings suggested in the
new Basle standards move in line with changes in economic cycles,
which implies higher bank capital requirements when economic
conditions are bad. As client rating depends to a great extent on the
probability of default, as assessed by the banks on the basis of inter-
nal ratings models, which itself changes in correlation with the eco-
nomic cycle, this may intensify the cyclicality of capital require-
ments and lending.
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Table 5
An alternative risk weighting proposal







and B– Lower rating
Risk weights of corporate loans 10 30 100 150
Source: Altman and Saunders (2001).The primary risk of
procyclicality lies in
the inadequate tim-
ing of allocating capi-
tal reserves
This may be of particular significance when a bank’s rating sys-
tem is based on a point-in-time or a short-term assessment of a cli-
ent’s economic situation, and longer-term developments are not
given appropriate consideration. Thus, the risk of procyclicality
lies not so much in allocating larger capital reserves to cover
greater risks, but in inappropriate timing, i.e. risks are not identified
in time.
During a crisis, there
is a significant in-
crease in the volatil-
ity of ratings
External rating agencies are praised for their longer-term ap-
proach, as they ignore short-term changes over the business cycle.
Experience suggests, however, that this is only the case in crisis-free
periods. The Asian and Russian crises provided a great deal of evi-
dence of significant changes in a country’s risk rating and a rise in
the volatility of ratings. Nevertheless, it can be stated with reason-
able certainty that if external rating is pro-cyclical, internal rating is
even more so, because of the shorter time horizon.
13
During a downturn
the value of collateral
declines, which im-
plies that banks must
hold a higher level of
capital, which in turn
reins in lending
Another procyclical effect is that the new Basle regulations
make capital requirements subject to credit-risk mitigating tech-
niques. The best example of this is that collateral changes in value
over the course of an economic cycle. It is common during a down-
turn that the value of collateral declines or, in many cases, even
plunges (as with asset price bubbles, for example). The implication
is that banks must hold a higher level of capital, which in turn reins in
lending. Furthermore, as shown by Clementi (2001), this cyclical
movement is not only true when real property is used as collateral
but also in the case of equipment and inventories, and even the as-
signment of receivables. Small and medium-sized businesses are
particularly vulnerable in this respect, as they can typically offer less
or poorer quality collateral.
Adjusting the capital




the capital of an
undercapitalised
bank
In order to avoid the negative side effects of the cyclical volatil-
ity of capital, banks relying on internal models will have to hold sig-
nificantly larger amounts of buffer capital, i.e. excess reserves, in ad-
dition to the regulatory minimum. In his assessment of the required
size of this buffer, Rime (2001) argues that such excess capital is
needed primarily because adjusting the capital adequacy ratio
would be a costly process, considering that issuing shares could
convey a negative message about the value of a bank when there are
information asymmetries. Furthermore, shareholders are reluctant
to increase the capital of a critically undercapitalised bank, as the
bank’s creditors (depositors) are the primary beneficiaries. Hence,
banks tend to maintain a capital buffer primarily in order to avoid the
need for any adjustment, and the greater the volatility of capital, the
larger the buffer.
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13 Some estimates suggest that in a recession banks’ capital requirements may even double un-
derthenewsystem.Clementi(2001)arguesthatcapitalregulationisonlyonefacetoffinancialsta-
bility,inadditiontovalueaccounting,loanlossprovisioningandliquiditymanagement.(Seelater.)As banks of various sizes and profiles differ significantly in their
access to additional capital, the required capital buffer also varies
considerably, in line with the size of individual banks. Rime (2001)
uses the example of Switzerland to illustrate this point. The Table 6
shows that smaller institutions held nearly 25% more capital than the
minimum requirement. The reason for this is that the shares of small
institutions are less liquid, which makes it more difficult for them to




age banks to hold
more capital
Jokivuolle and Karlo (2001) also use the cost argument to ar-
gue in favour of the need for a capital buffer. If a bank is undercapita-
lised, such costs may arise from more stringent and regular supervi-
sion, damaged business reputation and the threat of the bank being
forced to cut back lending, resulting in a loss of profitability. As
shown above, one of the key consequences of the new Basle princi-
ples is the increase in capital volatility. This raises the probability
that a bank might approach or even dip below the minimum at cer-
tain times. This may be the case especially when IRB models of
high-risk sensitivity are applied. The implication is that given an un-
changed portfolio, the new system will encourage banks to hold
more capital, making reliance on the IRB approach less attractive.
However, if banks are not willing to increase their levels of capital
they can still achieve the same objective by shifting towards less
risky activities. Higher capital and/or lower risk portfolio will en-
hance stability of the banking system, though it will not promote the




average values of the
probability of default,
banks should exam-
ine the longest possi-
ble time horizon
The Basle Committee has naturally recognised the effects of
procyclical capital fluctuations, and has drawn up a number of rec-
ommendations to deal with these. One such recommendation is that
when calculating the capital requirement and determining the aver-
age values of the probability of default, banks should examine the
longest possible time horizon. The effectiveness of this approach is
diminished by the fact that historical data is not necessarily suitable
for forecasting future trends as the financial market itself is changing
exceptionally fast, causing historical interrelationships to become
outdated quickly. An alternative option is to set sufficiently stringent
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Table 6





Big banks 8.06 2.15
Cantonal banks 21.02 6.62
Regional banks 25.16 7.60
Source: Rime (2001).probabilities of future default during the upswing of the cycle. This is
especially true in respect of customers in industries showing a strong
correlation with the business cycle. A third option is to use various
stress testing and scenario analysis methods to model adverse future
developments and then adjust internal model parameters accord-
ingly.
The options suggested above, however, do not always offer a
genuine solution to the problem. The ECB (2001b) lists the following
weaknesses:
In many cases, banks
lack sufficiently long
time-series data on a
given client
1 Adequacy of data: In many cases, banks lack sufficiently
long time-series data on a given client. Moreover, the rapid transfor-
mation of the market environment and the changing market partici-
pants make it even more difficult to acquire and process such data.
Consequently, the IRB model cannot be sufficiently accurate or pru-
dent. These problems may be mitigated somewhat by setting up effi-
cient debtor information systems. This, however, is hampered
by various obstacles to data flows, especially at the international
level.




2 Incentives: In the effort to curb capital costs, banks tend to
underestimate their capital requirements during a boom. By the
same token, it is in banks’ interest to set the IRB model parameters
to ensure the lowest possible capital requirement, which implies an
incentive against prudent assessment. This negative incentive may
be especially significant when banks hold a low level of capital to be-
gin with.
These problems impose an especially great responsibility on
supervisors, calling for stringent control of banks’ prudent opera-
tions. It seems expedient to allow authorities to prescribe higher cap-
ital requirements for banks that are regarded as highly vulnerable to
risk. Another suggested solution is that loan loss provisioning be as-
signed a greater role as a buffer to absorb negative shocks, and that
this be subject to external supervisory inspection.
The task of financing
higher risk customers





Any evaluation of the new Basle principles should draw atten-
tion to the threat of adverse selection, namely that the banks forced
to hold higher capital under the IRB approach than the standard ap-
proach would probably withdraw from financing higher risk custom-
ers. Clementi (2001) suggests that the task of financing higher risk
customers might shift to those banks that lack high-quality risk
management techniques.
The way in which the perception of sovereign debts affects the
rating of customer loans, a factor primarily affecting internationally
active banks, should also be examined. As documented by Ferri et al
(2001), less developed country sovereign debt has often been down-
graded by rating agencies more than was justified, due to individual
unfavourable economic developments. As up to now sovereign debt
rating has represented the upper limit of private enterprise ratings,
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a great deal of volatility into bank capital. Although the new Basle
principles abolish this upper limit, it seems to be a fair assumption
that sovereign debt ratings and corporate ratings will continue to
correlate in the future.
Sovereign debt is
generally sooner up-
graded than is corpo-
rate debt…





Ferri et al (2001) also show that sovereign debt is generally
sooner upgraded as a result of stronger economic performance than
is corporate debt, which adversely affects banks with corporate cus-
tomers. An example of this is the Asian crisis. Individual countries
may be especially hard hit if they are downgraded from the invest-
ment into the speculative category, as this greatly narrows the range
of potential creditors, with many countries prohibiting certain types
of financial institutions from investing in speculative paper. Thus, it
should be noted that to the extent that sovereign rating is procyclical,
corporate lending is also procyclical. Moreover, corporate ratings










Calculations by Ferri et al (2001) suggest that the envisaged
Basle regulations would prescribe lower capital requirements for
banks lending to companies in OECD countries, resulting ina1p e r -
centage point change in the CAR. By contrast, the more stringent
regulations in respect of less developed countries would entail a 1.5
percentage point rise in the CAR. The capital requirement prescribed
for loans to banks would increase in both groups of countries, by 2
and 6 percentage points respectively. As a result, less developed
countries would incur significantly higher costs in raising funds. The
proposed changes and the higher risk weighting would also be disad-
vantageous for Hungary and other lower-rated OECD countries. All
this might increase reliance on raising funds through parent compa-
nies and subsidiaries registered in countries with a better credit rat-
ing.
The impact study carried out by the Basle Committee (BCBS,
2001a) came to slightly different conclusions, suggesting that as EU
country bank portfolios have a relatively small proportion (in the
range of 15–20%) of customers with an A or higher credit rating, the
lower risk weights that can be assigned to them will not effectively
reduce the aggregate capital requirement imposed on loans. The
reason for this is that under a new proposal, customers with low
credit ratings will be given 150% risk weights, in addition to the vari-
ous credit lines, which are subject to higher risk weightings. This will
lead to an increase in capital requirements. A large part of the bank-
ing portfolio, roughly 70%–75%, is not rated in terms of creditworthi-
ness, which implies that the relevant risk weights will remain at
100%.
Looking at the potential consequences of the new Basle pro-
posals, Jokivuolle and Karlo (2001) also point out the difficulty of
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data become largely irrelevant when there are fundamental struc-
tural changes in the system, and Basle 2 can be viewed as precisely
such a change in regime.
As the IRB approach
is not mandatory, it
will only be adopted
by those banks for
which the new sys-
tem will mean a
lower capital require-
ment
The authors of the paper also point out that the IRB approach is
not mandatory but optional for banks. As IRB is costly to introduce, it
will only be adopted by those banks for which the new system will
mean a lower capital requirement, and therefore, a lower cost of cap-
ital. This may reduce aggregate capital for the banking system as a
whole.




As suggested by Jokivuolle and Karlo (2001), implementing
IRB might give a better picture of the state of a bank, but external
participants may have a problem in comparing the capital require-
ment data published by individual banks, as the information to be
compared is no longer derived from a uniform standard, but a large
number of different models. In other words, the absence of standardi-
sation may impair data comparability and, consequently, the as-
sessment of banks’ relative risk conditions.
The greater role of rat-





Jokivuolle and Karlo (2001) argue that, due to the fact that the
banks which are not implementing the internal models will have to
rely on the credit ratings of external rating agencies, the greater role
of such agencies will cut banks’ information advantage, and thus
competitiveness, as less regulated non-bank institutions may also
use external rating agency evaluations in their lending decisions. In-
creasing disintermediation, this process may have an adverse effect
on banks’ interest rate income and profitability. On the other hand, it
may facilitate the emergence of a secondary loan market, thanks to
non-banks’ easier access to credit information. While enhancing dis-
intermediation, this process may have a negative impact on finan-
cial stability, enabling banks to reallocate portfolios more easily and
re-channelling credit to less regulated institutions, which is likely to
increase systemic risk.
The authors also note that the high fixed costs associated with
IRB may promote mergers of small institutions. The same tendency
is likely to be reinforced by recognising reductions in portfolio con-
centration as a risk-mitigating factor when calculating the capital re-
quirement. At the same time, strong diversification may weaken the
incentive to monitor and screen customers, which may pose a threat
to stability.
Nevertheless, there are also advantages to Basle 2, as thanks
to its higher risk sensitivity it provides stronger incentives to deal
with problems quickly, thereby boosting corporate and financial sec-
tor efficiency, at least in the long run.
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and procyclicality






ing tries to approxi-
mate as closely as
possible the value of
assets at the time of
drawing up the finan-
cial statements
Any analysis of procyclicality should also discuss accounting is-
sues, as the valuation and accounting treatment of assets also influ-
ence banks’ behaviour, via profitability. This is a timely issue, due to
the strong controversy about the future course of development in
accounting. The literature gives increasingly greater attention to fair
value accounting, which tries to approximate as closely as possible
the value of assets at the time of drawing up the financial state-
ments, which implies that non-realised profits and losses are also
taken into account. Fair value accounting implies that the value of a
bank’s problem assets will fall immediately, in contrast with histori-
cal accounting where banks have to make reserves for the differ-
ence between the book value and actual value. The relevance of this
for this paper lies in the fact that frequent changes in the value of as-
sets exposed to market price fluctuations tend to amplify capital
volatility, which, as shown above, affects lending cycles.
It provides a more
up-to-date picture of a
bank’s assets at any
point in time, while
allowing enterprises
less latitude to man-
age earnings
One of the benefits of fair value accounting is that it provides a
more up-to-date picture of a bank’s assets at any point in time, offer-
ing better information to investors, bank management and supervi-
sors alike when assessing the financial state of an institution. In addi-
tion, fair value accounting allows enterprises less latitude to manage
earnings in a way that reflects management intentions, in contrast
with historical cost accounting, where the level of reserves depends,
to a certain extent, the decisions of the management.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that if a bank implements fair
value accounting, it still needs to create a certain level of reserves
even if there has been no downgrading of its portfolio, as losses may
materialise later during the year, even before the inflow of excess re-
ceipts from the interest rate premium. Jackson and Lodge (2000)
argue that such reserves should not be classified as capital, as profits
cannot be part of the capital unless they are realised.
However, there are several arguments against implementing
fair value accounting. Following the approach of Clerc et al (2001)
they can be listed as follows:
Fair value accounting
does not reflect ade-
quately the principle
of prudence
1 Fair value accounting does not reflect adequately the princi-
ple of prudence. This is because it treats latent profits and latent
losses similarly, whereas the concept of prudence requires that la-
tent profits not be taken into account, with the exception of profits on
liquid assets.




2 Fair value accounting does not adequately recognise the
specific nature of bank lending. It views banks as portfolio managers
rather than as resolvers of information problems. This is because the
market value of a bank loan is difficult to define due to the underlying
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value accounting can enhance the procyclical character of bank
lending, causing the bank credit market to strongly resemble the
bond market. This implies that at the time of a bond market tighten-
ing banks will not be able to offer an alternative source of liquidity,
given that the economic and financial market developments will
have had a similar impact on their balance sheets as that on the bond
markets.
It raises a number of
practical valuation
and verification is-




3 Fair value accounting raises a number of practical valuation
and verification issues relating to the fair value of non-negotiable
products. Without going into technical details, it should simply be
noted that the valuation of assets is a difficult task not only for banks
but also for auditors and supervisors.
It will increase the
volatility of bank
earnings…
4 Critics of fair value accounting argue that it will increase the
volatility of bank earnings even when banks make no changes in
their activities. This could make capital management more difficult
for banks, raising the cost of capital and even posing a threat to sys-
temic stability.
…and also has impli-
cations for monetary
policy
5 Fair value accounting also has implications for monetary
policy. If changes in interest rates affect banks’ balance sheets due
to fair value accounting, monetary authorities may hesitate before
raising interest rates sufficiently, especially if the banking system is
fragile and the central bank wants to avoid a more serious crisis.
The full-scale intro-
duction of fair value
accounting is not de-
sirable at this point
Jackson et al (2000) suggest that, due to the great number of
uncertainties surrounding fair value accounting, its full-scale intro-
duction is not desirable at this point. Furthermore, the current sys-
tem also has mechanisms that could enable the valuation of bank
portfolios to approximate to the true value as closely as possible.
One way to achieve this could be the development of provisioning
principles and procedures and formulation of relevant international
standards. This issue takes us to the relationship between capital
and provisions, however, which is the focus of the next section.
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tices and their links
with the rules on reg-
ulatory capital
A
n increasing number of studies deal with the analysis of the eco-
nomic consequences of bank capital regulation, with special re-
gard to procyclical effects, but as pointed out by Cavallo and
Majnoni (2001), these papers often disregard banks’ provisioning
practices and their links with the rules on regulatory capital. These
factors should be looked at together, as unless banks make ade-
quate provisions to cover expected loan losses both expected and
unexpected losses will have to be covered by capital. Accordingly,
inadequate provisioning practices could amplify the fluctuations in






their effects on capital
It should be noted at this point that the economic literature and
the Basle regulations hold slightly different views regarding the role
of provisions and capital in covering losses. In terms of generally ac-
cepted textbook approach provisions are made to cover expected
losses, while the purpose of capital is to cover unexpected losses. By
contrast, the Basle regulations make the distinction on the basis of
whether the losses have been identified or not. In this approach, pro-
visions are to cover identified losses, while capital is there to cover
unidentified losses. This discrepancy in approach causes some diffi-
culty in, for instance, the treatment of general risk provisions, which
in part are viewed as provisions (because they are intended to cover
expected losses) but which, according to the Basle regulations, are
part of capital (relating to unidentified losses).
Therefore, it should be emphasised that in its analysis of the ef-
fects of provisioning this paper makes a distinction between specific
provisions and general provisions, as they are made for different pur-
poses by banks and thus fulfil different functions in risk manage-
ment.
Specific provisions
serve to cover pro-
spective identified
losses
Cavallo and Majnoni’s (2001) interpretation, also followed in
this paper, is that specific provisions serve to cover prospective
identified losses. In character, they are similar to credit write-offs,
when identified loan losses are accounted for in banks’ books. Con-
sistent with the European practice, from 2001 items that were previ-
ously called specific provisions will also be recorded as valuation ad-
justments in Hungary.
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4  Provisioning rules
 and cyclicalityExpected losses stem
from normal banking
operations and can
be interpreted as the




signed to cover these
types of loss
Within the category of prospective but still unidentified risks a
distinction should be drawn between expected and unexpected loan
losses. Expected losses stem from normal banking operations and
can, in fact, be interpreted as the mean of the density function of loan
losses. General loss provisions are designed to cover these types of
loss. By contrast, regulatory capital serves to cover unexpected
losses, which can be characterised by the extreme values of the den-
sity function.
14 Needless to say, if a bank does not make adequate
provisions to cover expected losses, then from a risk management
perspective this will impose a disproportionately large burden on
capital.
Cavallo and Majnoni (2001) stress the following as the main
implications of distinguishing between expected and unexpected
losses:
General risk provi-
sions cannot be re-
duced by portfolio
diversification
1 General risk provisions cannot be reduced by portfolio diver-
sification, as they are characterised by the mean and not the vari-
ance of the expected losses. In other words, the same loan implies
the same provisioning requirement no matter whether it is evaluated
individually or as part of a highly diversified portfolio.
The provision require-




2 Due to the above-noted statistical properties, the provision
requirement can be estimated more efficiently than the capital re-
quirement, being less dependent on such statistical properties as the
asymmetry of the probability distribution or the number of observa-
tions. This is also beneficial from a regulatory perspective, as the
provisioning requirement can be defined more simply and accu-
rately than the capital requirement. Hence, it is easier to monitor and
enforce the regulations. This can be a particularly important consid-
eration in countries that lack the adequate quantity and quality of in-




both the income and
expenses sides of the
profit and loss ac-
count
3 From an accounting point of view, it is important that ex-
pected losses receive the same treatment on both the income and
expenses sides of the profit and loss account. If this is not so, banks’
operating income will be distorted. This means that if the expected
loan loss is entered into the interest premium as a credit item but the
general risk provision made to cover the same risks is not recorded
as an expense within the operating income, then banks will be able
to report better results on this item than are justified. Although in
Hungary risk provisions are treated as expenses within operating in-
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14Banks do not calculate unexpected losses, but use the required return on equity as the basis of
lending terms. However, to ensure cover for the expected losses, i.e. to make provisions, banks
must charge a risk premium depending on the size of the risk taken. If the provision is less than the




applying a multiplier, as in the case of market risks.come, there are a number of countries where this item is only entered
(if at all) in the pre-tax income line.
As regulators fre-




provisions at the nec-
essary level
Furthermore, as regulators frequently set upper limits on gen-
eral provisions, banks cannot always make provisions at the neces-
sary level. These restrictions are in place mainly because the ex-
pected losses cannot be documented or linked to individual transac-
tions. They can only be estimated statistically, which may lead to
their manipulation. Consequently, allocating general provisions for
risk may often run into obstacles from a taxation point of view, with
limits imposed on the size of possible deductions from taxes (or the
tax base).
In the longer term it is
more desirable for the
state to provide
banks with the incen-
tive to make ade-
quate provisions to
cover the risks taken
Cavallo and Majnoni (2001) point out that the treatment of gen-
eral risk provisions often follows the evolution of fiscal deficits. This
means that an increase in the deficit will prompt authorities to
tighten taxation policy, which can have a negative effect on
provisioning. However, this could also affect the stability of the bank-
ing system, as the negative economic developments caused by the
absence of adequate reserves may undermine previously sound
banks. The fiscal costs incurred may be substantial, as financial cri-
sis management is shown to be more expensive than prevention.
Consequently, in the longer term it is more desirable for the state to
provide banks with the incentive to make adequate provisions to
cover the risks taken.
With regard to the cyclicality of provisioning, the authors point
out that in G10 countries a strong positive correlation can be ob-
served between general risk provisions and banks’ pre-tax income.
By contrast, banks in non-G10 countries are more likely to create in-
adequate provisions during profitable years and are then forced to
make up the missing provisions during the bad times.
4.2 The role of provisions
in the new Basle regulations
As we have seen, loan-loss provisioning and capital requirements
serve to cover different risk factors. There is a broad-based agree-
ment between banks and the Basle Committee that capital should
be used to cover unexpected losses. During the debate on the new
Basle guidelines, however, banks criticised the suggestion that cap-
ital be used to cover expected losses. When defining the capital re-
quirements for IRB models, the Basle Committee decided not to
change the definition of regulatory capital, which includes general
provisions (or general loan-loss reserves) as well as supplementary
(tier 2) capital.
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tal requirement using
the IRB approach,
banks are required to
generate capital for
expected losses as
well, not only for un-
expected losses
However, it follows from the earlier arguments that this capital
element serves to cover expected (but not yet identified) losses in
normal cases. In other words, the supervisory authorities would want
to require banks to generate capital for expected losses as well, not
only for unexpected losses, when defining capital requirement using
the IRB approach. The reason for this is that in the opposite case, the
bank would use the general risk provisions (which, as mentioned
earlier, continues to be a part of regulatory capital) for double gear-






countries is a source
of problems
The Basle Committee justified its decision to stipulate capital
requirements for both expected and unexpected losses on the
grounds that it wished to avoid problems arising from the fairly differ-
ent approaches to provisioning for losses in various countries.
A fresh study by the BCBS (2001b) raises two rather important prob-
lems surrounding provisioning and capital requirements:




1 The current system of specific provisions involves perverse
incentives, as creating specific provisions reduces capital while
banks are still required to generate capital for the net value of assets
reduced by the amount of provisions. This does not encourage
banks to make timely provisions and disadvantages those institu-
tions that pursue cautious provisioning practices.
The system does not
encourage the cre-
ation of general risk
provisions either
2 The current system does not encourage the creation of gen-
eral risk provisions either, as it is impossible to take full account of
such provisions when calculating regulatory capital, given that there
are two limits – first, general risk provisions may not be higher than
1.25% of the amount of risk-weighted assets; second, tier 2 capital,
which includes this component of the risk provision, may not exceed
core (tier 1) capital. So, it may happen that banks make general risk
provisions to cushion against losses but regulatory capital neverthe-
less falls, due to the above limits. This does not encourage banks to
pursue prudent provisioning practices either.
The Basle Committee recommends, among other things,
that capital requirements related to expected losses be calculated
separately from unexpected losses. Naturally, a precondition for this
is that there be greater harmony across countries in credit rating and
provisioning and that international standards be developed.





losses should be lifted
The BCBS has suggested a number of proposals to modify the
calculation method for EAD (exposure at default), LGD (loss given
default) and SP (specific provision). In addition, it suggests that the
limits to the inclusion of general provisions when calculating a capi-
tal charge for expected losses should be lifted.
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research is being devoted to analysing lending cycles and investigat-
ing how fluctuations in specific provisioning could be ‘smoothed’ to
make the operations of the banking system more stable and bal-
anced, and to reduce the strongly procyclical nature of lending.
As expected losses do
exist even at the mo-
ment a loan is
granted, provisions
for expected losses
can be built right at
the beginning of the
loan period
It is important to note that expected losses do exist even at the
moment a loan is given. Precisely because of this, provisions for ex-
pected losses can be built right at the beginning of the loan period.
This may be especially important if banks make less specific provi-
sions than required in ‘good’ times due to strong cyclicality. This
underprovisioning is characteristic, for example, of Spain, where
banks showed strongly procyclical behaviour in the period
1963–1999, despite significant structural changes. Moreover, the




ples requires the har-
monisation of credit
rating standards
The integration of provisioning principles requires the harmoni-
sation of credit rating standards as well, as these are far from unified
even in the developed countries. There are countries where banks
and auditors are entrusted with developing the standards, and there
are others where the standards are defined in detail, although even in
these latter countries the standards are not yet uniform. Claims 90
days overdue are generally qualified as non-performing. However,
there are countries where rating is not conditional upon delay, but
credit rating is defined on the basis of the likelihood of repayment (in
principle, the Hungarian practice is similar to this). There are even
OCCASIONAL PAPERS 45
The effects of prudential regulation on banks’ procyclical behaviour
Table 7
Spanish economic cycles
1963–1975 1976–1986 1987–1991 1992–1996 1997–1999
Annual real growth rate
of loans
Of which:
11.4 0.3 9.2 0.5 13.1
– Mortgage loans 13.7 1.2 15.8 8.1 16.4
– Other loans 10.9 0.0 7.1 –3.3 10.7
GDP 5.8 1.8 4.3 1.4 3.8
Residential investment 5.0 –2.2 4.6 1.6 6.0
Non-residential investment 9.2 –0.6 11.2 0.3 8.5
Durable goods 7.7 0.7 6.5 0.0 11.6
Net acquisition of financial
assets (% GDP) – 18.2 19.1 13.6 20.4
Average real interest rates
of loans –2.4 0.0 10.1 7.6 3.6
Housing price index – – 13.0 –4.4 4.9
Source: de Lis (2000).greater differences in building provisions and their taxation than in
credit ratings.
Importantly, though, if provisions generated for expected
losses are treated inadequately from the taxation perspective, then
banks’ profits are higher than justified. This may be harmful from the
point of view of prudence, as larger profits allow larger dividend
payouts, which in turn reduce banks’ solvency. Furthermore, if the
total costs of a loan are not taken into account, managers are in-
clined to underprice loans at times of expansion, given that banks








A number of solutions, both theoretical and practical, have
been suggested to smooth the cyclicality of provisioning and prevent
systemic risks. The increasing popularity of dynamic provisioning
deserves special mention. However, the presentation of this ap-
proach is not the purpose of this study.
15
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15 These issues are discussed in Horváth (2002), with special emphasis on the theoretical and
practical aspects of dynamic provisioning. The analysis is available in this volume.A
nalysing the cyclical behaviour of bank lending reveals that, in
addition to micro and macroeconomic factors, prudential regu-
lation also significantly affects banks’ operations, and this may well
have serious real economic consequences. Lending expansions or
contractions should not be examined in isolation – the accompany-
ing risks, developments in credit standards and possible changes in
risk awareness should also be taken into account.
The potential real economic consequences of an excessive ex-
pansion of or a cutback in lending affect the various sectors of the
economy differently. Therefore, it is important to examine not just
the absolute measures of total lending, but also its distribution. We
have seen that regulation has a key role in the development of
banks’ portfolios. Taking into account that the extent of outstanding
loans and their structure both have a strong impact on economic
agents’ behaviour, it is of utmost importance from the perspectives
of macroeconomic and financial stability to understand the reasons
for the cyclicality of bank behaviour.
This paper has attempted to contribute to the better under-
standing of the interaction between the banking system and the real
economy, and of the direction of future developments, by giving an
overview of the imperfections of the system, the conflicting incen-
tives generated by the system, and the problems stemming from in-
formation asymmetry.
As monetary transmission realised through lending affects the
various sectors differently, and it may have numerous negative im-
plications for small firms in particular, a better understanding of the
mechanism of the credit channel and the characteristics of, and rea-
sons for, lending cycles is important from the perspective of mone-
tary policy. There are a number of suggestions, as well as practical
solutions, for mitigating the potential problems that may arise from
the cyclicality of lending. Of these, cautious, forward-looking princi-
ples for calculating capital and provisions deserve special mention.
The purpose of this study was not to draw up recommendations for
regulation. However, by giving an overview of the literature, it is
hoped to contribute to the academic debate on the issue, which, if
necessary, may help well-founded decisions to be reached in this
area.
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ContentsT
his study focuses on the relevance of certain conclu-
sions about the role, depth and character of financial
intermediationforthreeEast-Central-Europeantransition
economies (Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland,
hereinafter: ECE3), as these conclusions – while gener-
ally accepted – appear to be more or less contradictory in
the case of these countries.
The two conclusions under investigation can






1 The depth of financial intermediation and eco-




2 Due to its special characteristics, financial interme-
diation – and in particular bank lending – tends to be
procyclical in nature, as in periods of economic upswing
banks are more willing to extend credit to clients and
tend to accumulate lower credit risk provisions on their
exposures than would otherwise be reasonable, as they
often become overly optimistic about their clients’ busi-
ness prospects. If subsequently the economic situation
deteriorates, the solvency of their clients also falls, and
banks are suddenly confronted with increased risk
provisioning requirements. These factors lead to a decline
in banks’ profitability and capital base, automatically
triggering more rigorous credit evaluation and a further
squeeze in their lending activities. Accordingly, upturns
in the business cycle are accompanied by a growth in
credits and banks’ profitability, while downturns in the
business cycle can be characterised by more drastic than
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1  Introductionnecessary credit squeezes and falling earnings, due to
banks’ overreaction to their clients’ deteriorating posi-









Naturally, these two statements relate to different
time horizons – the first applies to long-term economic
development, while the second pertains to the short term.
Thetwostatementsco-existpeacefullytogetherinmarket
economies, where the level of development of financial
intermediation and the overall state of economic develop-
ment correspond well. In these countries financial inter-
mediation has already deepened significantly, and thus
financial depth can be viewed as an indicator which cor-
rectly reflects the state of development of economy as a
whole.
While financial deepening has also been a historical
process in these economies, this deepening has generally
occurred as a trend, and not as a series of sporadic credit
booms. In those cases, banks’ procyclical behaviour can
clearly cause serious damage, an extreme manifestation
of which can be the emergence of a credit crunch or even
a systemic banking crisis. This problem has recently be-
come one of the key elements in theoretical approaches to
financial stability. Numerous studies have been pub-
lished analysing this particular topic
1 in detail and sev-
eral possible regulatory responses to this problem have
been outlined as well.
In economies where significant deepening in finan-
cial intermediation has not yet occurred, i.e. where the
trend in financial depth must change, these two conclu-
sions and their resulting regulatory and behavioural im-
plications may inevitably contradict each other (the
ECE3 economies analysed in this study in more detail,
but generally speaking, the economies of former socialist
countries should be placed in this category). In these
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1 The special volume published by BIS (2001/a), containing 18 essays, is perhaps the most
authoritative of these.countries, the liberalisation of the financial intermedia-
tion system and its development towards market confor-
mity has a very short history. Compared to developed
countries, financial depth in these countries can be con-
sidered quite low, and it is quite certain that in order to
support sustainable economic growth there is an abso-
lute need for a significant deepening of financial interme-
diation. Thus, in the case of these countries, vigorous
credit expansion can be treated as a consequence not
only of the procyclical stance of the banking sector, but
also as an unavoidable consequence of the deepening in
financial intermediation, and these two aspects cannot







This is one reason that the implementation of regula-
tions of an anticyclical character does not necessarily
lead to a beneficial smoothing in the business cycle. On
the contrary, serious damage could be caused by this ap-
proach by limiting the pace of financial deepening and
thus restraining the longer-term trend of the economic
growth.
At the same time though, if financial deepening
is not accompanied by appropriately prudent behaviour
in the banking sector, then for less developed, less
well-regulated and subsequently more vulnerable bank-
ing sectors (compared to those functioning in developed
countries), the danger of a credit crunch or a systemic
bankingcrisisconstitutesaphenomenonofanevenmore
threatening character. Consequently, for these countries,
the issue of regulatory alternatives aimed at restraining
the procyclical attitude of financial institutions is more
complex, and the evaluation of proposed alternatives re-
quires a different system of criteria as well.
The following chapter contains a short overview
of the relationship between economic growth and finan-
cial depth. The third chapter highlights the main obser-
vations on the procyclical character of the banking sector
as well as the possible regulatory responses. The fourth
chapter analyses the depth of financial intermediation
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cade following the change of regime in their socio-
economic management. In the fifth chapter we try to
answer the question raised as the point of departure – is
financial intermediation in the ECE3 procyclical or due
to deepening. The last chapter presents the conclusions.
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T
he last decade has seen a wealth of publications analysing the re-
lationship between economic growth and particular features of fi-
nancial systems. Postulation of a relationship between economic
growthandfinancialdepthcannotbeconsideredabrand-newdiscov-
ery, as this was one of the cardinal points of Schumpeter’s develop-
ment theory. According to the theoretical stance advocated by
Schumpeter, the engine and prime mover of economic development
has always been the entrepreneur who is permanently striving to gain
profit by applying new combinations of factors of production. In order
to achieve this, the entrepreneur needs funding that can be obtained
through the money market.
2 According to this view there is a direct,
causal relation between economic growth and financial depth – eco-
nomic development generated by new combinations of production
factors (i.e. that portion of production growth, which is due not only to
the mere quantitative expansion of production factors, as this does
notconstituteanintegralpartofthedefinitionofdevelopmentaccord-
ing to Schumpeter’s theory) is naturally accompanied by financial




tion plays a key role
in Schumpeter’s
development theory
According to Schumpeter’s theory, in order to satisfy entrepre-
neurs’ demand for credit, banks assess the risks of firms requiring
outside funding, measuring their creditworthiness and, acting on be-
half of society in general, selecting those companies which are con-
sidered worthy of receiving loans. Hence, economic growth is un-
imaginable without the active participation of the banking system
(or more broadly, the system of financial intermediation) and the
more faster this growth is, the more active a financial intermediation
system (deeper financial intermediation) is needed. Theories ex-
tending their investigations into the costs of information and transac-
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2 According to Schumpeter’s theory, the definition of capital has a special meaning, as it is noth-
ing else than a means by which factors of production could be transferred into new domains or by
which new direction in production can be determined. This clearly shows that capital is the sole
source of financing innovation and economic development. Accordingly, the definition of money
and capital market also differs from that which is generally accepted as in Schumpeter’s theory the
principalvocationofmoneyandcapitalmarketistheallocationandcirculationofcreditsforfinanc-
ing development.tions, and refusing to suppose the existence of perfect competition in
markets, have led to conclusions similar to Schumpeter’s.




According to these theoretical models, information and trans-
action costs can be reduced with the aid of institutions conducting fi-
nancial intermediation, and thus the existence of these intermediar-
ies increases economic efficiency and fosters economic growth. Ba-
sically, by mobilising savings, diversifying risks, and channelling
savings into new projects as well as by monitoring the projects fi-
nanced, financial intermediation helps lower information and trans-
action costs. For example, the essay of Diamond (1996) on the spe-
cial role of financial intermediation can also be viewed as a theoretical
work on this topic. Diamond derives the raison d’etre for the financial
intermediation system from the need to minimise the costs of acquir-
ing the information required to constantly appraise and measure each
project financed by funds obtained from banks. According to Dia-
mond’s essay (and similar to Schumpeter’s theory) a bank is an or-
ganisation which plays the role of an intermediary between enter-
prises and savers. Nevertheless, while in Schumpeter’s theory, the
main task of an intermediary is to correctly select suitable projects for
financing, Diamond focuses on the monitoring of projects financed by
bank loans, a task delegated especially to the banks. Thus, in his
view, a bank is an agent which – acting as an observer on behalf of the
savers – continuously analyses and supervises firms’ activities and
their ability to repay the loans, in exchange for remuneration in the
form of a monitoring fee. He highlights the fact that as long banks fi-
nance an adequately large number of projects, this monitoring func-
tion delegated to the banks leads to lower costs for society as a whole
because borrowers’ default is far less frequent. Consequently, accord-
ing to this train of thoughts, the existence of the financial intermedia-
tion system fosters more efficient use of the resources available to the
society. Hence, Diamond’s model of financial intermediation also im-
plicitly contains the idea of a relationship between financial intermedi-
ation and economic growth.
A better understand-
ing of risks promotes
technological devel-
opment
Within the domain of economic literature there is also a wide
range of theoretical works on the role of financial intermediation in di-
versifying credit risk, which serves as a guarantee for every saver
against repayment failure of individual investment projects. Levine
(1997) stresses that by diversifying credit risks, it is possible not only
to assist and foster capital accumulation, but at the same time to pro-
mote technological development. Financial intermediaries – acting
as risk analysts – are constantly trying to gain technological advantage
by identifying the risks with increasing accuracy and are thus continu-
ously discovering new, profitable market niches. On one the hand,
those developing technological advantages reap the profit, and
on the other hand, successful innovation accelerates technological
development.
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noted that the aforementioned examples do not imply that a peace-
ful consensus has been achieved in the professional literature re-
garding the relationship between economic growth and the financial
system. On the contrary, according to mainstream development
economics, the driving forces behind economic growth are to be
found in the real sphere of the economy. In development theories
which presuppose perfect market competition, the economy has no
need for a financial intermediation system whatsoever. Accordingly,
classical theories of development economics generally ignore finan-
cial intermediation – indeed, they do not treat finance as an exoge-




tance of the evolution
of appropriate forms
and methods of capi-
tal allocation
The importance of the relationship between economic growth and
financial development has also been stressed by several studies in
the field of economic history, although this topic is approached from
a totally different standpoint in these cases. The most well known
and often cited among these is perhaps the conclusion of Hicks that
it was not the emergence of technical innovation, but rather the evo-
lution of appropriate forms and methods of capital allocation that
paved the way for the industrial revolution in England. Long before
the industrial revolution occurred all the products and technologies
which are its hallmarks had already been invented. But in order to
realise production on a mass scale, a dimension of capital concen-
tration and the existence of risk sharing techniques were necessary,
and only the appearance of joint stock companies could assure this.
Thus, even in Hicks’ theory, one necessary precondition for the oc-
currence of the industrial revolution and the economic growth seen
in that era was the active role played by the system of financial in-
termediation in the form of liquid capital markets.
The Netherlands
Rousseau and Sylla also reached the same conclusion, after
thoroughly examining the relations between financial systems and
economic growth in the economies of the Netherlands, England,
Germany, France, the United States and Japan, within the frame-
work of small case-studies on these countries. Rousseau and Sylla
define a properly functioning financial system with five criteria.
4
Among countries they investigated, the criteria of a modern,
up-to-date financialsystem first developed in the Netherlands in the
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3 Overviews of different types of theories on the relationship between economic growth and fi-
nancial systems can be found in Levine (1997), Rousseau and Sylla (2001) or Levine (2001), for
example.
4 These criteria are : (1) a solid state of public finances and public debt management; (2) stable
monetary arrangements; (3) the existence of a great number of banks, of which several have inter-
nal or external orientation and possibly some oriented in both direction; (4) a functioning central
bank for stabilizing the state of internal finances and managing international financial relations; (5)
properly functioning security markets.England
early 17th century. This was followed by one of the most outstanding
periods in Dutch economic history, at least as evidenced by its eco-
nomic performance, and is referred to by economic historians as the
‘golden era’ or the first modern economy. Nearly one century later,
the Dutch financial system was introduced in its entirety in England
as well. This was followed by a stabilisation of public finances, and in
parallel the internal money market began to flourish. The British
East-India Company was founded patterned on the Dutch example
and in 1694 the Bank of England was established. The development
of England’s financial system paved the way for the famous industrial
revolution and enabled the country to finance the building of its em-
pire and its wars for the acquisition of foreign territories.
France and Germany The commencement of development in both the French and the
German financial systems, which occurred very late, is often cited as
a counter example. Until the mid-19th century, neither France nor
Germany had created the necessary preconditions for smoothly-func-
tioning financial systems. One can argue that the missing elements of
a properly functioning financial system were established in both coun-
tries only during the mid-19th century, and that only after this process
was it possible for more rapid economic growth to actually begin in
these two countries.
In addition to analysing economic history developments in certain
countries by way of special case-studies, Rousseau and Wachtel also in-
vestigated the relationship between economic development and the fi-
nancial system using econometric methods to analyse a database col-
lected on five industrialised countries
5 for the period 1870–1929. Rous-
seau and Wachtel’s analysis covered five countries where industrialis-
ation was carried out rapidly in this period. Applying Vector Error Cor-
rection Models (VECM), they substantiated the existence of a long-term
relationship between financial intermediation and the volume of per ca-
pita output. Following this, by employing the Granger causality test they
found that indicators characterising financial depth can help to explain
the pace of activity in the real sphere of the economy, although there is
no causal relation in the opposite direction. Examining data for each in-
dividual country (despite the individual differences) leads to the same re-
sult – the authors clearly demonstrated that in the period prior to the
Great Depression, in the five rapidly industrialising countries they re-
viewed the quality of the functions provided by the developed financial
system contributed greatly to economic growth.
Applying regression analysis for data on 17 countries
6 com-
piled for a period of approximately 150 years (1850–1997), Rous-
seau and Sylla again found a close positive correlation between
financial depth and the rate of economic growth. At the same time
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5 The United States, England, Canada, Norway and Sweden
6 Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, England and the United States.they also proved that the impact of financial intermediation in foster-
ing economic growth was stronger in the period prior to the Great
Depression, and although this effect remained significant even in
subsequent periods, its impact has weakened demonstrably.
2.3 Empirical analyses
Owing to the abundance and better availability of data, empirical
analyses of the relationship between economic growth and the fi-
nancial system can be more easily performed for the period after
1945. The following section presents a short overview of the empiri-
cal literature examining the evidence of a relationship between eco-





measures of the de-
velopment of the fi-
nancial system and
indicators of growth
King and Levine (1993/a, 1993/b) also examined the nature of
the links between economic growth and the financial system. In their
analyses they investigated empirical evidence, analysing a database
collected for 80 countries for the period 1960–1989, seeking to de-
termine whether a higher intensity in financial intermediation shows
a significant positive correlation with faster economic growth in a
given period or for future periods. For their research work they ap-
plied four indicators which they qualified as able to characterise the
level of a financial system’s development. These can be enumerated
as follows: (i) the size of the financial intermediary sector compared
to GDP;
8 (ii) the degree to which credit is allocated by the banking
sector versus central bank; (iii) the ratio of loans allocated to private
enterprises compared to loans granted to state sector; (iv) the ratio
of total loans to private enterprises to GDP. Similarly, the rate of eco-
nomic growth was measured applying four indicators: (i) the aver-
age rate of real per capita GDP growth, which was broken down into
two sub-components; namely (ii) the average rate of physical capi-
tal accumulation; and (iii) total productivity growth; and finally (iv)
the ratio of investments to GDP. In their study they concluded that
from 1960 to 1989, (a) the four indicators featuring financial sys-
tems unanimously show and prove the existence of a positive, statis-
tically significant correlation between the four indicators of financial
development on the one hand, and the four growth indicators, on the
other hand, and (b) there is close correlation even between the finan-
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7 There are two trends in the empirical literature published on this subject which can be distin-
guished: one searches for connections between economic growth and aggregate indicators of fi-
nancial system, while the other lays stress on revealing and defining such factors of financial
system which can have the effect of generating economic growth. In some studies, the two different
kindsofanalysispresentthemselvesascomplementary:ananalysisofmacro-economiccharacter
is supplemented by an analysis of the effect of some other factors (for example: the system of juris-
prudence or accounting, the structure of the financial system, etc.) In this paper – in accordance
with the issues indicated as a point of departure – we deal only with professional literature attempt-
ing to demonstrate a relation of an aggregate feature. An overview of the empirical literature can be
found: in Tsuru (2000) and Thiel (2001).
8 The size of financial intermediation has been defined and measured as the aggregate sum of
liquid liabilities (cash money outside the banking sector + sight and interest bearing deposits held
by banks and non-banking financial intermediaries).cial development indicators themselves. Hence, it can be demon-
strated that the development level of financial systems and eco-





King and Levine also explored whether some kind of a relation-
ship could be demonstrated between the initial level of financial de-
velopment indicators and the rate of economic growth recorded for a
succeeding period. The data at their disposal supported the hypoth-
esis that financial depth is a good leading indicator of subsequent
rates of economic growth. In countries with a more developed sys-
tem of financial intermediation, a significantly faster rate of eco-
nomic growth was achieved over the following 10–30 years. The
conclusion that not only is there a statistically significant correlation
between financial depth and the rate of long-term economic growth,
but that this indicator also has a reliable forecasting capacity, raises
serious questions about the assumption that financial depth simply
moves in parallel with other factors behind economic growth. These
findings also highlight the guiding influence of the development
of the financial system on economic growth.
Cause and effect
relationship
In their analysis, Levin, Loayza and Beck (2000) explicitly focus
on the causality of the relationship between financial intermediation
and economic growth. In order to reveal the existence of a cause and
effect relationship, they apply two kinds of econometric approaches.
Data for 74 countries for 1960–1995 were analysed using a cross-
sectional, instrumental-variable estimator on the one hand, and GMM
(generalised method-of-moments) dynamic panel estimators as well,
an assessment procedure formulated especially for dynamic panel
models, on the other hand. In order to measure the depth of financial
intermediation, of the indicators applied by King and Levine (1993/b)
they considered the fourth one to be relevant, namely the ratio of total
loans by banks and other financial intermediaries to private enter-
prises as compared to GDP, a variable they consider to be the main
indicator. As complementary indicators, they employed the first and
the second indicators from King and Levine’s study as well.
10 Studies
employing the panel model as well as the cross-sectional method
of analysis produced the same result – the exogenous variable of fi-
nancial intermediary development exhibits a strong positive relation
to the rate of long-term economic growth.
Channels through
which the develop-
ment of financial in-
termediation affects
the rate of economic
growth
Applying the same econometric methods, Beck, Levine and
Loayza (1999) also analysed the channels through which the devel-
opment of financial intermediation affects the rate of economic
growth. Their main conclusion can be summarised as follows: the fi-
nancial sector exerts its beneficial impact on economic growth not
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9 It is understood that the correlations they observed do not definitely mean the existence of
acausalrelationship,becauseitcanalsobeimaginedthat,forexample,thisrelationshiphasitsori-
gin in a third factor constituting a variable not involved in this analysis, but otherwise having a bear-
ing on both the system of financial intermediation and economic growth.
10 The calculation method for these three indicators has been significantly improved compared
to the that applied in the analysis published in 1993.primarily by increasing per capita capital accumulation or the sav-
ings rate, but by increasing productivity (i.e. through more efficient
allocation of resources).
Levine (2001) examines to what extent the initial level of depth
of banking intermediation – as measured in 1960, and the size and li-
quidity of capital markets as registered in 1976 – defined the rate of
economic growth during 1960–1989, as well as for 1976–1993. For
the purpose of this analysis, he ranks the countries in the study into
four categories according to the initial level of the variable with ex-
planatory effect as registered in 1960 and in 1976 (very low, low,
high, very high). His conclusions are as follows:
(a) Financial depth predicts future economic growth in a reli-
able manner.
(b) Financial depth predicts future growth in total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP).
(c) Financial depth does not predict the future development
of the savings rate.
Predictive power
of indicators
(d) Stock market liquidity predicts future economic
growth.
(e) Stock market liquidity also predicts future growth in pro-
ductivity (TFP).
(f) At the same time, stock market liquidity does not predict the
evolution in the future trend of savings.
(g) Stock market capitalisation does not predict the future
growth of savings.
(h) Stock market volatility does not predict economic growth.
The effects of the financial sector on economic growth are de-
scribed as causal, robust and strong.
11 Furthermore, banks and cap-
ital markets have an impact on the economic growth rate primarily
by increasing productivity, and not by their effects on boosting the
savings propensity of financial asset holders. On the basis of this
Levine reached two important conclusions. Firstly, the economies of
countries which currently have more smoothly functioning financial
systems will probably grow faster during the coming decades; and
(closely related to this assumption) secondly: this is why it is highly
important for economic policy decision-makers to give high priority
to reforming the financial sector.
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11 According to the view expressed by Levine, for example if the financial intermediation of the
banking sector in Mexico had been average size regarding the initial situation prevailing in 1976,
then the rate of growth in per capita GDP during the period reviewed would have been 3 percentage
points higher per annum, while if the liquidity situation on its capital market were of an average
character, then the per capita growth rate of the Mexican economy would have been 1 percentage




he procyclical nature of banks’ behaviour – derived from infor-
mation asymmetry between creditors and borrowers – can be
described schematically as follows: in periods of economic reces-
sion, due to information asymmetry, not even projects which other-
wise would be financed profitably and without problems can be as-
sured of obtaining loans. Accordingly, banks’ behaviour contributes
to further deepening of an emerging crisis. During periods of eco-
nomicupswingthesituationisreversed.Underthesecircumstances,
banks’ attitude changes – loans can be more easily received by en-
terprises, and the easier conditions for obtaining loans facilitate and
strengthen the process of economic development. Naturally, in peri-
ods of economic upturn, the repayment capacity of debtors is stron-
ger,whileduringrecessionperiodsitisgenerallyweaker.Butbanks-
due to the fact that their appetite for risk varies according to the ac-
tual phase of economic cycle – enormously overreact to these
swings. In phases of economic boom, banks are inclined to take on
greater risks, owing to their basically positive anticipations as re-
gards the course of the economy and future trends. In such periods it
could generally be observed that banks show more willingness to
extend loans to clients and ease the requirements for accepting
collaterals as well. This cyclical behaviour by banks is supported
greatly by the fact that during economic upturns the value of
collaterals accepted by banks increases significantly, while during
economic recessions the value of such collaterals may decline con-
siderably. The increase in banks’ risk appetite is reflected in the pric-
ing of loans, too. One typical phenomenon during economic
upswings is that banks cut the prices of their loans, thereby helping
topreserveorincreasetheirmarketshare.So,theattitudegoverning
banks’ credit policy tends to reinforce business cycle, both in terms
of cyclical upturns and downturns, and thus – by its very nature –
has a strongly procyclical character.
In addition to their anticipations about the future economic situ-
ation in general, another key factor behind banks’ procyclical behav-
iour is the cyclical character of bank profitability. In cyclical upturns,
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3  Procyclical character of banks' behaviourbanks’ earnings generally grow, while during recessions they typi-
cally decline.
Banks’ profitability
and the business cy-
cle
The main reason for this phenomenon can be found in the evo-
lution of banks’ provisioning costs. The ratio of provisions to total
loans, and consequently the costs of provisioning, only decline dur-
ing cyclical upturns, while during downturns in the business cycle
these increase quickly and significantly. So, the turning point in the
business cycle is immediately accompanied by an erosion of bank
earnings together with a sudden deterioration in banks’ willingness
to take on risk, a tighter supply of credit, a restructuring of their asset
portfolio towards increased security as well as a modification of their




The procyclical nature of banks’ behaviour is statistically very
well documented. Borio, Furfine and Lowe illustrated this process us-
ing a database collected on 10 developed OECD member-countries
12
for the period 1980–1999. They demonstrated that periods of eco-
nomic upturn
13 are accompanied by significant increases in the ratio
of private sector credit to GDP, while during periods of an economic
downturn this indicator generally falls. Similarly, periods of strong
credit demand coincide with upward trends in real estate and equity
prices. They found the procyclical nature of banks’ credit risk
provisioning to be even stronger than that of changes in the volume of
loans granted and asset prices. A strong negative correlation was
demonstrated between banks’ provisioning, on the one hand, and
business cycles, on the other,
14 with the consequence that the vol-
ume of provisions accumulated by banks for covering future losses
generally only begins to increase after the rate of economic growth
has already slackened significantly. Indeed, in many cases, this
occurs only when it is clear that the economy is in a recession. One
direct consequence of banks’ provisioning behaviour is clearly the
coincidence between the development of bank earnings and the eco-
nomic cycle.
15 This positive correlation is strongest in countries which
suffered a systemic banking crisis during the 1990s. A positive corre-
lation was also detected between the evolution of the economic cycle
and that of banks’ share prices, although in accordance with the ratio-
nal expectations of capital markets, this correlation is weaker.
In summary, banks’ procyclical behaviour in all of the ten
countries examined was documented clearly in retrospect – regard-
less of whether one approaches the issue of the link between eco-
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12 These were: the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Australia, Finland, Japan, Italy,
Spain, Sweden and Norway.
13 The authors use the output gap to measure the pace of an economic upturn or a recession as
calculated by OECD.
14 From among the 10 countries examined, only in the case of the United States could the exis-
tence of a small positive correlation be detected caused by increased credit risk provisioning re-
quired of banks in the second half of the 1980s. This was triggered to a great extent by late the
portfolio revision accomplished by US banks and required by the debt crisis occurring in develop-
ing countries during the early 1980s.
15 Using their hidden reserves German banks were capable to exert a smoothing effect on evolu-
tion of their earnings and so, they are the only exception.nomic cycle and the attitude of banks from the perspective of the de-
velopment of total loans, changes in asset prices, banks’ pro-
visioning behaviour, or the trend in their profitability, or price move-
ments of in bank equities.
3.2 Causes of procyclical behaviour
According to the point of view stated by the BIS, the primary cause
of the clearly procyclical behaviour of the financial system is that
money market participants fail to treat the time-dimension of risks
appropriately.
16 The main reason for this is that they generally in-
correctly assess the evolution of risk over time (this generalisation
holds true less for the assessment of individual risks, but more so for
systemic risks). Another less important reason which was found is
that the incentives affecting the attitude of market participants and
the regulatory environment as well leads in the following direction:
even if they judged the time-dimension of a certain risk appropri-
ately, they wouldn’t act based on this appropriate assessment.
3.2.1 Assessment of the time-dimension of risks






The shortcomings in credit risk assessment are primarily derived
from the extremely short horizon of the risk measurement tech-
niques applied by banks. Another cause is that when assessing
credit risks, little attention is paid to changes in correlations over
time. Both these factors can be clearly demonstrated in credit risk
management systems as well, which rely on banks’ internal rating
systems, external rating agencies and the application of credit risk
models. Banks using internal rating systems rank the loans they ex-
tend into different categories each representing a different level of
credit risk. In general, internal rating systems assess the risk repre-
sented by a client at a given point in time and, based on this initial
assessment, often extrapolate this risk for the entire time-horizon.
This time-dimension is generally very short, usually just one year.
17
Hence, it is a natural consequence that ratings become more advan-
tageous in periods when default ratios are generally low, reflecting
the low expected default ratio for the coming period of time, and on
the contrary, when the default ratio of borrowers increases and short
term business expectations deteriorate in parallel, the ratings are
also worse. This is why – owing to the methods applied – internal
ratings of the banks move in parallel with the business cycle.
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16Thisconclusionispresentedinthechapterontheexistenceofarelationshipbetweenbusiness
cycles and financial systems contained in BIS (2001/b) as well as in the Borio, Furfine and Lowe
which is the leading study (published as the BIS background paper) of BIS (2001/a).
17 A detailed overview of internal rating practices applied by banks can be found in BCBS
(2000/a).The characteristics
of external ratings
The ratings from external rating agencies used by banks are
also characterised by the fact
18 that in many cases they react retro-
actively to credit risk events which have already occurred. One com-
monly quoted example of this phenomenon was the behaviour
of rating agencies during the autumn 1997 crisis in Asia, when long-
term debts denominated in foreign currencies of the countries af-
fected were ranked into a higher sovereign risk category only after
the national currencies of these countries had been devalued. In gen-
eral, the approaches to risk assessment applied by rating agencies
only differ from those employed by banks in that sense that in most
cases agencies do not focus on a single point in time, but search for
an appropriate answer to the following question: what would be the
actual degree of vulnerability of a certain party (sovereign or enter-
prise) in the event of a downturn in the business cycle as envisaged
according to a scenario they construct, and to what measure would
this affect the repayment capacity of that party. While external rating
agencies do not simply extrapolate the contemporary situation, even
the scenarios they formulate are rigid, and are only modified on rare
occasion, and generally as a reaction to a shock which has already
actually occurred, but was not originally accounted for in the sce-
nario. So, in respect of external ratings as well, it is true that during
upturns in the business cycle they are better (actual downturns in the
business cycle are generally more severe than in the scenarios),
while during downturns, they are more pessimistic. In summary,
even ratings by external rating agencies have a procyclical charac-
ter, although the intensity of this aspect is less pronounced than in
internal rating systems due to their special approach.
Credit risk modelling offers a more sophisticated approach
to credit risks.
19 The limited availability of forward-looking information
causes problems in connection with extending the time-dimension in
these models
,20 and increasing this time-dimension may also greatly
increase the margin of error in the forecasts.
3.2.2 Incentives and the regulatory environment
The objectives are






Of the incentives influencing the cyclical assessment of risks, the
relaxation of credit standards during economic upturns, and con-
versely their tightening during downturns, is of outstanding impor-
tance. The main cause for relaxing standards during upturns can be
found in banks’ efforts to defend their competitive positions in the
market, while during recessions the incentives to avoid losses are
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18 A detailed overview of practices applied by external rating agencies can be found in BCBS
(2000/b).
19 An overview of credit risk modelling applied by banks can be found, for example, in BCBS
(1999) or in a study by Jackson, Nickell and Perraudin (1999).
20Thisiswhyinordertomanagefutureshocks,banksapplyingthemostsophisticatedriskman-
agement systems more and more frequently resort to stress testing, in addition to models, but
in parallel with them as well.obviously stronger. Although the changes in behaviour at individual
banks according to fluctuations in the business cycle do not have a
significant impact on the evolution of the cycle itself, it is easy to see
that if banks’ incentives all work in the same direction, i.e. if cyclical
changes in credit standards become characteristic of the banking
sector as a whole, then these incentives will strengthen the





Banks’ procyclical attitude is promoted by taxation, accounting
and regulatory practises as well. Accounting rules on provisioning fre-
quently allow provisioning only for expected losses which are cor-
rectly documented, while tax regulations impose serious limits on
provisioning before taxes, and – taking into account the retrospective
character of assessing credit risks – this almost automatically leads to
insufficient provisioning during economic upswings. Capital ade-
quacy rules are another incentive for overtightening bank lending dur-
ing downturns in the business cycle. Although current capital ade-
quacy rules require only a minimum level of capital, falling capital ad-
equacy ratios during recession periods can trigger tightening in lend-
ing activity long before these ratios could reach their regulatory mini-
mum level, because the capital adequacy position has become one
of the primary synthetic indicators with an important effect on the
credit rating of the banks themselves, as well as on their capacity
to raise additional capital. The existence of incentives to sustain
the level of capital adequacy are underlined by the fact that parallel
movements between capital ratios and the evolution of the economic
cycle have not been clearly demonstrated.
21
3.3 Procyclical behaviour and financial crises
Expansion in credit is
frequently an ex post
indicator of financial
crises…
In most publications analysing financial crises the procyclical na-
ture of banks’ behaviour and credit expansion linked to economic
upturns, which considerably exceeds the dimension of such up-
turns, have both been noted as one of the important indicators of fi-
nancial crises that has been identified ex post.
22 Of 15 empirical
analyses conducted by the IMF
23 in 12 of the studies an upward
trend in the loan to GDP ratio was noted as one of the indicators ca-
pable of predicting the emergence of a future crisis, while in 14 of
the 34 empirical analyses by Hawkins and Klau, the impact of credit
expansion on the emergence of a systemic financial crisis was found
to be significant. Of the 34 studies, seven focused explicitly on
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21 See: BIS (2001/b).
22 There is a wide-ranging professional literature on the analysis of episodes of banking crises
and attempting to identify indicators capable reliably forecasting such crises. See, for example:
KaminskyandReinhardt(1999) Demirgüc-KuntandDetragiache(1998) IMF(2000).Amorede-
tailed summary of professional literature can be found in: IMF (2000), Bell and Pain (2000) and
Klau (2000) .
23 See: IMF (2000).banking crises within the sphere of financial crises in a broader
sense, and four discerned the impact of rapid credit expansion as
triggering these banking crises. Practically all of the empirical anal-
yses mentioned can be characterised by the fact that a great num-
ber of countries which have already suffered a banking crisis were
included in the sample, and the time-dimension chosen for examin-
ing economies and financial sectors of the countries to be analysed
was not restricted to the period of the crisis itself, but was extended
to a longer time frame. According to the conclusions drawn from
these studies an overvalued exchange rate, an inadequate level
of international reserves, economic recession, high real interest
rates and excessive lending growth by banks were identified as key
indicators for banking crises.
…but cannot be con-
sidered an ex ante in-
dicator
Nevertheless, models attempting to define the main indicators
for reliably forecasting the emergence of banking crises suffer from
a number of imperfections.
24 Banking crises occur more frequently
in developing countries than in developed countries, and complete
accessibility and reliability of the data for appropriately describing
these countries’ economies is by no means assured. Nor is it uncon-
ditionally true that only banking systems in economies which have
already suffered from banking crises are vulnerable and threatened
by crises. Approaching the question from another perspective, it has
also not been possible to clearly demonstrate that (excessively)
expansive behaviour of banks – a phenomenon which can be dem-
onstrated in economic upturns – can be considered an ex ante indi-
cator capable of reliably predicting the emergence of a crisis, or that
periods of lending booms are highly likely to be followed by periods
of financial crises.
Banking crises are
not the results of
credit expansion…
Gourinchas, Valdés and Landerretche (2001) also analysed the
relationship between lending booms and banking crises. They de-
fined a lending boom as a period when the ratio of private credit to
GDP deviates from its stochastic trend more than a previously de-
fined threshold. The divergence was analysed by these researchers
in absolute and in relative terms as well.
25 They treated as banking
crises the episodes defined as such by Caprio and Klinguebiel
(1997), or by Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996). They examined
whether the degree of probability of a banking crisis occurring was
higher during periods preceding, or following lending booms, or dur-
ing ‘quiet’ periods. Data collected for 91 countries for 1960–1996
were taken as a basis for the analysis. Their conclusions can be sum-
marised as follows: (i) The probability of a banking crisis occurring
following periods of lending booms is not very high. Based on
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24 A detailed criticism of the so-called leading indicator models can be found in: Bell and Pain
(2000).
25 In the event of a divergence in relative terms, the growth of lending activity as compared to the
trend is qualified according to its relation to the size of the banking sector, while in the case of diver-
gence in absolute terms it must be compared to the volume of GDP itself.Lingreen, Garcia and Saal’s data, the degree of probability ranges
between 9.5 and 13.9 percent, while according to Caprio and
Klinguebiel’s data, the probability fluctuates between 12.7 and 21
percent. (ii) Although the probability of a banking crisis occurring
within two years of a lending boom was judged to be somewhat
higher compared to a ‘quiet’ period, in most cases the increase in the
degree of probability was not judged to be statistically significant. In
other words, it could not be definitively proven that banking crises
are direct repercussions of lending booms, because most periods
characterised credit expansion in the banking sector have not been
followed by any banking crisis whatsoever.
…but may contribute
to an increase in
banking sector vul-
nerability
The case of Latin America, where exceptionally strong growth
in lending took place in the 1990s, was examined separately by the
study. In contrast to the findings valid for the overall sample of coun-
tries analysed, this lending boom enormously increased the vulnera-
bility of Latin American countries to banking and financial crises.
Otherwise, lending booms experienced in the Latin American coun-
tries involved in the sample analysed, occurred during periods of fi-
nancial deregulation and capital flows liberalisation, in parallel with
massive capital inflow and failed exchange rate-based stabilisation
programs. Accordingly, the probability of a lending boom being fol-
lowed by a banking or currency crisis is twice or three times greater
compared to other regions in this respect.
This overview of the relationships between lending booms and
banking crises suggests that while a rapid expansion of lending is
frequently one of the key factors contributing to an increased degree
of vulnerability of banking systems, the existence of a clear-cut,
causal relationship capable of generating a crisis cannot be unequiv-
ocally demonstrated. Systemic banking crises can always be traced
back to the simultaneous presence of a number of factors, and – at
least according to the experience gained from crises which have
occurred so far – the types and combinations of these factors can
very greatly from crisis to crisis.
It can be assumed that the indicators formulated as a result of
empirical analyses are more appropriate for assessing the particular
degree of stability in financial or banking systems as well as their vul-
nerability, but are less suitable for reliably forecasting future crises.
At the same time though, it is important to stress that it is by no
means certain that systems which appear to be vulnerable based on
the indicators are actually in a state preceding a crisis. Thus, vulner-
ability constitutes a fairly demonstrable precondition for a crisis, but
should not be considered to be a clear-cut, undeniable cause of it.
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A better understand-
ing of risks
In their work Borio, Furfine and Lowe classified four different groups
of possible methods for preventing procyclical behaviour by banks.
The first method is aimed at helping market participants better un-
derstand the actual nature of risks, their development over time
and how risks are related to business and financial cycles. This goal
is achieved by analyses published by financial authorities, and
speeches, lectures or statements delivered by leading financial offi-
cers. The Financial Stability Reports published by an ever growing
number of central banks also greatly facilitate better assessment
of credit risks as well as a professional exchange of views on the na-
ture of risks. In addition to this approach, the efforts of international
organisations designed to render the functioning of financial inter-
mediation systems as transparent as possible, and to make them
conform to international standards established according to differ-





Endowing supervisory authorities with discretionary powers
represents a second possibility for constraining/eliminating the im-
pact of procyclicality. For example, exercising their discretionary
powers, supervisory authorities can increase the minimum capital
adequacy ratios enforceable either for the banking sector as a whole
or for certain individual banks if they feel that in the euphoric atmo-
sphere of an economic boom banks are assessing credit risks inade-
quately, or if they feel that systemic risks have begun to emerge.
In addition to increasing the required capital adequacy ratios, an-
other complementary discretionary instrument can also be applied
if necessary, either by increasing the level of individual credit risk
provisioning required or insisting on the application of more rigorous





Prescription of mandatory prudential rules to be applied by
banks constitutes the third possibility. These rules can be stipulated
as a function of a specific economic indicator, or can be fixed ones,
which are nevertheless able to mitigate the procyclical attitude of the
banking system. As a matter of fact, the former option may repre-
sent an alternative to rules of a discretionary nature, with the differ-
ence that the prescription of more rigorous rules does not only de-
pend on the judgement of supervisory authorities, but rather de-
pends on a trend in a certain economic indicator (lending growth,
real estate prices, etc. are good examples of this). For instance, reg-
ulations of an anticyclical character to be implemented by applying
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26 The results of this effort have been presented, for example, by the reports based on surveys
conducted by IMF missions in its member-countries and published regularly on their home page on
the Internet under the title: Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC)
27 This sort of regulation practice was applied, for example, in Hong Kong from 1991 on, where
regulatory authorities suggested that banks should apply a 70 percent loan-to-value ratio ceiling in
the case of mortgage lending.provisioning rules,
28 or the proposed modification of the Basle Capi-
tal Accord aimed at correcting the procyclical provisioning attitude
of banks by broadening the scope of capital requirement to cover not
only unexpected risks but expected risks as well, can be viewed as




Applying monetary policy instruments to preclude the emer-
gence of procyclicality in the financial system represents the fourth
regulatory possibility. One special tool in the sphere of monetary
policy is, for example, if the central bank reacts to an excessive ex-
pansion of mortgage loans by raising interest rates, and does so
even if this wouldn’t otherwise be justified by other circumstances.
Having reviewed the regulatory options, the authors conclude
that each approach has a number of advantages and disadvantages.
Weighing these pluses and minuses, they reach the conclusion that
– based on the current state of knowledge on financial and business
cycles – of the various options, the application of direct prudential
regulatory instruments, which can be classified into the third cate-
gory, seems to be the most expedient approach. As a first step, they
would expect the introduction of forward-looking provisioning rules
to restrain procyclicality, but with a view to the future they consider
it important that eventually the required loan-to-value ratio or mini-
mum capital adequacy ratios be changed, in line with the business
cycle, or more precisely linked to it. Nor can the introduction of regu-
lations in the sphere of monetary policy, as well as discretionary
powers of supervisory authorities be precluded, but the authors feel
that these are acceptable only on rare occasion, i.e. in the event of
a serious financial imbalance.
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28 The most striking example of this is the dynamic rules governing credit risk provisioning re-
quirements for banks in Spain. See: Lis, Martinez and Saurina (2001).
29 See: BCBS (2001). Although this element of the proposed regulation by no means has a sig-
nificant counterbalancing effect on credit risk provisioning attitude of procyclical character found
at some banks, the proposal in general - according to the opinion of most analysts - would rather
enhance than weaken the procyclicality of banks’ behaviour by increasing the risk sensitivity of
theircapital.(See:forexampleECB(2001).ThiselementoftheBasleproposalforextendingcapi-
tal requirements to cover both the expected and unexpected risks, is one of the most debated fea-
tures of the new regulatory framework, and it is not certain at all that it can be introduced as the
originallyproposedversionwouldentail.TheprofessionaldebateonthenewBasleproposalcanbe
found at www.bis.org.The development
of financial intermedi-
ation has its roots




he development of financial intermediation in Hungary, the
Czech Republic and Poland has its roots in the financial systems
of centrally-planned economies, characterised by single-tier bank-
ing systems and the complete lack of a capital market. In these three
countries the establishment of a two-tier banking system and a capi-
tal market was a necessary precondition for the development of fi-
nancial intermediation. In respect of transforming the system of fi-
nancial intermediation, the leading role was played by Hungary
where well before the change of regime, market orientation had be-
gun to be an increasing characteristic feature of this sector. From
1982 on enterprises were allowed to issue bonds, in 1987 the two-
tier banking was established
30 and in 1989 the Budapest Stock Ex-
change was opened – the first of its kind in the region.
In establishing capital markets, these countries had to start from
scratch – prior to the change of regime the notion of a joint stock com-
pany, trading in shares as well as that of corporate bond issue
31 was
practically unknown. Public sector financing requirements were satis-
fied directly by the central banks in accordance with the central plan.
The establishment of two-tier banking systems was carried out simi-
larly. One characteristic feature of these three countries was that the
former ‘mono-bank’ was transformed into independent financial or-
ganisations playing the role of the central bank on the one hand, as
well as handling functions of commercial banks, on the other (initially
in state ownership), and that the stock of credits in the commercial
banking sphere was equivalent of that of the credits granted earlier by
the mono-bank. In terms of the size of the banking sectors in the three
countries at the moment of their establishment a remarkable differ-
ence was already visible – the ratio of credit to GDP in the Czech bank-
ing sector significantly surpassed the same value for the Hungarian
banking sector, and the credit volume of Polish commercial banks
was considerably lower than in Hungary. Under the centrally-planned
socialist regime it was a policy decision made by the economic man-
agement of each respective country, as to what sort of role was de-
fined for bank loans for financing enterprises, because the mono-bank
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31 Although in Hungary bond issuance was legally allowed and some bonds were already issued,
their role in financing enterprises was only marginal.allocated loans among the agents of the economy in accordance with
the pre-determined directives of the central plan, without considering
economic efficiency criteria. The Czech system of economic manage-
ment ascribed greater importance to allocating loans by banks which
is why the initial level of loans registered by Czech commercial banks
was naturally higher compared to the two other countries. Accord-
ingly, the initial level of financial intermediation was lowest in Poland,
where under the centrally-planned system the role played by bank
loans was marginal. In addition to this, even well before the transfor-
mation crisis which followed the change of regime, financial depth in
Poland was considerably weakened by the protracted economic and
financial crisis experienced during the 1980s.
4.1 The depth of banking intermediation






The ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP is considered the most suitable
and widely accepted indicator for generally assessing the depth of
banking intermediation.
32 The ratio of liquid liabilities (M2) indi-
cates how much of a role financial processes play in an economy.
This indicator measures the banking sector synthetically, without
distinguishing between different types of institutions or specific uses
of financial resources. In open economies one disadvantage it suf-
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32 This was already used by King and Levine (1993/a and 1993/b), but the application of this is
proposed – as part of a new database appropriate for international comparison – by Beck,
Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (1999) as well.
33 Data representing the evolution of M2 indicator have been derived from stock data, while
thoseonGDPrepresentflowdata,henceaccordingtothisanalysisthechangesfromoneyeartoan
other could be misleading, although the evolution of orders of magnitude as well as trends are
shown appropriately by these data, too.



























Financial depth as a percentage of GDP
33
Source: International Financial Statistics, rows 351.fers from is that it only measures domestic financing resources. In
the three economies under review, there is an external channel for
deepening financial intermediation, and while its order of magnitude
cannot be qualified as negligible, its size is not so great that it can
considerably affect the conclusions to be drawn from international
comparisons or from the analysis itself.
To a great extent, the legacies inherited from the previous so-
cialist-type economies determined the depth of financial intermedia-
tion in the three countries, and, as evidenced by Chart 1, the first de-
cade of transformation to a market economy has not led to any sig-
nificant changes in this respect. At first glance, it can be seen that the
establishment of a market economy in the ECE3 has not been ac-
companied by significant changes in the role of finances played in
their economies.
35
In 1990, the level of financial intermediation in Hungary in in-
ternational comparison (see Chart 2) was identical to that of the
group constituted by middle-income countries, while in this respect
the level characterising Poland approached the group of low-income
economies. During the last decade, the intensity of financial inter-
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34 For the purpose of comparison, the World Bank employed data representing the trend of M3
instead of that focusing on the evolution of M2 used for compiling Chart 1. But as regards the three
countries analysed, the difference between data characterizing the trend of M2 and that of M3 is not
significant.
35 This study does not deal with the principal causes of low level in financial intermediation (the
modest volume of financial assets owned by households considered really low as compared to vol-
umeofitsearnings,thewaveofbankruptciescoincidinginanaturalwaywithtransformationcrisis,
high level of nominal and real interest rates, etc. could be enumerated as main examples), because
this has a very indirect relation with the overall question of procyclicality. Only the phenomenon it-







































Financial depth in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland in international
comparison
Source: World Development Indicators 2001, World Bank
34mediation in the Hungarian banking sector did not change in line
with the trend of strong deepening seen in the group of mid-
dle-income countries – accordingly, by 1999, its degree had become
rather similar to that of low-income countries, lagging well behind
the middle-income group. As far as Poland is concerned, its relative
position over the last decade has not changed either. In 1999, finan-
cial depth in the Czech Republic
36 was practically at the same value
for the group of middle-income countries.
The ratio of private
sector loans to GDP is
also low, but it has
started rising in Hun-
gary and Poland
Of the indicators capable measuring the degree of depth in
banking intermediation, which were proposed by Beck, Demirgüc-
Kunt and Levine (1999), the ratio of private sector loans by deposit
money banks to GDP represents a more focused, sophisticated indi-
cator than liquid liabilities to GDP, because it more adequately re-
flects the role that loans play in financing economic activity
37 (see
Chart 3). In addition to the initial position, the trend in the evolution
of the private loans to GDP ratio depends largely on the timing and
the particular methods each country applied to resolve portfolio
quality problems which represent a serious risk for the banking sys-
tem as a whole, and were unavoidably coupled with transformation
crises in all the three countries in question. For example, in Hungary
the trend in total loans reflects the more and more rigorous character
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36 Obviously, in respect of the Czech Republic only data for the period after the establishment
of the country is available, i.e. after the separation of the former Czechoslovakia into two individual
countries.
37 This indicator separates the volume of credits granted by banks to the government or to the
public sphere of the economy from those they allocated to the private sector, and when measuring
the actual extent of financial depth, only the latter have been taken into account. Nor have credits
granted directly by monetary authorities to the private sector been considered an integral part of fi-
nancial intermediation carried out by banks.
38SeethefootnotetoChart1.Herethedataonaggregatecreditsisstockdata,whilethoseonthe
trend of GDP are flow data.























Ratio of private credit to GDP (in %)
38
Source: International Financial Statistics (rows 22d).of regulations on assessing credit portfolio risks by banks as well as
the impact of their portfolio revisions performed during the consoli-
dation of the sector. In Poland – owing to the low base figures charac-
terising its banking system at the outset – the consolidation process
was not coupled with a decline in the ratio of total loans to GDP, while
in the Czech Republic the protracted (and as of yet unfinished) con-
solidation and privatisation of the banking sector is one important
reason why this ratio only began to decline in the latter half of the
1990s. Nevertheless, one conclusion valid for the entire ECE3 is that
the role played by domestic banks in financing the economy contin-
ues to be very low by international standards. The role of loans
granted by banks in Hungary and Poland only minimally exceeds the
size characteristic for the group of low-income countries. By 1999,
only in the Czech Republic did the ratio of private loans to GDP
approach the level typical for the middle-income group of countries,
and even so it still lagged far behind the level registered in EMU
members as well as the high income group (see Chart 4).
Loans play a chang-
ing role in financing
the economy
Nevertheless, based on Chart 3, the initial conclusion reached
after a superficial study of Chart 1 can be refined further – in respect of
Hungary and Poland, the changing role that loans play in financing
their economies may be a key factor behind the stability seen in total
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Ratio of private loans to GDP in the Hungarian, the Czech and the Polish
banking sectors, in international comparison
Source: World Development Indicators 2001, World Bank.
The World Bank employed IFS rows 32d in International Financial Statistics for the purposes
of comparison, which incorporates liabilities of monetary authorities vis-à-vis the private
sector (IFS rows 12d), in addition to those held by deposit money banks (IFS rows 22d).
39
39 Employment of data incorporated into row 32d of IFS is clearly justified by the fact that in sev-
eral countries (especially in less developed ones) direct credit granting by monetary authorities
playsanimportantroleinfinancialintermediation.Butinthethreecountriesexaminedthisfactoris
negligible, so the orders of magnitudes in Charts 3. and 4. represent practically the same ones.liquid liabilities over the last decade. During the transformation crisis,
the overhaul of banks’ bad quality portfolios – due to former obsolete
structure of production – was completely accomplished, and this was
able to serve as an appropriate basis for increasing lending on the
heels of this crisis, so that – following a temporary decline (or in the
case of Poland, a stagnation in this respect) – a clear process of deep-
ening in financial intermediation of their banking sectors could begin.
While adding to its
complexity, direct bor-
rowing from abroad
does not change the
overall picture
The very low level of bank credits by international standards is
evident together with the fact that in these countries, financing by
banks plays a strikingly greater role in their financial system than
that of their capital markets. The financial sectors of the three coun-
tries can be typified as the so-called German-type, namely bank-
based features, instead of bearing the hallmarks characteristic of
Anglo-Saxon countries, which tend to have market-based sys-
tems.
40
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40 In the case of these countries financial assets owned by banks represent 85–95 percent as
compared to their aggregate volume, in contrast with the proportion of about 50 percent in coun-
tries with market-based financial systems. (See: Wagner and Iakova /2001/).
Chart 5
Ratio of domestic and external private loans to GDP (in %)
Source: Wagner and Iakova (2001).































































































Other countriesThe overall picture from this analysis of banking intermediation
depth in the ECE3 may be further influenced by the fact that these
countries have open economies, and hence, in addition to domestic
resources, their enterprises are able to increase their level of indebt-
edness by relying on external loans as well. As illustrated by Chart 5,
in the ECE3 corporate sector financing via external loans has been
very important, helping to establish a healthy corporate financing
structure which stimulates and sustains economic growth, but does
not increase the depth of domestic banking intermediation. At the
same time, it cannot be stated that the private loan to GDP ratio, ad-
justed accordingly by direct foreign indebtedness, would be such a
degree higher that it would be able to modify the overall picture of
generally low banking intermediation.
41
4.2 The depth of capital market intermediation
The depth of capital
market intermedia-
tion is also low
In accordance with the basically non-market character of financial
intermediation, the depth of capital market intermediation can also
be characterised as being very low in the ECE3. In 1999, only in
Hungary did the ratio of market capitalisation to GDP, an indicator
generally used for measuring the size of capital markets, approach
the level typical for the group of middle-income countries, while in
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Ratio of market capitalisation to GDP in Hungary, the Czech Republic
and Poland in international comparison
Source: World Development Indicators 2001, World Bank.
41Intercompanyloans,constitutinganintegralpartofforeigndirectinvestment(FDI),couldalso
be classified into the foreign resources of enterprise financing, the order of magnitude of which in
the case of the three countries examined is approximately identical to that of the volume of stock of
credits granted by foreign banks. But according to its very nature, it is questionable what role this
source of enterprise financing plays: one similar to that played by capital or more so by credits.the two other countries it was even lower than that of the low-
income group. Compared the EMU area and especially to the group
of high-income economies, it is smaller by several orders of magni-
tude (see Chart 6).
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Tendency in capital market turnover to GDP in Hungary, the Czech Republic
and Poland, in international comparison
































Tendency in capital market turnover to the market capitalisation in Hun-
gary, the Czech Republic and Poland, in international comparison
Source: World Development Indicators 2001, World Bank.
…but liquidity relative
to capitalisation in Hun-
gary is in conformity
with the internationally
typical level
The ratio of capital mar-
ket liquidity to GDP is
low…In addition to the size of capital markets, their degree of liquid-
ity is also highly important, as only appropriately liquid capital
markets can guarantee the mobilisation of capital to be channelled
into financing the economy. There are two indicators generally
accepted for measuring the degree of capital market liquidity. One
is the value traded ratio, which represents the total value of shares
traded on the stock exchange divided by GDP (trading vol-
ume/GDP), the other is the turnover ratio, which is the total value
of shares traded on stock exchange divided by stock market
capitalisation, representing the size of the capital market (trading
volume/market capitalisation). Obviously, these two market li-
quidity indicators show totally differing values for countries where
the capital market is small in size, but is coupled with relatively high
liquidity. The trend in the two liquidity indicators is shown in Charts
7 and 8. From the ECE3, even in respect of level of capital market
liquidity, the situation in Hungary could be qualified as the most
favourable one. In Hungary, the increasing volume of market
capitalisation has been coupled with the same tendency in the evo-
lution of the level of capital market liquidity over the last decade,
and thanks to this progress, by 1999 the ratio of capital market
liquidity to GDP had reached the level of the middle-income group,
while the ratio between the volume of market liquidity and the di-
mension of the capital market can be considered as being in con-
formity with internationally typical level. In the Czech Republic and
in Poland, the low level of market capitalisation has been associ-
ated with a low degree of liquidity in capital markets. Meanwhile,
it must be noted that data on capital markets for 2000 and 2001
show a more disadvantageous tendency in the depth of capital
market intermediation in East-Central-Europe than the end-1999
data. The reason for this is that from the second quarter of 2000,
global participants on capital markets have been restructuring their
investment portfolios towards investments guaranteeing more se-
curity, and thus have reduced their volume of investments in this
region. For example, in Hungary the ratio of capital market capi-
talisation to GDP dropped from 36 percent in 1999 to 26 per cent in
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42 See: 2000 Annual Report of the National Bank of Hungary.A
s was mentioned in the analysis of banking intermediation
depth, according to the distribution of financial assets among
different types of financial institutions, the ECE3 can be character-





But a look at the data on financial depth in these countries ren-
ders a picture which can be characterised more appropriately as
‘neither bank-based, nor market-based’ in terms of their financial in-
termediation. For all three countries, it can be argued that they have
lagged far behind the level they are aiming for, namely that of the
EMU-area countries or developed countries in terms of the intensity
of banking, as well as capital market intermediation. As far as bank-
ing intermediation is concerned, the situation in the Czech Republic
could be described in this respect as more favourable than the aver-
age of this group of countries, while in Poland, and to a lesser extent
in Hungary as well, a process of deepening in financial intermedia-
tion is visible. In the case of Hungary, indicators of capital market
size and liquidity are higher.
The second chapter of this study analysed the relationship be-
tween economic growth and financial depth. Presumably, the con-
clusions drawn there could be relevant for the banking systems of
the ECE3, too. If the state of development of the financial intermedi-
ation system and deeper banking and capital market intermediation
do have an undeniably positive impact on productivity trends, then
in respect of the ECE3 it is important and crucial for their further de-
velopment that significant deepening in their financial intermedia-
tion be achieved in the future. If the initial level of financial depth reli-
ably predicts the rate of development of the following period, then it
can also be suggested that if sufficiently large-scale deepening pro-
cess does not take place in their financial intermediation systems,
this would necessarily lead to a lower trend of economic growth,
compared to what could be achieved in conjunction with an appro-




In these countries procyclical behaviour of the banks cannot be
observed yet, because the possibility of normal economic cycles de-
veloping only appeared from the mid-1990s - or to put it more pre-
cisely, after the transformation crises had subsided. According to
Chart 3, in the case of Hungary, the existence of a close relationship
between the transformation crisis and banking intermediation in par-
ticular is discernible, as from 1990 to 1995, the depth of financial in-
termediation continuously dropped, while from 1996 on, it has
slowly begun to increase. In Poland, due to the protracted crisis dur-
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5  Necessity of financial deepening
 and procyclicalitying the 1980s and to the low basis, the transformation period was not
accompanied by a temporary drop in the degree of financial depth,
but the increase in the volume of loans since the mid-1990s has
been more pronounced than in Hungary.
…in addition to suffi-
ciently prudent lend-
ing behaviour
In order for the ECE3 to close the gap to the developed coun-
tries, it is absolutely necessary that in the future the role of lending in
their economies grow significantly and that a period definable as a
lending boom occur. Based on an analysis by Gourinchas, Valdés
and Landerretche it was demonstrated that lending booms are not -
as a rule - followed by systemic banking crises. In order for the role of
lending to increase smoothly as is necessary, and for it not to lead to
a higher degree of vulnerability of the banking sector, and eventually
to a credit crunch or – in extreme cases – a systemic banking crisis, it
is important that during lending booms the establishment of a pat-
tern of procyclical behaviour by banks be prevented, i.e. deepening
in financial intermediation should not be accompanied by a relax-
ation of rigorous credit standards, by loosening collateral require-
ments nor by under-provisioning credit risks.
5.1 When is fast growth in credit extension
activity considered damaging and when is it
advantageous?
In principle, and based on the considerations presented, this ques-
tion should be easy to answer. It is generally seen as useful when the
degree of financial depth increases, as this is conducive to eco-
nomic growth. Conversely, it is damaging if such deepening is ac-
companied by a relaxation of credit standards and by the emer-
gence of a pattern of procyclical behaviour, as this increases the
vulnerability of the financial system to a great extent.




Analysing lending cycles in the US economy, Keeton (1999)
differentiates three possible causes of lending booms – first, a supply
shift, second, a demand shift and third, a productivity shift. The pat-
tern of procyclical behaviour by banks can be seen as a typical sup-
ply-side shift – banks’ inclination to grant credits increases, leading
to a relaxation of credit standards (for example, banks tend to lower
the value of collaterals they require, or accept poorer track-records,
etc.). Obviously, this type of behaviour by banks, possibly in con-
junction with a decreasing level of interest rates, exacerbates the
banking sector’s future losses.
demand shifts...
If corporate demand for credits increases, this can also contrib-
ute to a growth in lending activity, as well as to more rigorous credit
evaluation standards. A relative increase in financing costs through
the channel of the capital market or a decline in the volume of inter-
nal cash flow at enterprises, as a result of which firms may wish to in-
crease the proportion of bank loans, can result in a kind of a boom on
the demand-side. Due to the increase in demand, banks are inclined
to raise the level of interest rates on loans, and to tighten credit stan-
dards, both of which serve to reduce the probability of future losses.
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shifts
In the case of an increase in credit demand stimulated by a pro-
ductivity shift, in principle more vigorous lending activity does not
aggravate bank’s potential losses, as the financial position and debt
repayment capacity of their clients is improving, and even applying
the same credit standards, more and more clients are judged by
banks as being creditworthy. Indeed, growth in lending volume stim-
ulated by a productivity shift can diminish the probability of future
losses even in cases when banks relax credit standards. If corporate
productivity is growing, in parallel with this the probability that a
group of clients with given characteristics will be able to repay their
debts increases. This makes it possible, for example, for banks to
ease their requirements as regards collaterals or requirements for
the quality of borrowers’ track-records. Rising productivity also
stimulates enterprises to increase their credit demand. Thus, the
changes stemming from advances in productivity can lead to a lend-
ing boom due to the combined impact of a relaxation in the rigour of
credit standards, as well as burgeoning credit demand by enter-
prises. In this case, the process of relaxing credit standards does not
necessarily lead to higher losses by banks, because the impact of
financing even more poorly rated clients (i.e. with less collateral
or shorter track-records) may be counterbalanced by this possibility
– taking into account gains in productivity, the debt repayment
capacity of average quality clients may also increase.
For successful con-
vergence, lending
has to grow at a
faster pace than pro-
ductivity
In respect of transition economies, which have been characterised
by a low level of financial intermediation, the possibility of increasing
lending activity is even greater, and may even surpass productivity
gains, as a low degree of financial intermediation means (amongst
other things) that earlier loan extension to clients which otherwise could
have been financed by them profitably, has not taken place.
Having accepted the aforementioned classification, it seems
obvious that in the ECE3 the catching up process could be
achieved, based solely on a credit boom stimulated by (and even
surpassing) advances in productivity. In this process there is even
some leeway for a relaxation of credit standards, but only to the
extent that the overall banking sector’s prudential behaviour in
respect of lending is not called into question. For example, bank’s
remarkable increase in financing of small and medium-sized enter-
prises has been a necessary precondition for the region’s economic
progress, while at the same time, it is obvious that during the trans-
formation period this sphere of the economy – which has practically
no collateral of acceptable value, and where good quality track-
records are few and far between – could not have been financed
at all from the point of view of focusing exclusively on the risk bear-
ing capacity of the banks. During the catching up period, after the
transformation crises are over, the debt repayment capacity of this
sphere of the economy naturally improves, even though their weak
track-records and relatively low value collateral continue to re-
strain them from obtaining loans (i.e. in this period this sector can
only be financed by the banks due to loosening credit standards.)
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group of the banking
sector
Examining the business policy of Hungarian banks, it is clear
that since economic growth took off in the late 1990s, small and me-
dium-sized enterprises have increasingly become the financing tar-
get group of the banking sector. Banks’ expansion of lending in this
sphere of the economy will not cause losses if the scope of the lend-
ing boom does not exceed the improvement in firms’ future repay-
ment capacity based on productivity growth. However, it is clear that
this is necessarily accompanied by a relaxation of credit standards
during a lending boom. In order to avoid this process leading to the
development of a procyclical behaviour pattern in the banking sec-
tor, great emphasis must be placed on factors such as the quality of
lending, careful analysis of clients’ financial position, as well as con-
stant monitoring - and such monitoring must begin immediately af-
ter clients obtain loans from the banks.
5.2 Deepening of financial intermediation,




question deserving great attention, as the transformation of the
banking sector in these countries towards market economy stan-
dards only began after the change of regime, and despite the enor-
mous progress achieved up to now this process still cannot be con-
sidered finished. This makes it very difficult to judge the transpar-
ency and accuracy of the credit risk assessments of their banking
sectors.
Financial sector oper-




Since 1994, the EBRD has continuously evaluated the devel-
opment of its members’ financial systems, and to this end its staff
has formulated a system of indicators. This system assesses the de-
velopment level of individual countries’ financial systems on a scale
of 1 (no reforms at all) to 4.3 (functioning financial system similar to
that in a market economy).
43 The key aspect in this evaluation is to
correctly assess the following: to what extent does the degree of
overall banking regulation and the sector’s operations – due to the
reforms carried out in the countries’ banking and non-banking finan-
cial intermediation systems – approach the norms and standards of
developed countries? From Table 1, it can be seen that even the
Hungarian financial sector – which the EBRD has rated as the best
since 1997 – was not once given the highest rating of 4.3, while the
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Table 1
EBRD indexes for the banking sector
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Hungary 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Czech Republic 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3
Poland 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3
Source: Transition Report 2000, EBRD.
43Atthebeginning,thevaluesmarkedonthescalerangedfrom1to4+.From1997,the+/–signs
whichsupplementedtheindexnumbersmarkedonthescaleandweregivenbytheEBRDstafftoin-
dividual countries were substituted by a method of adding or subtracting +/– 0.3 from the value of
the rating originally stipulated by the Bank.ratings for the Czech and the Polish banking sectors have been one
level lower than Hungary’s. In all three countries, the transparency of
risks is seriously hindered by the lack of consolidated financial sec-
tor regulation and supervision. In the Czech Republic the still unfin-
ished process of consolidating problematic loan portfolios has made
an appropriate assessment of banks’ positions particularly difficult.
In its 2000 report, the EBRD also separately evaluates to what
extent the degree of overall legal regulation and the efficiency of en-
forcement of these regulations in financial the sector (examining
banking and non-banking financial intermediation together) of the in-
dividual countries can be generally qualified as complying with the
standards and norms of market economies. A scale of 1 to 4+ is used.
Hence, in the ECE3 financial deepening must occur in a period
when the transformation of the regulation and operations of their fi-
nancial sectors towards conformity with market economy require-
ments is already very advanced, but cannot yet be qualified as com-
plete. Although it has not been possible to observe a full economic
cycle since the completion of the transformation crises in these
countries, the lending booms which have unavoidably unfolded in-
trinsically carry the danger that the mechanisms characteristic of
procyclical banking behaviour, which foster instability in their finan-
cial sectors, may develop (see Table 2,3).
Need for special regu-
latory solutions
This phenomenon requires a very careful reaction from both reg-
ulatory and supervisory authorities, and the application of policies
and instruments which do not hinder the deepening of financial inter-
mediation, but do safeguard their system from excessive risks and, as
a consequence, from an emerging pattern of procyclical behaviour by
banks, which may eventually contribute to the occurrence of a sys-
temic banking crisis. In our view, of the possible methods capable of
solving the problem – as proposed in Chapter 3.4 – the first option
mentioned, namely encouraging transparency in the system of finan-
cial institutions and promoting better assessment of credit risk, is best
able to support achievement of this goal. Endowing supervisory au-
thorities with discretionary powers may also be useful because if they
feel that the banking sector is assuming risks above and beyond the
extent justified to foster economic growth, in excess of the rate of pro-
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Table 2
EBRD indexes for non-banking financial intermediaries
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Hungary 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3
Czech Republic 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0
Poland 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3
Source:Transition Report 2000, EBRD.
Table 3
EBRD indexes for the degree of overall legal regulation in the financial sector
2000 1999
overall extent effectiveness overall extent effectiveness
Hungary 44 4 44 4
Czech Republic 3+ 4 3– 3 3+ 2+
Poland 44 4 44 4
Source:Transition Report 2000, EBRD.OCCASIONAL PAPERS 89
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Differences between legal systems and their relations with the financial sphere
Legal systems are generally broken down into two main categories: legal systems based on Roman law
(so-called ‘civil law’ systems), and Anglo-Saxon legal systems based on precedents (so-called ‘common
law’ systems). The key difference between these two types of legal systems is that whilst the first one func-
tions almost exclusively by applying statutory provisions stipulated by jurists, the second assures an impor-
tant role for the judgements of courts rendered in legal disputes as well, and these judgements continuously
affect the law itself.
Within the category of civil law systems, three further sub-groups are differentiated in the profes-
sional legal literature. The basis for the French-type legal system is the jurisprudence applied under Napo-
leon. The German-type legal system is based on the jurisprudence applied under Bismarck in the period fol-
lowing German unification. The Scandinavian-type system, though also based on civil law, occasionally
treats civil law prescriptions less rigidly, and thus from a certain point of view represents a transitional type
between the two main groups of legal systems. As to the type of legal system, Hungary and the Czech Re-
public can be classified into the group of countries applying a mixed Franco-Latin/Germanic type of juris-
prudence, while that applied by Poland falls into the Germanic/Scandinavian group.**
A close relationship can be seen between the different legal systems on the one hand, and the devel-
opment level of the financial sphere, on the other. La Porta et al analysed the legal systems of 49 countries in
respect of investor protection. Investor protection was examined according to two points of view - actual
rules and the enforcement of such. It was found that in countries applying the most rigid rules based on
French civil law, the legal protection of investors’ rights could be qualified as weakest, while in countries ap-
plying common law, it could be considered as strongest. Countries applying legal systems based on Ger-
man and Scandinavian-type civil law take a middle position in this respect. (No former socialist countries
were included in the sample comprising 49 countries.) The data used by La Porta et al for the legal systems
was examined by Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) together with their own database as regards financial in-
termediation systems. They concluded that formal rules, as well as their enforceability, exhibited a close re-
lation with the development level of financial intermediation. In countries where the quality and
enforceability of rules protecting investors’ rights was better, the operation of financial intermediation sys-
tems was smoother.
(2000) goes far further in considering the relationship between legal systems and the financial
sphere. His hypothesis, taking as its basis Hayek’s view on the superiority of Anglo-Saxon-type legal sys-
tems versus French-type systems, states that one or the other type of legal system not only constitutes an
instrument capable of more or less supporting financial development, but also plays a causal role in the de-
velopment of financial systems in its own right. Having examined data collected on 102 countries for
1960-1992, he found that the economic growth rate was significantly higher in countries applying common
law systems than in those applying legal systems based on civil law (once again, in this sample former so-
cialist countries were not represented). According to his view, this is mainly due to the fact that An-
glo-Saxon-type legal systems support private sector economic activity more strongly, while legal systems
based on civil law support state intervention more efficiently.
Today, the problems stemming from differences between characteristics or special types of legal sys-
tems have already begun to dissolve due to the globalisation of international money and capital markets,
and in our view, it can be expected that the responsibility borne by international financial institutions for
maintaining and safeguarding financial stability will alleviate such problems even further. The Financial Sta-
bility Forum and activities of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) are good examples of
this process. The Forum has defined 12 international standards, compliance with which constitutes a key
precondition for the stable functioning of financial systems. As seen, these standards have been accepted
and applied by a steadily growing number of countries, irrespective of their particular type of legal system,
and are increasingly accepted as a basis for their national regulations. The BCBS’s proposal for renewing
capital adequacy regulations is based on three pillars and contains the following main principles: transpar-
ency, comprehensive control by supervisory authorities, and the possibility of intervention using discretion-
ary powers. Widespread international acceptance of uniform rules and standards governing financial sys-
tems automatically leads to fewer differences between legal systems. Analysing their special features and
regulatory proposals as well as standards, it is clear that a shift towards an Anglo-Saxon-type legal ap-
proach to financial systems is underway.
* An overview of legal systems can be found in La Porta et al (1996), for example.
** See: Wood (1997).
*** The Financial Stability Forum (FSF) was established in April 1999 with the purpose of coordinating the efforts of differ-
ent forums for supporting financial stability. International financial institutions, national authorities with responsibility for
safeguarding financial stability as well as national supervisory authorities are among the Forum’s founding members.ductivity gains, then they should have an appropriate instrument at
their disposal for intervening efficiently. Endowing supervisory au-
thorities with discretionary powers may also be an efficient, precision
instrument for restraining excessive growth in lending by banks, al-
though its application raises several problems as well. On the one
hand, in these countries the supervisory authorities have short track
records and thus their reputation cannot be compared to that of su-
pervisory authorities operating in market economies of developed
countries. For this reason, the legitimacy of discretionary, and fre-
quently individual, intervention is much lower than in developed
countries. Furthermore, the type of legal system applied in the ECE3
countries, based on civil law and rigorous codification principles, does
not encourage endowing supervisory authorities with discretionary




In our view, the third possible method for solving the problem in
question, considered by the authors of the BIS study as most suit-
able, can only be applied in transition economies to a limited degree.
The introduction, for example, of dynamic provisioning rules, funda-
mentally assumes that a lending boom during an economic upturn is
associated with a procyclical pattern of bank behaviour, i.e. the in-
crease in credit volume is based on a supply-side shift and not on
productivity gains. In respect of a lending boom engendered by ad-
vances in productivity, it presumes that the degree of relaxation in
credit standards will exceed the improvement in debtors’ repayment
capacity. Consequently, dynamic provisioning not only smoothes
banks’ provisioning behaviour, but also smoothes lending activity it-
self, by restraining the buoyancy of lending during an economic up-
swing, and reducing the scope of credit squeeze during a recession.
This may have quite a damaging impact in transition economies, as
it necessarily hinders the deepening process in their financial inter-
mediation. Prescribing high loan-to-value ratios and further increas-
ing these during lending booms may also constitute an obstacle to
deepening financial intermediation.
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ing of the financial in-
termediation systems
is imperative T
he most important conclusion of this study is that – in respect
of the ECE3 – in order to lay the groundwork for the sustainable
economic growth necessary to close the gap to the developed coun-
tries, a significant deepening of their financial intermediation sys-
temsandinparticulartheirbankingsectorsisimperative.Itiscrucial
that this deepening of financial intermediation be accomplished in
such a way that the damaging effect of a pattern of procyclical char-
acter by banks, an excessive relaxation of credit standards, under-




The lending boom which had to occur in these countries is not
an unequivocal sign of imprudent lending or a supply-side expan-
sion in lending by banks – on the contrary, it should be viewed as
a natural accompaniment in the economic development and prog-
ress of these economies. If regulatory and supervisory authorities as-
sess expansion in lending by banks in this region as an undeniable
sign of procyclical behaviour, and formulate regulations to cool
down their lending activity, they may cause serious damage, and,
under extreme circumstances, even contribute to interrupting the
path of economic growth in these countries. On the other hand,
if during a lending expansion supervisory authorities fail to duly
enforce or attend to the enforcement of the principles of prudence,
the best possible assessment and measurement of credit risks
by banks, this may lead to banks’ expansive business policy not
deepening financial intermediation, but rather undermining the sta-
bility of the financial system as a whole.
Fostering a better un-
derstanding of risk
factors
In developed market economies regulatory authorities and the
BCBS are increasingly paying attention to eliminating the deleteri-
ous effect of procyclicality, and a number of proposals regarding
regulation of this character or some alternatives actually capable
solving this sort of problem have been outlined. Presumably, regula-
tions designed to prevent procyclicality cannot be considered as
rules applicable uniformly for every banking system, and – in partic-
ular with regard to transition economies – it must be examined on a
case-by-case basis whether or not such regulations hinder the re-
quired deepening in these financial intermediation systems. In our
view, these countries need regulations which encourage better as-
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gence of appropriate corporate governance, but – in parallel with
these aspects – do not automatically rein in strong lending activity
by banks. For this purpose, publications promoting better assess-
ment of risks as well as professional exchange of views are most
suitable. The special surveys conducted under the title ‘Financial
System Stability Assessment (FSSA)’, published within the frame-
work of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) initiated
by the International Monetary Fund fall into this class, and are de-
voted to exploring the degree of stability or vulnerability of individual
countries’ financial sector. Similarly, financial stability reports pub-
lished by the central banks of more and more countries and publica-
tions by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), pre-
senting professional debates on the renewal of capital adequacy
rules can be classified in this category as well.
Vesting supervisory authorities with discretionary powers may
also be suitable for restraining excessive and at the same time insuf-
ficiently prudent bank lending. But in the ECE3, and mainly in re-
spect of Hungary and the Czech Republic, this instrument is difficult
to harmonise at the time being with their legal systems which are
based on traditional civil law.
Compulsory application of rules formulated or introduced in
developed market economies for restraining procyclicality under
certain conditions may clearly hinder economic development in
transition countries, and hence under no circumstances would we
recommend their introduction as uniform international norms. Dif-
ferent kinds of dynamic provisioning or rules envisaging extremely
rigorous norms for accepting collateral by banks during periods of
expanding lending also belong to this type of regulation.
Focus on quality
factors
In summary, in our view regulatory instruments which focus on
quality factors, foster the development of this sector and operate in
accordance with international standards are effective means of regu-
lating the financial sector in transition economies, placing less em-
phasis on quantitative regulations which (may) slow down the rate of
expansion in bank lending.
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ContentsBanks fail to prepare
for a possible reversal




number of international precedents draw attention
tothefactthatinlendingboomsoccurringduringex-
pansionary phases of the business cycle (which are de-
fined as positive output gaps) banks fail to prepare for
a possible reversal of the cycle and for managing the
growing risks entailed by such a reversal, whereas dete-
rioration of loan portfolio quality during a recession (neg-
ativeoutputgap)caneasilycauseshocksinthebanking
system. This paper investigates the regulatory methods
which are implemented during lending booms in over-
heated economies and which attempt to motivate banks
to be aware of the risks inherent in a change in the busi-
ness cycle.
A considerable increase in the loan portfolio in a tem-
porarily overheated economy is especially dangerous be-
cause the very same loans involve a much higher credit
risk exposure in a recession, as financial downturns are
characterised by an increase in the probability of default
and loss given defaults, and by a strengthening of the
correlation among loan losses and a decline in the value
of collaterals. Thus, loans – as of the moment of being ex-
tended – entail a kind of systemic risk according to




Consequently, the banking instruments which are
presently used to manage credit risks, primarily the tradi-
tional asset side provisioning/loan loss system based on
ex post criteria and the definition of the capital require-
ments, are insensitive to the fact that if a lending boom
takes place during an expansionary business cycle, the
quality of the loans does not reflect potential losses aris-
ing from a possible downturn in the economic cycle.
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sions to the total loan portfolio declines during an expan-
sion and grows during a recession, disregarding the
above-mentioned trend of credit risks. Hence, the devel-
opment of this risk renders banks’ results unstable, exac-
erbating the impact of economic cycles on their stability.
Banks’ behaviour in this regard indicates that they tend
to regard an economic expansion, which is temporary in
its nature, as a permanent phenomenon, and evaluate
their loan-related risks on that basis. On the one hand,
the reason for this is that the consideration of risks in-
creases costs and consequently the price of certain loans,
and, on the other, unsolved methodological problems
and the lack of regulatory encouragement have the same
result.
The adoption of
Basel 2 may increase
procyclicality, but
the assessment
of long data series
may offer a solution
Even the adoption of the New Basel Capital Accord
(Basel 2), which is regarded as a reform of the present
banking regulations, will not modify this type of instabil-
ity in the banking system, due to the short length of the
forecast horizon and other deficiencies in the risk evalua-
tion methods. Indeed, its adoption may even increase the
cyclical flow of capital. Cyclical fluctuations are also
exacerbatedbyneglectingthefactthattheextentofcorre-
lation between loan losses and the value of collaterals de-
velops in parallel with business cycles. Collaterals play a
decisive role in the rating system of banks, mitigating
losses in case of default. Since both the extent of the loan
lossprovisionandtheriskweightusedtospecifythecap-
ital requirement according to the New Basel Capital
Accord depend on the value of collateral, any shift in the
value of the collateral – which follows the development
of the business cycle much closer than the loan portfolio –
influences the extent of loan loss provisions and capital
at the same time and in the same direction. Basel 2, how-
ever, also points out that one of the risk factors – the Loss
Given Default – depends on the business cycle. This
is partly the reason why only those banks which meet
the highest requirements and use data of at least 7 years
(probably reflecting the characteristics of everal phases
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Regulatory instruments which are able to reduce the
banking system’s exposure to the business cycle include
correct modification of loan-to-value ratios, capital re-




specified by a statisti-
cal model
This study focuses on the presentation of the classi-
cal principle of dynamic provisioning, which at present
seems to be the most sophisticated method. In this case,
provisioning is undertaken on the basis of expected fu-
ture losses specified by statistical models. Examples
of this form of regulation are shown using the experiences
of two countries – Spain, where it is a mandatory admin-
istrative requirement and Australia, where it is a recom-
mendation of the supervisory authority.
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he development of banks’ private loan portfolios tend to follow
changes in the business cycle. This trend, however, cannot be




According to the BIS panel investigation (see Chart 1) the tem-
porary overheated nature of an economy, or a recession has an im-
pact on changes in the loan portfolio, although this impact is not
necessarily procyclical - in many cases it is deferred and varies from
country to country.
In the countries reviewed a temporarily overheated economy
(positive output gap) caused an increase in the loan portfolio/GDP
ratio, while in most cases a negative output gap led to stagnation,
or less frequently, to a decline in the ratio. Even during a negative
output gap the loan portfolio/GDP ratio did not decline in Japan in
the 1980s, in England in the early 1980s, nor in Italy in the late
1990s.
In those countries reviewed where the loan portfolio/GDP ratio
declined (Spain, Scandinavian countries), this decline started with
the output gap turning negative; when the crisis was overcome, the
loan portfolio/GDP ratio started to increase concomitantly with the
decline in the negative output gap.
Analogies of bank cri-
ses
International examples of banking system crises (in the Scan-
dinavian countries, Japan, the US, and other Asian countries) illus-
trate that in each case the banking crisis was preceded by a rapid
expansion of lending in an overheated economy, while in other cases
this phenomenon did not cause a decline in the credit/GDP ratio.
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2  Cyclical development of bank lending,
 problem loans and provisions
1 This is demonstrated by the output gap, the difference between the actual and the potential
(trend) GDP. A stable position of the economy is shown by close to zero value of the output gap;
if the output gap is positive, the economy is overheated to such an extent which cannot be main-
tained permanently, if it is negative, there is a recession which is also to be regarded as a temporary
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Chart 1
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2 BIS Papers: Procyclicality of the financial system and financial stability: issues and policy
options,March2001.(OutputgapdataarebasedonthemethodologyusedintheOECDEconomic






The relationship between economic activity and loan losses is much
more evident than the relationship between economic activity and
the credit/GDP ratio. Nevertheless, it is still quite difficult to quantify
this phenomenon and to model the temporal changes in the correla-
tion of individual debtors’ loan losses. Despite the uncertainties
we can presume the following: ceteris paribus, cash flow forecasts
are optimistic throughout a boom, and equity prices and the market
value of firms are high as well. Thus, the probability of default and
loss given default – due to a change in the valuation of the collateral
– is lower during a boom (and higher during a recession). In case of
dynamic economic activity banking conditions ease (partly for-
mally, partly automatically regarding performance) and this may
cause an excessive accumulation of loans.
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Business and lending cycles
On an aggregate level, both credit demand and supply factors change in parallel with the eco-
nomic background. The economic background can be characterised using the following as-
pects: GDP and the rate of unemployment, private consumption, asset prices and the regional
and global development of the economy. Problems arise if the evaluation of the future is unreal-
istic, i.e. if increases in asset prices and loans are unjustified, because the expectations on
which their values are based have become irrational. Bubbles of this type will burst sooner or
later, and this is evident mainly in declines in asset prices.
Asset prices may be defined as the present value of the income produced by the assets in
the future. Thus, increasing asset prices reflect increasing future incomes, which make it
worthwhile to take out more loans ( demand for loans increases). The supply of credit in-
creases as well, since higher asset prices enable higher levels of credits. So parties wishing to
borrow are in a better position. Simultaneously, they will be assessed more positively, as
higher income and cash flow expectations indicate that debtors will be able to service and re-
pay their debts more easily. The banking crises in the 1980s and 1990s in the developed econo-
mies all resulted from an expansion of lending driven by high asset prices (frequently increas-
ing real estate prices entail a change in the loan portfolio, for example in the case of the Scandi-
navian crisis).
Private consumption and a positive international business environment may also lead to
increases in the loan portfolio (for example, in Denmark in 1982–1986 and 1993–1998). In the
household sector the macroeconomic consequences of a boom are declining unemployment
and rising real wages, while in the corporate sector the result is an improving market for prod-
ucts. The corporate sector’s credit demand rises in order to accommodate growing consumer
demand. Households also want to borrow out more, in order to purchase capital goods (which
seems to be more cost-effective due to the expansion) or to follow growing real estate prices or
to make advance consumption. While banks are prepared for the possibility that some of their
loans will be non-performing (for example due to default by firms), they are not prepared for a
concurrent series of defaults in a recession.…and so does sys-
temic risk
Economic intuition suggests that the correlation among loan
losses is higher if the probability of default is high. The reason for
this is mainly that the better a company’s credit rating, the lower its
correlation with the loan losses of other companies and vice versa.
Thus, we might presume that default correlation is also higher during
a recession than during a boom. The development of correlation of
loan losses is also reinforced by the fact that the coincidence of de-
fault is probably due to systematic factors as well; thus, the change
in the correlation may clearly follow the development of systemic
risk, which is higher during a recession. For the participants of the fi-
nancial system systemic risk is a ‘mediator’, which ‘transmits’ the
cyclical development of the economic and financial environment.
An increase in the
loan portfolio is a
kind of risk indicator
Since loans involve a latent risk as of the very moment of being
extended – depending on the changes in the macroeconomic envi-
ronment – this latent credit risk moves in parallel with the loan port-
folio, and increases when the loan portfolio grows. Consequently,
it may be justified to regard an increase in the loan portfolio as a kind
of risk indicator.
In terms of banking instruments, provisions and capital are
used to measure and manage credit risk exposure. Thus, it is useful
to investigate how their level changes in connection with the afore-
mentioned development of credit risk exposure.
2.2 Instruments used to manage credit risk
exposure – provisions and capital
Credit risk is covered
by provisions
and capital
Traditionally, capital is used to cover unexpected losses, whereas
provisions serve to cover expected losses. For capital it is expedient
to consider a different time horizon than in the case of provisions.
A time period is considered to be relevant throughout which the
bank is able to raise new capital or is able to eliminate risk expo-
sures in its balance sheet. Whereas expected events after the expi-
ration of the duration may modify the asset value and the provisions
needed, this change does not influence the quantity of capital. In re-
spect of loans, however, this diverging time horizon does not result
in a significant difference, since in most cases the duration is de-
fined by the maturity of the asset and upon ‘expiration’ of the dura-
tion the asset disappears.
The aggregate volume of provisions formed in relation to lend-
ing activity is designed to reflect a bank’s credit risk exposure in the
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3 In the case of individual debtors, client groups and industries as well.
4 Zhou (1997), Gersbach and Lipponer (2000)entire loan portfolio, to reduce the value of loans to a level which is in
line with their risks, and to represent all these aspects in the profit
and loss accounts, thus rendering a correct and prudent evaluation
of the bank’s profit and capital. The total volume of provisions (spe-
cific and general) can be considered adequate if it is able to counter-
balance the estimated losses in the loan portfolio.
Forward-looking
provisioning
It is a fact, that in countries experiencing a financial recession
banks have consistently underestimated the possible losses in their
assets, and thus overvalued their assets (including the value of
loans) and capital. This highlights the fact that there is an urgent
need for forward-looking criteria, through which expected future
losses on loans are already treated as losses in the present, function-
ing as a certain type of insurance. In certain countries the financial
authorities support the specification of expected losses with statisti-
cal models, and the provisions established on the basis of such cal-
culations are called ex ante or dynamic provisions. The following ta-
ble presents a few examples of ex post and ex ante provisioning cri-
teria.
Unlike ex post crite-
ria, ex ante criteria
are not specified
by regulators
It is clear that the use of ex post criteria is the simplest and most
self-evident method. Regulators tend to formulate ex post criteria
most clearly, while also ambiguously referring to ex ante criteria as
well, thus providing significant leeway for banks to apply ex ante cri-
teria. In most countries specific provisions are established if a loss is
highly probable (for example due to past-due payment), however
there is still a possibility that the claim will be collected. Thus, in
some respects they use also ex ante criteria, but in practice only the
most developed banks use ex ante provisioning, and – as will be evi-
dent from the limits of the credit risk models – in these cases as well
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Table 1
5
Ex post criteria Ex ante criteria
– Delay in interest rates or principal
payments
– If the loss is legally acknowledged
– Loss is highly probable according to sta-
tistical analyses (including delays, histori-
cal experiences, present economic
conditions)
– The quality of the loan has deteriorated
(there is not enough collateral to service it)
– According to credit rating information the
loss is quite probable.
– The loss is attributable to temporary fac-
tors (fluctuation in the annual loss around
the expected value throughout a business
cycle)
5 Cortavarria, Dziobek, Kanaya, Inwon (2000)the criteria are applied only with certain shortcomings. General pro-
visions are created on a ‘more forward looking’ basis since they are
established for losses, which are formally not predictable although
their occurrence is quite probable.
Ratings based on tra-
ditional indicators
can be viewed more
as ex post
According to current regulations in Hungary specific provi-
sions/loan loss allowances must be established if default for a speci-
fied period of time has occurred in the schedule of payments, or
if information is obtained indicating that such a default is quite prob-
able – thus both ex ante and ex post criteria are formulated. This,
however, is realised initially as an ex post criteria related to the pres-
ent and the past. The main reason for this is that measuring future
credit quality expectations is very complicated and thus, in the
course of the rating based on traditional balance-sheet indicators,
provisions are established mainly on the basis of events which have
already happened and not on those which may happen in the future.
General provisions on the liability side, which – amongst other
things – also include the growth in the loan portfolio, only reflect the
increase in the volume, and not the character (slowing, accelerating)
of growth.






ceases to be over-
heated
According to the examples illustrated in Chart 2, the provi-
sion/total loans ratio begins to grow upon termination of the positive
output gap and peaks at the top of the negative output gap. Compar-
ison with Chart 1 shows that the quality of the loans accumulated
during the positive output gap deteriorates considerably when the
economy ceases to be overheated. Since only an insignificant por-
tion of provisions established in a certain year are connected with
new loans, the change in the provisions/loan portfolio ratio provides
insight on the change in the quality in the previous year’s portfolio.
With the decline in the negative gap the provisions/total loans ratio
also declines, thus the quality of the portfolio does not continue to
decline - banks do not face more default on payments; on the con-
trary, the trend improves. The development of provisions also illus-
trates the behaviour of banks, showing that they evaluate the quality
of loans based on the assumption that the business situation prevail-
ing in a certain year is permanent.
Aware of the change in risk factors, even on the basis of mere
observations, we may draw the conclusion that changes in the busi-
ness cycle influence the systemic risk of loans. Whereas the devel-
opment of a positive gap means low risks throughout the maturity
of an average loan portfolio (which, on the basis of the recommenda-
tions of the New Basel Capital Accord, is about 3 years), a decline
in the positive gap and the development of a negative gap lead to a
considerable increase in risks.
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6 According to the valid (effective) Hungarian regulations general provisions might be taken into
consideration among tier 1 capital elements up to maximum 1.25% of the total balance sheet.OCCASIONAL PAPERS 109
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7 BIS Papers (2001) Output gap data are based on the methodology used in OECD: Economic Outlook.
Chart 2
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SwedenProvisioning is not
forward-looking
The change in provisions outlined above can be explained in
several ways. Accumulation of specific provisions declines during an
economic upswing due to the fact that the debt repayment ability of
debtors is excellent and they satisfy traditional evaluation criteria
more easily. The creation of general provisions increases, since
these are established in most cases in relation to total assets, i.e.
they exert some kind of correcting effect – but on the basis of interna-
tional examples, it can been seen that this is insufficient. (See Chart
2.)Thus, all in all, the ratio of provisions established against total
loans declines. Bank results, which are improving anyway due to the
credit boom, will continue to improve since they need only charge a
small amount of provisions as costs.
The effect is exactly the opposite in the case of a recession – the
allocation and portfolio of specific provisions increases, because the
position of debtors deteriorates and the volume of general provisions
increases at a slower rate (if the recession causes a decline in the
rate of increase of loans and not of the total volume since in the latter
case the portfolio decreases). Thus, total provisioning increases,
with a further deleterious impact on banking results, which are de-
clining anyway.
This behaviour will be strengthened further by the fact that dur-
ing a strong business upturn the market expects a higher yield from
banks and exerts considerable pressure on them to produce higher
profits. This increase in profits is also supported by the decline in
provisions established against loans - thus banks will be less inter-
ested in disclosing uncertain future losses and thereby reducing their
results.
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comings T
he current risk measurement methods (banks’ internal ratings,
ratingsofcreditratingagencies,creditriskmodels)areprimarily
able to assess relative risks, but are hardly suited for the evaluation
of changes in systemic risks due to financial and business cycles.
The main reason for this is the lack of available data, but certain
characteristics of the models also have this consequence, such
as the short-term time horizon, disregard of the diversification effect
in the loan portfolio, or the assumption that the correlation between





tems focus on a point
in time and investi-
gate the risk of a
one-year time horizon
The more developed rating systems, which evaluate the total credit
risk exposure of the portfolio and are also involved in pricing, capi-
tal allocation and provisioning decisions, suffer from the following
problems: they focus on a particular date (point-in-time) and inves-
tigate the risk of a one-year time horizon. The reason for the one-
year horizon is the availability of data, the accounting period of
banks and the time period of allocating new capital. These systems
do not deal at all with changes in the correlation typical for the port-
folio or with the fact that they develop in parallel with the business
cycle and the deterioration of credit quality.
Consequently, the quality of banks’ portfolios changes consid-





to stabilise their rat-
ings
Despite the fact that actual practice shows a different picture,
agencies specialised in rating debtors and loans try to rate their
debtors so that the rating is valid through a whole cycle
(through-the-cycle). Their method is to assume a hypothetical
negative scenario when investigating the debtor (they assume a
higher default probability or – more often – higher loss given de-
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3  Limitations of risk measurement methods
 in the assessment of systemic risksfaults). Ratings are changed if the agency changes the probability
of default in the negative scenario or the scenario itself. This,
of course, also means that if a recession is more severe than
the postulated negative scenario, the rating deteriorates. The con-
sequence of this method is that whereas the rating of a debtor will
not change throughout a cycle, the probability of default relevant
for a specific rating will. On the contrary, if the debtor is rated
for a particular date assuming present conditions, the rating of
the debtor will change over the course of time, but the probability
of default will remain constant. Thus, banks must pay particular
attention to the method which they wish to use in their internal
rating system and whether or not they want to make their rating





Most rating agencies do not only modify risk factors on the ba-
sis of their assumptions regarding business cycles, but also consider
the role of the debtor within the particular sector of industry as well
as the demand and supply-determining role of the industrie’s busi-
ness cycle.
Credit risk models
The majority of mod-
els extrapolate the
present state into the
future
Limitations are...
For the majority of models it is evident that models extrapolate the
present state into the future in some way or another. For larger port-
folios the nature of correlations within the portfolio – if they are con-




The Merton-based model concentrates on microeconomic
changes. In concrete terms this means that the probability of default
is calculated from the capital structure and the volatility of the asset
price. According to the model, default occurs if the value of liabilities
exceeds the market value of assets on the day of maturity. Accord-
ing to initial assumptions credit risk is governed by the dynamism
of asset values, thus it evaluates the probability of liabilities’ book
values exceeding assets’ market values, in correspondence to cer-
tain systemic factors.
The market value of corporate assets is not considered as a
value which can be observed – hence, the market value will be speci-
fied with the aid of equity prices, the volatility of equities and the
book value of liabilities applying the option characteristic of equities.
Used for a one-year period it will produce obviously cyclical values
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8 More detailed see Horváth (2001)since equity prices and the volatility of equities moving in parallel
with the business cycle determine the default probability and the cor-
relation among corporate defaults. A longer than one-year applica-
tion of the model is possible as well; in this case, however, the time




The CreditMetrics model using a transition matrix operates on
the following principle: each debtor is rated and, with the help of a
transition matrix, the probability of an improvement or deterioration
of the rating, or perhaps default is specified. A default is the most ex-
treme case of a drop in value, but the price of the loan also declines if
the rating deteriorates. Accordingly the CreditMetrics model simu-
lates the distribution of the debtors’ rating at random (what is the
probability of each rating). It recalculates the price of the loan on the
basis of the values calculated and with forward premiums typical for
the rating given and – by aggregating these sums – it generates the
value of the portfolio. Thus, it is generally regarded as a forward
looking model; the consideration of future events, however, occurs
through a mechanical adaptation of transition matrixes, and a transi-
tion matrix does not depend on economic or financial variables.
Another disadvantage of the model is that it strongly depends on the
rating system used.
...dependence on the
quality of the data...
The CreditRisk+ model focuses on the loss distribution of port-
folios using analytical calculations. Its methodology is based on
mathematical models which are also used in the field of insurance.
Different sectors are created in the model, with each sector exhibit-
ing a characteristic loss distribution and using two parameters: the
expected value and the volatility of the probability of default. The
conditional probability of default of a particular loan is worked out
with cross-sector weighting. Thus, the occurrence of a default is a
statistical probability without any background argument. The model,
which due to its default mode aspect concentrates exclusively on
losses from default and does not handle changes in loan quality, de-
pends strongly on the methodology according to which the probabil-
ity of default is formulated. If this is focused on a particular date, the
results of the model will be cyclical.
...and shortage of
data
There are also models, which make their results explicitly de-
pendent on the state of the economy. The CreditPortfolioView is
an econometric model, which regards the actual macroeconomic
environment as a determinant factor in the evaluation of credit risk.
Thus, for example, the default probability of a BBB debtor is higher
in a recession than in an improving economic environment.
The distribution of losses is customised using the state of the
economy in different countries and industrial sectors. The econo-
metric model calculates the ratio of default through the analysis
of an indicator consisting of macroeconomic variables and the sensi-
tivities related to them. Instead of using average default ratios to
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dependent on the actual economic situation. This model was created
by the observation that the ratio of default changes in parallel with
the cycles of the economy, and that the volatility of the default ratio
can differ considerably across various sectors. Therefore, in this
case, the links observed among macroeconomic factors and transi-
tion matrixes are used. The problem is primarily a lack of the re-
quired data.
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tion may be neces-
sary, but also
dangerous I
n the event of intervention, the following question arises: to what
extent are the authorities better able to estimate the vulnerability of
the system than the market? In any case, regulators have different
incentives and different responsibilities than market players (e.g.
protection of depositors, stability of the system, etc.). Thus, for ex-
ample,inaperiodofrapidgrowthregulatorsmayfinditnecessaryto
increase capital requirements whereas the institutions themselves
are less willing to increase capital. At the same time, another aspect
must be taken into consideration: what are the consequences if the
authorities intervene in the wrong direction? The efficiency of the
banking sector may deteriorate if regulators require excessive cau-
tion, which is not justified based on the growth of asset prices,
whereasitmayleadtoaweakeningofthesystemifnointerventionis




A financial cycle’s volatility may be exacerbated by regulatory
restrictions, collateral valuation techniques, incorrect estimation of
capital reserves and provisions. Regulators have three instruments,
which they can use in different ways (discretionarily, automatically
and by setting minimum limits):
– suitable modification of loan-to-value ratios
– modification of capital adequacy regulations
– changes to provisioning requirements.
… and its three
methods are
verbal intervention...
In addition to these options, there is the possibility of verbal in-
tervention as well, revealing and communicating risks in the form of
published analyses, research studies and speeches presented by
managers on the stability of the financial system. Accordingly sev-
eral countries, including Norway, Sweden, England and Hungary
publish reports on financial stability. Verbal intervention, of course,
can only have results if market players take the analyses of the au-
thorities seriously – warnings which are ignored have no effect.
Regulatory instruments can also be supplemented automati-
cally in line with the change in risks if minimum capital adequacy
ratios, provisioning ratios and the maximum loan-to-value ratio are
linked automatically to factors such as the growth rate of loans,
the length of an expansion, or changes in real estate prices. This
method has the same effect as the use of discretionary instruments.
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4  Possible regulatory instruments for reducing
 the volatility of financial cycles...changing the meth-
ods behind regula-
tory requirements
One advantage is that it does not depend on the hesitation
of authorities, and there is no need of constantly justify this type
of intervention. One disadvantage, however, is the difficulty in esti-
mating the correlation among variables and finding weights, which
are constant within the time limit, and modelling their effects.
Another method of amending regulations is that the regulatory
requirements do not change explicitly, but rather the methods and
models behind them are altered. One example of this is a change
of provisioning rules. More and more sophisticated internal models
are adapted to specify expected losses. It would be beneficial to
make use of these models in the accounting rules as well.
...and discretionary
intervention
Discretionary use of supervisory instruments is only seldom
possible, in the case of significant imbalances. In such cases super-
visory instruments are employed on the basis of particular supervi-
sory decisions and not automatically. These methods may function
primarily as security brakes, in the event that automated mecha-
nisms fail.
The period reviewed
should be a medium
time period
In order to correct the most important shortcomings of the
models – namely, the short time period – regulators may specify that
the period reviewed be a medium time period, thereby integrating
changes in the business cycle into the model.




Attention should be drawn to two possible dangers of regulatory in-
tervention or the failure to undertake such intervention. During an
economic downturn there is greater pressure on supervisors to in-
troduce tighter standards, in order to protect depositors and the
banking system. This, however, may contribute to a further expan-
sion of the crisis since it curbs lending activity, which is already de-
clining more steeply anyway. It exacerbates the cyclical movement
of lending too, if the supervisors do not change the standards during
a business cycle. Constant standards represent a de facto easing
during an upturn and a tightening during a recession.
4.1.1 Modification of loan-to-value ratios
In most countries it has been realised that real estate prices react
most sensitively to the development of the financial cycle. Thus, the
market price of collaterals may intensify the evolution of the cycle.
This will have an even stronger effect if the loan-to-value ratio is
high. Most supervisory authorities do not specify exact parameters
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specify discount rates to calculate the present value or to recom-
mend the use of conservative valuation procedures. Thus, for exam-
ple, in Germany minimum discount rates and forecasting time
periods are defined, in Denmark discount rates are defined but in
a less formal way, while in Japan and Mexico haircuts for further de-
preciation of the market value are formulated. During the crisis
in Hong Kong in the 1990s lending was limited to 70 per cent of the
collateral – 3 years later this figure was cut back to 60 per cent. The
New Basel Capital Accord (Basel 2) specifies the minimum haircuts
according to the type and quality of collaterals; the first draft of the
recommendation allowed a perfect coverage only in extraordinary
cases (i.e. repo-style transactions).
Medium-term eco-
nomic changes may
also be taken account
of through the modifi-
cation of the haircuts
used in the valuation
of collateral and
loan-to-value ratios
Changes in the maximum loan-to-value ratios or modification
of the haircuts used in the valuation of collaterals can also be used as
a discretionary instrument. However, it is also possible for maximum
loan-to-value figures to be linked automatically to certain indicators.
In addition to automatic modifications minimum haircuts might be
specified to the valuation of collaterals as well.




during a boom will
provide a buffer
during a downturn
As another discretionary instrument, authorities may require higher
capital adequacy ratio throughout a boom either at the system level
or at specific banks which are highly exposed to changes in
the business cycle. The same could function automatically when
– such as in the case of loan-to-value ratios – minimum capital
adequacy ratios are linked to the state of the economy, the growth
rate of lending or real estate prices. Changes to minimum capital
adequacy ratios may serve as a minimum mandatory supervisory
regulation when, for example, ‘target’ capital requirement indica-
tors are set for banks, which they may underperform only during re-
cessions and may lower their capital adequacy ratio to the mini-
mum level.
4.1.3 Modification of provisioning methods
Minimum provisioning ratios can be specified both discretionarily
and automatically, similar to the aforementioned. There are manda-
tory, normative supervisory regulations available as well, to miti-
gate the cyclical changes in provisions, such as the regulations in-
troduced in Spain.
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with dynamic
provisioning are...
In the course of dynamic provisioning, which aims at specifying
expected losses, the most important steps are the following:
...defining expected
losses...
– Specifying expected losses which are characteristic for indi-
vidual categories (regulators use a minimum value, while banks use
a value estimated by internal models). Essentially, this is the most
controversial area, since there is no perfect model and different
models produce different results.
...and clarifying ac-
counting rules
– Selection of accounting principles. Provisions created in this
manner are a kind of general provision in the sense that they are not
connected to a particular loan but to categories and the portfolio as a
whole. On the other hand, such provisions are not part of own funds -
contrary to general provisions - since with the realisation of risks the
specific provision is transferred from these provisions.
International models Dynamic provisioning or the application of similar statistical
methods for creating provisions is not yet a widely used technique.
As a mandatory regulation it is applied only in Spain and Portugal;
in Australia the supervisory authority recommends its use, while
several other countries offer tax incentives to encourage application
of this method. Some of the most developed banks use a
provisioning system based on statistical methods, for example:
Barclays Bank PLC and Swiss Banking Corporation in Europe,
Bankers Trust, JP Morgan, Bank of America, Citibank and Bank of
Montreal in North-America.
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9 The point of this method is that statistical provisions are defined on the basis of long-term aver-
age losses and specific provisions are established complementing these allowances, so the change
in specific provisions does not influence profit and loss accounts.
10 Cortavarria, Dziobek, Kanaya, Song 2001)5.1 The statistical provisions in Spain
5.1.1 The new method of provisioning
A
s a result of the boom in the Spanish economy, since 1993 the
lending expansion of banks has led to a low value of the provi-
sions/total loan portfolio ratio for the reasons outlined above.
In Spain and Portu-
gal, dynamic
provisioning has
been a regulatory in-
strument since 1999
Recognising the problems inherent in this phenomenon, the
authorities modified the provisioning rules in the second half of
1999. These regulations now require credit institutions to take risks
of this nature into consideration over the medium and long term.
A new provisioning category was also created, the so-called ‘statisti-
cal provision for insolvency’ (see Chart 3).
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5  International examples
 of dynamic provisioning
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Provisions/total loans (right-hand scale)
Chart 3
Provisions-to-total loans ratio and GDP growth rateThe three constitu-
ents of provisions
General and specific provisions are created continuously in the
traditional manner and for traditional purposes. General provisions
are established to cover expected losses as a given proportion of the
total loan portfolio (there are three risk groups: 0%, 0.5%, 1%), which
are, however, not connected with direct assets and are for unspeci-
fied losses. Specific provisions are created to cover the expected im-
pairment of assets based on problem loans and coefficients con-
nected therewith (these more or less correspond to the categories
found in Hungary). In addition to these provisions, the statistical pro-
vision is formed with the purpose of anticipating risks arising from
changes in business cycles for each risk category. The statistical
provision records the expected losses connected with the initial port-
folio in a way that total provisions (specific, general and statistical)
created over the years are smoothed. The statistical provision in-
creases in periods of economic growth, complementing net specific
provisions, which are rather low in these periods compared to total
loans. That is, it records expected losses expected in a recession
against the profit for the present period. The ratio of specific provi-
sions to total loans, which increases during a recession, will be re-
duced in the P&L account by the release of the statistical provision.
Thus, in a specific year it is not necessary to create as high provi-
sions as specific provision indicators show, since the institution is al-
ready prepared to handle that problem, it has already created a part
of this provision earlier.
Statistical provisions
for expected losses
also take account of








changes in the eco-
nomic cycle
The new approach establishes six categories according to the
riskiness of loans and these six categories are assigned the historical
average net specific provisioning ratios (ratios increasing with riski-
ness) based on a previous cycle (1986–1998). This indicator is the
average of the net provisions created throughout the cycle, thus it
determines the amount of provisions to be created for expected loan
losses (latent risks) for one year in advance (this indicator is known
as the statistical specific charge, or SSC, hereinafter: estimated sta-
tistical loss), which is shown in the P&L accounts for the year in
question. Due to its calculation methodology, this value is a flow
value and not a stock value. It indicates the amount of provisioning
necessary against the loan portfolio with a given risk in that particu-
lar year in order to smooth provisions connected with the initial loan
portfolio during the years. Following the estimation of expected
losses of the loan category given, the write-off is carried out
smoothly, not in one step.
On a quarterly basis, the estimated statistical loss (one-quarter
of the yearly amount) is compared to specific provisions, loan loss
write-offs and recoveries, and releases of provisions in the profit and
loss accounts (this is the net provision created against doubtful and
bad loans). The aim of this method is that the aggregate amount of
the estimated statistical loss and the general provision (GP) should
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year. Hence, if the amount of the estimated statistical loss is higher
than the specific provisions created in that quarter (recorded provi-
sions are insufficient or loan loss forecasts are too optimistic) the
missing difference is entered into the Statistical Provision account as
a profit-decreasing item. If the situation is the opposite and the esti-
mated statistical loss is lower than the specific provision created, the
surplus will be released through the Statistical Provision account and
it will be entered as a profit-increasing item. In this way it is possible
for the correct amount of provision to be entered in the profit and loss
account, no less and no more.
Provisions required
in one particular year
– expected annual
losses







the risk profile of new
loans and that of ex-
isting loans
The new loan loss provisioning method is a correcting account
which smoothes the cyclical nature of the ratio of provisioning to to-
tal loans and the profit influencing effects of provisions. The change
in provisions indicates the change in the portfolio of risky loans – es-
sentially changes in the credit quality of new loans and to a lesser ex-
tent changes in existing loans. This later might only happen if the es-
timation is incorrect, or an unexpected shock occurred. It already
provides information on the risks of the loan at the beginning of the
transaction and thus the bank will have a chance not only to simply
react, but can decide as early as the lending phase if it wishes to take
on the risk of the transaction or not.
The determination of the estimated statistical loss, which is
used as a basis for provisioning, is a critical point in this system -
hence, a high level flexibility is built in to ensure the viability of the
system. In the case of the standard approach the result is the follow-
ing: six different categories are established according to the sensitiv-
ity to changes in the business cycle, and these are multiplied by co-
efficients characteristic for the different credit categories (in brack-
ets) which are to be modified according to the characteristic features
of the development of the next business cycle:
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Annual estimated statistical loss
Annual net specific provisions








ity to changes in the
economic environ-
ment
– Without risk (0%) items: risks involving the public sector
– Low risk (0.1%) items: certain mortgages, and exposures to
firms whose long-term debts are rated at least A.
– Medium-low risk (0.4%) items: financial leases and other
collateralised claims (which are different from the two points above)
– Medium risk (0.6%) items: risks not categorised under the
other points.
– Medium-high risk (1%) items: personal credits to finance pur-
chases of durable consumer goods, other goods and services not for
business purposes.
– High risk (1.5%) items: credit card balances, current account





In specifying credit risk categories and their coefficients, Span-
ish regulators made use of their historical experience (at least in the
case of the centrally-formulated standard methodology). As a model
they considered a total business cycle (1986-1998) and the ratio of
net specific provisions created during the years of that cycle to the
total loan portfolio. This is the ratio of provisioning which is needed
to cover loan losses expected in a business cycle, and this volume
was distributed evenly (averaged) for the years of the cycle. The aim
was not to adapt to the past cycle in the example, but rather to antici-
pate the next cycle. Thus, they decided that all these coefficients
might be modified any time if a shift in the characteristic trend
through the cycle and the associated loss renders such a change
necessary.
Correction is based
on the outlook for the
future
Assuming minimum requirements are satisfied, credit institu-
tions are allowed to use their own risk management system to spec-
ify the provisioning ratios necessary in individual cycles if they find
their system more appropriate. With this policy they encourage
banks to use risk management systems, which are more in accor-
dance with the new capital adequacy reforms, which the BCBS
wishes to introduce. The standard approach is a minimum require-
ment at the same time (if they use their own methodology, but if this
is below the level of the centrally-specified rates, they must use the
later). Despite the fact that the method of calculation and the deter-
mination of the ratio of provisioning to be achieved is left up to the
credit institutions, the treatment of these provisions is in accordance
with the accounting system of the centrally-regulated standard
approach.
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Provisions follow
changes in the vol-
ume of risky loans
Net provisions created during the year using statistical provisions as
well (SP+GP+StP) involve elements, which follow the volume indi-
cators of the loans (GP+estimated statistical loss) since both are
calculated in the proportion of risky loans. Thus, the change in pro-
visions reflects the development of loans correctly if there is no need
to change coefficients.
General Provision:
Level: coefficient * total loan portfolio
Change in provision of the year: GP = coefficient *  total loan
portfolio
Specific Provision:
Level: coefficient * problem loan portfolio
Change in provision of the year: SP = coefficient *  problem
loan portfolio
Statistical Provision:
Latent risk measure (estimated statistical loss, SSC):
coefficient * size of the given loan category
Change in provisions in the year: StPt = SSC – SP (specific
provisions created in the year)
Level: StPt + the previous year’s level
Change in total provisions in the year given:
GP+SP+StPt=coefficient* total loan+SP+(SSC–SP)=GP+SSC
The expected effects of the new provision factor is well illus-
trated in Charts 4 and 5 which are the results of the simulation devel-
oped for the case of Spain.
11 The left axis shows the value of loans,
while the right axis the value of net provisions created during the
year and the horizontal axis the number of years. The actual statisti-
cal provision is the change in the statistical provision level in the year
given, i.e. the sum of creation and release of provisions in the year
given, so negative values are possible, the level of the statistical pro-
visions, however, may never fall below zero. Traditional provisions
are shown similarly as changes in the portfolio.
Chart 5 illustrates how provision portfolio changes evolve dur-
ing a lending cycle in a traditional approach and with statistical pro-
visions. As is also observed in practice, the increase in traditional
provisions is low when the loan portfolio is increasing, which is
mainly due to the dominance of specific provisions.
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11 Lis, Pagés, Saurina (2000)The smoothing effect
of statistical provi-
sions
With the help of statistical provisions total provisions follow the
development of the volume and risk of the loan correctly, thus per-
forming a dynamic provisioning function.
Analysing the change in the ratio of provisions to the total loan
portfolio, the change in the statistical provision and thus its re-
sult-smoothing effect is evident.
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If the shape or the length of the cycle was not properly estimated,
the consequence will be that coefficients and hence expected losses
will be specified incorrectly. In this case, since the portfolio of statis-
tical provisions is limited to between zero and three times the annual
expected loss, incorrect calculation does not have serious conse-
quences. The correcting effects of the statistical provisions linger on
and when they reache the ceilings, they allow the system to con-
tinue working, as if the correction did not exist at all.
The same will happen if the statistical provision is introduced in
a period when a decline is just starting. Since its level may never be
negative, it automatically ‘will not start operating’ until the economy
and lending starts expanding.
5.1.4 Taxation and capital adequacy
Provisioning influ-
ences the amount
of capital via the fi-
nancial results
Regarding the characteristics and working principles of the statisti-
cal provision (created as a cost to cover expected losses) it is not
an element of own funds. Nevertheless, creation of the statistical
provision influences the amount of capital, because, ceteris paribus,
low results during a boom decrease the size of the basic capital
elements, while during a recession, on the other, they increase it.
In Spain specific and general provisions are tax-deductible ex-
penses, whereas the statistical provision is not – thus the distribution
of tax-payment through a cycle has not changed.
5.2 Recommendations




In June 2001, the Australian supervisory authority published a rec-
ommendation on dynamic provisioning. The new provisioning sys-
tem represents a shift in the fundamental strategy of provisioning,
since it does not specify the expected loan losses for a future date
(for example on December 31); instead, the expected loan loss
within the maturity of the loan is regarded as the key factor.
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12 APRA, Australian Prudential Regulation Authority
13 StaffmemberoftheAustralianReserveBank,Mr.PatrickD’Arcyhelpedusinthischapterwith
documents.For identified losses of particular loans (which are not yet
losses, although the signs of non-performance are already indicated,
for example, by a delay in interest payment) a specific provision is
created, while for losses expected in the portfolio, general provisions
are generated using the technique of dynamic provisioning. The su-





Expected losses = loan value * probability of default (%) * Loss
given defaults (%) * (correction factor to reflect stage of economic
cycle, if applicable) * average remaining term of exposure
Provisions are calcu-
lated based on the ex-
pected losses during
the maturity of the
loan corrected for the
stage of the business
cycle
The formula above defines the expected loss of particular loans
– by aggregating these, the total expected loss of the portfolio can be
calculated. Since the probability of default and loss given defaults
are annual indicators, multiplying them by the value of loans pro-
duces the annual expected loss. Correction of the result by the aver-
age remaining term to maturity is necessary to define the expected
loss throughout the period of maturity. Correction according to busi-
ness cycles is necessary since the probability of default and loss
given defaults are specified on the basis of historical data. Without
this correction the result is much less relevant in respect of the fu-
ture. On the basis of the aforementioned, the formula can be inter-
preted as follows: expected losses during the maturity of the loan
corrected for the stage of the business cycle.
On the basis of the definition above the model accepts the sys-
temic risk stemming from the change in the business cycle and
its explicit effects on the particular risk of the debtor, but it does




a period of stable
business
Correction by the remaining term to maturity ensures that
whereas new loans increase the level of provisions, provisions for old
loans continuously decline. Thus, if a maturing loan is substituted for
a loan in a similar risk category, of similar amount (stable business)
the provision does not change. For example, if I grant 3-year loans
on an annual basis, in the first year my portfolio consists of 3 loans
each with a face value of 100 with 1, 2 and 3 years duration. Next
year the 1-year term loan expires and instead a new 3-year loan will
enter the portfolio. The remaining duration of the other two loans de-
creases by 1 year, thus the product of the value of the loan portfolio
and the average remaining duration remains constant.
Correction by the remaining term to maturity obviously encour-
ages short-term lending, in the case of stable course of business;
however, if the risk of maturing and new loans is identical, the portfo-
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14Theriskfactorsofwhicharethesameastheriskfactorsintheinternalmodelspublishedinthe
New Basle Capital Accord (probability of default, loss given default, maturity).lio risk and the volume of provisions remain stable (this is reflected in





moment the loan is
entered into the bal-
ance sheet
One important difference compared to the method used by the
Spanish regulators is that expected losses are not distributed over
the whole period of the cycle, but the entire estimated amount is de-
ducted the moment the loan is entered into the balance sheet. The
table below illustrates roughly how the correction by the average
term of maturity functions. For the sake of simplicity we demon-
strate the creation and release of the provision of a loan portfolio with
four-year average remaining term, with an initial face value of 100,
excluding interest and principal payments. The expected annual
loan loss is 10.
5.2.1 Dynamic provisioning at the Westpac Bank
The system introduced in 1997 manages larger loans, corporate
loans and consumer loans differently. On the whole, the method is
not different from the recommendations of the Australian supervi-
sory authority published two years later, but it does not explicitly
correct the model for business cycles. During the recording of the
risk factors, however, this correction may be introduced into the
value of expected loss in an implicit way as well. In the case of retail
loans, specific loans are not rated but rather are assigned to default
categories. According to this method there is a category for
one-month delay, two-month delay, etc. The flow among categories
and ultimately the occurrence of risks can be characterised with a
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Table 2















1 10 –10 40 –40
2 20 –10 40 0
3 30 –10 40 0
4 40 –10 40 0stable proportion and provisioning is based on that ratio. In the
event that no appropriate data are available for this approach, a ra-
tio is used for provisioning, i.e. the portfolio of the yearly average
bad loans is expressed in the proportion of outstanding housing
loans.
For corporate loans (large loans) the rating system of the bank
corresponds to the rating system of the rating agencies (Moody’s,
Standard & Poors) and uses the default ratios officially published by
these agencies. The bank decides on the question, to which category
the particular loan may belong. The extent of the loss, however, is
estimated on the basis of own data.
The amount of provision will be specified the following way:
Dynamic provision = expected losses = loan * probability of de-
fault of the loan category * severity of loss, characteristic for indus-





The average maturity is equal to the weighted average remain-
ing term of different loan categories; the maturity of particular loans
is weighted by the ratio of those loans within the portfolio. The for-
mula above is calculated for each business unit and for each rating
category regarding losses characteristic for the business unit and
probability of default characteristic for the given rating category. Ba-
sically, a matrix is drawn up where the categories created according
to the probability of default are shown in the rows and the default loss
categories characteristic for industries are shown in the columns.
The expected loan loss, the basis of provisioning, is specified for
each cell in the matrix and is reviewed monthly.
Provisioning contin-
ues to be unstable
The provisioning is based on forward-looking and expected
losses – nevertheless, it does not take into account the development
of the business cycle. This is in part the reason that the development
of provisions continues to be cyclical at this Australian bank.
The provisioning sys-




There is less detailed information available for Australia and
New Zealand Banking Group Limited. On the basis of data available
the bank generates a new provision category independent from the
specific and general provision called ‘Economic Loss Provision’
which indicates the yearly average expected loss of a loan portfolio
with a given risk rating throughout a business cycle. On the other
hand, specific provisions reflect identified losses, not expected
losses, similar to the previous bank.
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In the Australian model expected losses are covered with general
provisioning when entering the loan into the balance sheet (a spe-
cific provision may not yet be connected to a new loan since at that
time there is no possibility of delay or default and no losses to be
written off). In each individual case when the allocation of a specific
provision is required, this can be regarded as the realisation of ex-
pected losses, and the specific provisioning is transferred from the
general provision (thus, it does not influence the bank’s result). The
Spanish, however, generate specific and statistical provision with a
different accounting methodology, – they create them in parallel
with each other (not by transferring them from each other), in such
a manner that the aggregate amount of both provisions should cor-
respond with the preliminary estimates.
Loan category vs.
individual loans
In the case of the methodology illustrated by Australian exam-
ples expected losses within the term of maturity of specific, actual
loans are estimated, whereas in the Spanish model the expected loss
within a business cycle of a given loan category is recorded. At the
same time the stability of the product – face value * remaining dura-
tion analysed in the Australian model is obviously characteristic to
loan categories; therefore there is also a possibility in that case to
specify the ratio of longer-term losses of the category.
The Australian model is adjusted to the average maturity
of loans, thus a decline in the quality about 6–7 years later, even after
expiration, is not built into the price of loans. If the correction de-
pending on the state of the economy is proper, this methodology fos-
ters an increase in loans at the beginning of the boom and restrains
lending at the peak of the boom. In the last years of the boom it en-
courages banks to consider the quality of the loans on the basis
of the approaching economic recession. For this reason – in contrast
with the Spanish model – this method does not have a smoothing
effect on results, but the fluctuation in the results due to the rapid
changes in provisioning will, however, be dampened.
The proportion of provisions to total assets is constant in
the case of the Spanish model, thus it does not follow necessarily
changes in actual expected losses.
Difficulty associated
with correction for ac-
tual risk
One advantage and disadvantage of the Spanish model is that
once the ratio of provisioning through the cycle is defined, it is not
necessary to modify the values according to the changes in the ac-
tual business cycle. In this case, however, it is difficult to make cor-
rections.
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he differences in the examples clearly show that there is no per-
fect method for revealing risks arising from shifts in systemic
risk. One of the principal reasons for that is, that there is no methodi-
cal solution which is able to model the deterioration of quality due to
the change in the business environment on the basis of an objective
approach. Definition of the characteristics of the future business en-
vironment is uncertain, and nor can it be taken for granted that the
shift in the business environment really causes the deterioration in
quality, which was expected. However, in terms of theoretical con-
siderations and historical lessons it is clear that lending during eco-
nomic upturns which are to be regarded as temporary should be
evaluated much more cautiously and that this state of the economy
should not be regarded as a long-term situation.
To distinguish business trend and cycle, the output gap may
function as a suitable indicator, showing to what extent the perfor-
mance of the economy diverges from the value of the trend, from the
potentially expected performance. Divergence should be regarded in
any case as a temporary phenomenon, since the economy may not
deviate from its potential performance over the long run. Thus, a pe-
riod with a positive output gap involves a higher credit risk than is
shown by methods indicating permanence in the state of the econ-
omy. In order to correct this fact a methodology is needed which in-
dicates a lower correction if the positive output gap is lower and a
higher one if the gap is higher.
The consequences of recording expected losses as a provision,
also considering the trend of systemic risk, are shown in the table be-
low.
Corrections differing
in terms of methodol-
ogy and size
The examples of regulation methods differ as to whether they
prefer the correction of risk factors determining the expected losses
or they correct the expected loss itself. There may also be deviations
in terms of the extent of the correction. There is a possibility for mi-
nor corrections, or for corrections which result in average values,
and it is also possible – such as in the case of the rating agencies – to
specify the worst scenario rating and the loss connected to this rat-
ing. However, all these methods only offer appropriate safety, if the
next recession does not turn out to be worse than assumed in the
negative scenario.
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The recommendation of the Australian supervisory authority
demonstrates the correction of certain risk factors and the expected
losses and also the Integrated Prudential Sourcebook, the new
collection of basic rules to be introduced by the FSA in 2005.
According to the concept of the British supervisory authority the
indicator of expected losses used for the calculation of capital
should be corrected according to the state of the business cycle – in
the case of increasing growth the correction would be less, in the




Lending booms, credit risk and the dynamic provisioning system
Table 3
Advantages of dynamic rovisioning Disadvantages of dynamic rovisioning
Ensures more precise coverage for actual
credit risks. It is based not on the perma-
nency of the present business situation but
itevaluatestheriskofloansandloancatego-
ries on the basis of future medium-term ex-
pectations.
The lack of data on previous cycles.
Changes in provisions provides information
on changes in the risks of the portfolio, and it
is connected first of all to new loans. It
informs about the risk of new loans already
at the beginning of the transaction, thus the
bank will have the chance not only for reac-
tive steps but it may decide in the phase of
lending, if it wants to undertake the risk or
not.
There is no methodology to specify charac-
teristics of a future cycle.
Part of the credit risk (expected loss) is indi-
cated in the books of the bank ex ante, from
the moment of occurrence. Thus the values
of the P L balance are more realistic and it
makes managers of the bank aware of the
presence of the credit risk in the medium
term.
On the one hand it ensures coverage for cer-
tainrisks,ontheother,however,itgenerates
new ones, i.e. the uncertainty of future
events. Mainly two uncertainties create sig-
nificant risks – first, whether the economy
develops as expected, second, if it has the
expected consequences in the deterioration
of quality (provisioning).
Dampening cycles in the ratio of provi-
sions/loan portfolio and thus it diminishes
fluctuation in the results of banks and con-
tributes to the stability of the banking sys-
tem.
The methodology allows long-term pro-
cesses and terms to be integrated into in the
system,butitishardtodecideinrealityifthe
trend has changed or, instead, a new cycle
has started.
Information and methods used in dynamic
provisioning may be helpful for pricing loans
and calculations of capital requirements as
well.
Banks estimate their expected losses using
their internal models, thus they have the
chance to smooth their profit too, making
evaluation of banks more complicated.
It applies a mechanism, which makes banks
to deal with problems of the future even in
the period of growth.




not an absolute disadvantage since higher
costs mean that higher risks are really ob-
served.
16 Stephenson (2001)In accordance with
Basel 2 – capital re-
quirements for
expected losses
Instead of provisioning, the stress has been shifted to the defini-
tion of capital requirements, following the new concept formulated in
the New Basel Capital Accord. Basel 2 namely prescribes a capital
requirement to cover expected losses as well, modifying the old sys-
tem, where the purpose of the provision was to cover expected
losses, whereas that of the capital to cover unexpected losses.
If the risk factors are specified not by corrections but by the av-
erage value characteristic for the loan risk category throughout
a whole cycle, the results are similar to that of the Spanish model.
The method based on average loss values (trends) are preferred
by regulators since there is a possibility of using historical data as
a minimum requirement and using objective requirements, despite




The New Basel Capital Accord tries to eliminate the expected
fluctuation arising from the annual forecast periods of risk by fixing
the ratio of loss given defaults to loans (Foundation Approach), or it
requires taking into consideration a 7-year data series. However, for
the time being it has no suggestions for which method and what
weights data should be taken into consideration, although the expla-
nations to the length of the series indicate the consideration of aver-
age values. According to the explanations seven years are needed
for default loss data since this allows fluctuations due to the business






Provisions based on expected losses are general provisions in the
case of the Spanish model since they are not connected with the
loan specified but only with the category and the portfolio as a
whole. In the Australian model the provision based on expected
losses is connected with an actual loan – according to the Australian
accounting system, however, it is not part of the specific provision
connected with individual loans since the creation of specific provi-
sion already means the identification of losses. Part of the general
provision representing expected losses, on the other hand, is not
part of the regulatory capital, since in the event of realisation of the
risk, a specific provision must be transferred from this provision.
Nevertheless, it seems that the Basel Committee insists on its
standpoint that in the future regulatory capital will also serve for the
coverage of expected losses expected, and the above-mentioned
problem may be solved by recording all general provisions among
capital elements.
132 NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARY
Lending booms, credit risk and the dynamic provisioning systemOCCASIONAL PAPERS 133
Lending booms, credit risk and the dynamic provisioning system
Table 4
Consequences of provisioning on the basis of expected losses
Provisioning based on expected losses In this case, irrespective of the different accounting methods, the
provision generated throughout the year is divided into a provision
based on expected losses and a provision based on unexpected
losses. The provision based on expected losses guarantees that
financial institutions are protected from volatilities of business
cycles.
Provisions created are higher in a cyclical upturn and lower in
recessioncomparedtothepresentsystem.Theextentofthedevia-
tion guarantees that the fluctuation of the provision/ loan portfolio
ratio will decline and follow a trend.
Pricing effect Practical experience show that provisions are included directly in
the price of loans, but that does not mean that the expected loss
characteristic for the risk category would be priced into the value of
the individual loan as well. If so, it might also happen that during an
upturn ceteris paribus the loan will be more expensive due to the
higherburdenoftheprovisions,andduringrecessionthelowerpro-
visions will not be reflected in lower prices.
Effect on results The fluctuation of results compared to the loan portfolio will dimin-
ish. Since provisioning according to loan quality is one of the items
oftheP Laccount,thefluctuationofwhichinfluencesthevolatility
oftheresultconsiderably,withthesmoothingofthissingleitemthe
fluctuation of the result will moderate. We had no assumptions re-
garding the movement of the other items (interest margin, over-
heads, etc.) so we may find only with the assumption that they are
constant that the result will be lower during an upturn and higher
during a recession compared to the previous system.
Effect on taxation In parallel with the effect on results it means less tax payment obli-
gation during an upturn and higher obligations during a recession
than in the traditional system. If the institution is profit making, on
the whole it will pay the same amount of taxes throughout a cycle,
whereas if it is loss making, only the tax smoothing effect will work.
If the development of lending really depends on the development of
the economy, the new provisioning system is more beneficial for
the state, since tax collection is smoothed and in a recession re-
ceipts are even higher than in the previous system. This is not unfa-
vourable for credit institutions since their provisioning, one of the
mostvolatileitemsoftheirresults,becomesindependentfromeco-
nomic cycles (the decline in the loan portfolio connected with a
recession worsens their position but the deterioration of the quality
of the former portfolio does not) and their tax burden becomes
more balanced as well.
Capital adequacy If the provisioning for expected losses cannot be part of the capital,
since it is generated from the result it influences the volume of the
capital as well. Through an upturn more provisions are generated,
thus banks will have less profit and worse capital adequacy ratio.
If they are not able to increase capital they must cut back lending
and so the overheated lending boom will moderate. In an opposite




lthough illustrated mainly using international examples, it is
trueevenforHungary,thatcurrentprudentialregulationsdonot
take into account the problem that fluctuations in the state of the
economy – independent of the depth of the financial intermediation
system – significantly influence banks’ lending activity and results.
At the same time this indicates a lack of medium-term risk aware-
nessbybanksandregulators.Thepurposeofthisstudyistosupport
the development of this awareness by focusing on the approach that
in evaluating credit risks the medium-term cyclical nature of the
economy should also be taken into consideration.
Provisioning changes
in line with the stock
of the different loan
categories
Following the overview of international regulatory examples
and recommendations, we focused on the regulation of dynamic
provisions, which were introduced in Spain and Portugal as manda-
tory regulations, in Australia as a recommendation. The aim of the
method is to guarantee that the value of provisions reflect ex ante the
expected future loss of the present portfolio which is to be recorded
by statistical means and that this is reflected properly in banks’ re-
sults as well. The use of this technique involves that the ratio of pro-
visions in the year under review be in line with the development of
the loan portfolio, due to the fact that from the moment the loan is
entered into the balance sheet of the bank, a provision is to be cre-
ated to cover the expected losses. Similarly, it follows the changes in
the structure of the loan portfolio too, since some individual loan cat-
egories (public sector, best-rated companies, or firms of industries
which are highly exposed to the development of the business cycles,
private loans, credit cards) belong to different risk categories. This is
what is meant by ‘dynamic’ provisioning.
Dynamic provisioning primarily uses the same definitions,
principles and risk factors as the Internal Ratings Based method pre-
sented in the New Basel Capital Accord.
17 The most important differ-
ence is that it uses the principles presented there to create provisions
for different loan categories extended for a longer time period and
possible turns of the trend are considered as well.
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17 Internal Ratings Based (IRB) method is a procedure of the new Basel capital adequacy recom-
mendations,whicharetobeintroducedinJanuary2005,inthecourseofwhichinstitutions(mainly
credit institutions) are allowed to use their own internal credit rating systems to define their mini-
mumcapitalrequirement.Withcertainregulatorylimitationstheprobabilityofdefaultestimatedby
credit institutions and loss given defaults determine the volume of the minimum capital.Taking account of
the gradual change
in the quality of loans
in parallel with busi-
ness cycles
Lack of data and
inaccuracy of mea-
surements
While dynamic provisioning is not able to prevent crises arising
from unexpected shocks characteristic for developing economies
(e.g. the Asian currency crisis or the financial and capital market cri-
sis in Russia), it is much more capable following the gradual change
in the quality of loans in parallel with business cycles, which is a phe-
nomenon characteristic of developed countries. Its widespread
use is hindered by limits which are well familiar from risk manage-
ment models. There is no model available, which is able to estimate
the expected losses and the development of business cycles over the
longer term objectively and with adequate accuracy. Most of the
models are not able to look forward for more than one year – the rea-
son for this is mainly the lack of data and the inaccuracy of measure-
ments arising from the longer time period. Only limited data are
available on losses in previous cycles and at the same time it is much
more complicated to evaluate the characteristics of future cycles.
There is no best regu-
latory practice
In the course of the analyses of practical regulations it became
clear that present solutions to the problems raised are not to be re-
garded as optimal regulatory reactions for many reasons, and the
‘best regulatory practice’ is – for the time being – not available.
The recommendation
is to specify expected
losses while taking
account of the trend
of the economy and
the particular sector
of industry
In the absence of a suitable methodology, for the moment, the
scope of the regulatory instruments is limited to the definition of ex-
pected losses as precisely as possible – and to fostering risk aware-
ness. In evaluating future losses it should be investigated whether or
not the present state of the economy is stable, and the individual risk
of the debtor should be evaluated on the basis of the trend values of
the economy (and if possible of the industry).
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